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ABSTRACT 
In a multi-disciplinary discussion that includes major contribution 
from sociology, economics, environmental sciences, ecophilosophy 
and management theory, I outline transitions towards, and the style 
and practice of eco-sensitive management. Eco-sensitivity means the 
presence of eco-centric values together with the ability to put these 
into practice. The argument proceeds in two sections. 
In the first the deep roots of industrial exploitation of the natural 
world are established. In chapter one industrial capitalism is 
discussed while chapter two outlines the moves towards what I 
have called 're-organised capitalism'. As is pointed out in chapter 
three, whilst both systems involve exploitation of the natural world, 
there are indications within re-organised capitalism of an 
opportunity to 'turn around' the juggernaut of exploitative 
expansionary capitalism and adopt more eco-sensitive approaches. 
Business organisations, now entering a period of yet greater 
influence on world affairs, are a key to this, but as I point out in 
chapter four, in striving to become more eco-sensitive they must 
deal with the complex structures of the natural world, a point made 
by an examination of biodiversity. 
In the second section the shape of eco-sensitive management is 
outlined. In chapter five important transitions in the 'world view' 
of organisations are discussed; they must become less 
anthropocentric, adopt holistic thinking practices and use the notion 
of 'risk for nature' instead of financial risk. They will also use 'new 
science' and ecological economics, sets of ideas developed and 
discussed in chapter six. Incrementalist and learning based models of 
strategic planning and an eco-centred scenario based planning style 
that is used in conjunction with systems thinking are discussed in 
chapters seven and eight. An organisation structure suitable for eco-
organisations and an eco-leadership style are elaborated on in 
chapter nine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The broad argument in this thesis is that business organisations in 
the dawning world of what is herein called re-organised capitalism 
are under pressure to become more actively concerned about their 
impact on the natural world. They must become more eco-sensitive 
which means that they combine eco-centric values together with the 
ability to put these into practice. 
This is a multi-disciplinary discussion with major contributions 
from sociology, economics, environmental science, ecophilosophy 
and management theory. The argument is integrated and issue 
focused. It therefore does not seek to answer the challenges of a 
single discipline oriented approach but to use the insights from a 
variety of sources to further the argument. Answers are arrived at in 
a discussion of theory chosen from European, North American and 
Australian writings, integrated into a coherent whole. 
This represents a variation on much conventional academic 
writing, one justified by the fact that globally sourced 
multidisciplinarity is the only way to answer the fundamental 
questions raised: 
• what are the roots of industrial exploitation of the natural 
world? 
• How has the industrial system changed, and how do these 
changes provide an opportunity for a re-orientation of the 
approach of business organisations to nature? Assuming 
these opportunities exist, what challenges are posed by the 
complexity of the natural world? 
• What is the shape of eco-sensitive management that can 
answer such challenges? 
• What are the transitions that have taken place towards this 
eco-sensitivity? 
Discussion is divided into two sections with part A considering the 
first three sets of issues and part B the last two. Part A effectively 
poses the problem and establishes the deep rooted nature of 
industrial exploitation of the natural world and part B points the 
way towards solutions. The introduction to part A follows, and that 
to part B is presented from pages 139 to 153. 
What follows is limited only in that basic reading finished in 
September 1995. Otherwise, to use Isaac Newton's terms, (but 
without claiming his eminence), I have 'stood on the shoulders of 
giants' to reach the conclusions presented in the following 
discussion. The argument is ecologically optimistic but cautious, to 
paraphrase Simon Schama (1995:19), it is a journey through ideas, 
eyes wide open, that may help us keep faith with a future on this 
tough, lovely old planet. 
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Part A includes four chapters. The aim of the first is to present an 
overview of the process of modernisation and industrialisation, and 
their results, leading to a summary of their impact on the natural 
world. One basic theme within the narrative is that business 
organisations have been (and remain) active agents for change in 
the modernisation process which transformed the 'Western World' 
and continues to exert significant influence both there and in 
elements of the 'Third World' that are still industrialising. Another 
is that the expansionary system of modern capitalism is 
overwhelmingly negative in its impact on nature and that the 
complex systems of production, state control, science and business 
activity are inter-related in a culture which legitimates this impact. 
This broad conclusion is important for later argument in which the 
complexities involved in establishing and operating eco-sensitive 
organisations in opposition to this culture are discussed. 
Chapter two examines the work of the range of commentators since 
the 1960s who have detected major changes within the systems of 
modern industrial capitalism, with the suggestion that these 
changes were evident by the mid 1960s (see Harvey 1989:141). 
However, as the discussion indicates, there are important 
disagreements between them on a range of matters: the reasons for 
this change; whether it amounts to a new form of modernism (late 
modernism can serve as a summary term) or 'post modernism'; 
whether it is a new form of capitalism or a gradual disorganisation 
of capitalism; whether it represents a real discontinuity or an 
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extension of existing patterns. There remains a consensus that 
important changes to the modern world have taken place, and these 
will be described in a discussion with three parts. 
The first part of chapter two called 'Theories of Change', presents 
various theoretical views of these changes. Theorists discussed, 
basically presented in line with the year of their major contributing 
publication in order to facilitate development of the analysis, 
include Drucker (1969), Bell (1973), Lash and Urry (1987), Harvey 
(1989), Crook, Pakulski and Waters (1992), all of whom deal with 
change in a general fashion, and then Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990, 
1991), whose contributions to the discussion are more specifically 
eco-centric. This part of the discussion is also important because 
some of the analytical tools and perspectives presented by these 
theorists will be used in later discussion. 
The second part, 'Re-organised Capitalism in the 1990s', draws the 
analyses together, and updates the discussion by referring to 
important changes in key areas that have taken place in the late 
1980s and 1990s. The following elements of change are discussed: 
knowledge and services; a global finance system; mass marketing; 
increased power of information; computers and flexible 
manufacturing; the nation state, trade blocs, and renaissance of the 
market philosophy; changes to the pattern of core nations; business 
alliances and smaller firms; trans-national corporations; and the 
individual in re-organised capitalism. 
The third part of chapter two contains concluding comments, and 
brings elements of the previous two sections together. 
There are three parts to chapter three. In the first, which I call 'The 
Negatives', the problems of the natural world in re-organised 
capitalism are analysed, with separate discussion of macro and meso 
4 
Introduction to Part A 
level problems. In the second, 'The Positives', elements of change in 
re-organised capitalism that offer hope for the natural world are 
analysed with separate discussion of the role of global environment 
agreements, the growth in community concern for the 
environment, and changes in business attitudes and practices in 
environmental matters. 
Discussion concludes with 'The Way Forward', in which an 
argument is developed that business, with help from government, 
scientists and other experts, can become an increasingly positive 
force for the preservation of the natural world, particularly at the 
meso level, but ultimately at the macro level too. 
Chapter four examines biodiversity, used as an example of the 
complexity of the natural world with which organisations striving 
to become more eco-sensitive must deal. The broad conclusion here 
is that biodiversity, whilst a fundamental aspect of the natural 
world, is little researched, poorly understood and perhaps 
unknowable. 
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MODERNISATION, ORGANISATIONS, AND 
THE NATURAL WORLD 
Processes of Modernisation 
Western societies began to modernise with the onset of the 
industrial revolution, which dates from the end of the eighteenth 
century. The processes that make up modernisation are best 
described with reference to the writings of classic sociology, itself a 
discipline born out of a struggle to understand the social and 
economic effects of the industrial revolution. Using major 
sociological traditions, Crook, Pakulski and Waters (1992) identify 
three dynamic principles underlying modernisation: differentiation, 
which they locate in the Durkheim tradition but is fundamental to 
all analyses of modern change; commodification, which is best 
understood in terms of the Marxist tradition; and rationalisation, 
analysis of which is central to Weber's work. 
Differentiation is conventionally seen as fundamental to the 
modern experience, not only in Durkheim's work, but in 
functionalist theories of social change (see Parsons, Bales and Shils 
1953; Smelser 1968), a range of Marxist writings (Braverman 1974), 
and new organisation theory (see Clegg 1992). The concept focuses 
attention on the way that units of social structure, including 
institutions, groups of people, occupations, positions and tasks, 
become ever more specialised and therefore inter-dependent with 
industrialisation and related processes of modernisation. The 
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sociological tradition also draws attention to the various units 
specialising in the resultant processes of social integration; for 
example state agencies and trade unions which, Smelser (1968) 
points out, are necessary to ensure that functions essential for the 
maintenance of society such as socialisation are performed. The 
social fabric is also drawn together by values and ideologies that 
legitimate this social structure. Related to differentiation is a 
tendency to use language to divide the world into many categories, 
since a differentiated world requires precise tools for conceptual 
analysis and communication. 
Division of labour is a key differentiating process and, as Clegg (1992) 
argues, it has been presented in the sociological tradition as a core 
element of the modern experience, and also as the key moral 
question which prompted Marx's analysis of the inhumanity of 
industrial labour, and Durkheim's account of the difficulties of 
retaining a coherent identity in a world which requires ever more 
and ever narrower social relationships. 
In Marxist theory the process of commodification is one in which 
the products of human labour and that labour itself are turned into 
commodities that are sold in the market for profit. Ultimately they 
receive a significance previously given to aspects of religion and 
Marx therefore suggested that modern culture was subject to 
'commodity fetishism'. The process is powerful and new 'use values' 
are created via manipulation of demand in advertising and the mass 
media, so that elements of cultural and personal life previously 
qualitatively different to exchange commodities are turned into 
goods that can be traded in the markets. Art, music and the natural 
world are packaged for the market and sold; previously mundane 
objects are turned into objects for the art market (for example 
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Georgian shoe buckles became a solid investment) unusual trees are 
fenced, paths cut, and tourists charged for a view; and ideas become 
powerful objects for trade. 
The essence of modern (capitalist) society, according to Weber, is 
rationality, through which market transactions take place, 
unconstrained by tradition or sentiment or by 'obligations of 
brotherliness or reverence' (Brubaker 1984:10). The concept was 
multi-faceted in Weber's analysis, so each major component of 
Western social order had its own specific mode of rationality, and 
each of industrial capitalism, law, and bureaucratic administration 
reflect rationality differently. Brubaker's (1984) analysis of the 
thematic strands that 'weave together the various aspects of Weber's 
conception of the unique rationality of modern society' serves to 
indicate some lines of thought that are extremely useful for this 
discussion. 
The first of these is knowledge. To act rationally is to act on the basis 
of knowledge. This is true for all societies to a large extent, but in 
modern western society the rise of science and technology gives 
knowledge a new significance, and the development and complexity 
of technology and bureaucracy lead to ever increasing demands for 
specialised knowledge. This is related to a displacement of magical 
and religious world views, and induces the idea that all things can 
be mastered by calculation (Brubaker 1984:31). In this knowledge 
society the specialised expert displaces the cultivated man, everyday 
life has a rational feel, and the natural and social world are subjects 
of a continual search for means of quantification, perhaps best seen 
in econometrics, the branch of economics in which the world is 
reduced to numbers conducive to calculation. 
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The second is impersonality, in which personal sources of power are 
replaced by objectified and depersonalised power and authority. 
Market transactions are impersonal, and transgressions of the 
impersonal laws of the market place entails economic failure and, in 
the long run, economic ruin (Brubaker 1984:32). Political authority 
also becomes impersonal and legal authority and bureaucracy 
operate via formal rules which are enforced without regard for 
individual differences. The world of work is also affected; in 
Weber's vision man works 'sheerly in accordance with the 
impersonal duty imposed by his calling and not as a result of any 
concrete personal relationship' (Weber, quoted in Brubaker 1984:37). 
The third is control. Rational knowledge, regulations specifying the 
actions of people working in capitalist firms and bureaucratic 
administrative organisations, and the embedding of scientific 
knowledge within practical activities, dramatically extend the degree 
to which man and nature can be controlled. Social relationships 
become part of the processes of administration as individuals are 
reduced to the function they perform, and their world is subject to 
calculation. Weber's modern industrial capitalism 'depends upon 
the possibility of correct calculations. This is true the more capital-
intensive industrial capitalism is, and especially the more saturated 
it is with fixed capital. Industrial capitalism must be able to count on 
the continuity, trustworthiness and objectivity of the legal order, 
and on the rational, predictable functioning of legal and 
administrative agencies' (Weber 1961:1095). 
These themes draw together Weber's analysis of the transformation 
of social institutions. Capitalism in ideal typical form is based on the 
rational calculation of the market and operates from deliberate and 
calculating self-interest free from any traditional constraints or the 
influence of feeling, as bureaucratically organised enterprises 
exercise precise control over human and non-human means of 
9 
Chapter One 
production. The legal system is also formal and uses legal rules to 
solve disputes, to set up the structure within which the contract 
system essential for market operation can, co-operate, and to protect 
property. Administration is increasingly and inevitably bureaucratic 
and mechanically efficient and given to codified technical rules to 
make decisions. The labour force operates with rationality stemming 
from the 'worldly asceticism' generated in the Reformation, which 
renders it hard-working and self-controlled and committed to the 
duty of work. 
In his analysis Weber also makes use of a contrast between formal 
and substantive rationality, where the former is a matter of fact and 
applies to the calculability of means and procedures, and the latter is 
inherently evaluative and compares ends or results with some 
standard rather than with actions. The rationality at the core of 
capitalism and bureaucracy and in puritan asceticism is purely 
formal but the results may be substantively irrational; the two exist 
in tension. The legal system is formally rational but does not 
produce substantive justice (Weber 1961:229-220), the formally 
rational commitment to duty and self-control by labour does not 
produce the substantive rationality of happiness, and in Weber's 
most quoted statement, formally rational bureaucracy becomes an 
'iron cage'. 
Differentiation, commodification and rationalisation are closely 
related in their impacts on society, and intertwine as they transform 
relatively disorganised pre-modern into systematically organised 
modern society. In the next section some major outcomes of the 
process are described. They include the establishment of the 
capitalist modes of production which are associated with 
'globalisation' and with growth of a world market; the emergence of 
the modern state; and the triumph of 'big science', which assists in 
the technological advances that facilitate domination over nature. 
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The role of organisations and organisation theory in the modern 
world, the general impact of modernisation on the natural 
environment, and the modern mind (modern patterns of thought) 
are then briefly considered, since all three are of special interest to 
the current project. 
Capitalist Production 
The feudal system which dominated the western world before the 
Industrial Revolution was based on obedience to established 
authority, intimate personal relationships, and a powerful religious 
tradition. This was a system which had a relatively benign effect on 
the natural world and in which people used simple technologies to 
produce food and products for personal consumption and mainly 
local trade while living to schedules set by the sun and seasons. 
Knowledge, though in some ways profound, was limited in scope, 
and it was possible for an individual to be up to date with almost all 
of the important intellectual developments of the time, as for 
example, Francis Bacon was in his day. It is easy to overstate the 
steadiness of feudal society; like all systems it was subject to constant 
changes in technology (Gimpel 1979) and culture. The pattern was, 
however, basically that of a stable society. 
A major contribution to the Industrial Revolution came with 
mercantilism, a system of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
which featured merchant traders from Britain and the Low 
Countries establishing flourishing overseas trading empires. The 
early 'commercial capitalism' which succeeded mercantilism 
featured simple industrial technologies and an increasingly 
sophisticated market. These technologies enabled small factories and 
mechanised craft industries to become established, and the markets 
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allowed products to be readily traded. Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations, published in 1776, the same year as the American 
Revolution and Watts' perfected steam engine, describes this system 
in considerable detail. By this time society had moved towards one 
in which individuals strove for material gain and materially located 
status, in direct contrast to the basic pattern of earlier sodety. Smith 
suggested an entire society could be co-ordinated via the market, 
whose 'invisable hand' would ensure optimal allocation of goods, 
and thereby started an argument which has continued for more than 
two centuries. 
The next stage, one of 'industrial capitalism', was associated with the 
impact of a range of new technologies which increased output 
dramatically. For example in the British cotton industry the 
spinning jenny (1770), the water frame (1773), the mule (1779), the 
power loom (1785), and the use of steam power (1785) meant output 
increased a hundred fold (Jones 1968:24). New technologies also 
implied major changes in the size of the work force in 
manufacturing operations; Smith's famous pin factory had only 10 
workers, but by the middle of the nineteenth century the standard 
textile mill had several hundred, steel mills several thousand, and 
Brunel's railway gangs tens of thousands. In the coming decades of 
industrial capitalism these workers tended to be poorly paid, and 
they also worked in poor conditions for long hours and lived in 
degraded social conditions in fast growing urban areas. They were 
increasingly under the control of a management class which directed 
operations on behalf of the owners of capital. In this phase, too, the 
capacity to exploit the natural environment increased with 
technological efficiency and huge increases in productivity and total 
output, and a market logic of constant expansion of output was 
firmly established. 
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In its essential features this model of capitalism continued to operate 
at least until the early 1970's, by which time it could aptly be called 
'organised capitalism'. Its initial flowering came with the 
introduction of electricity-based technology in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, which massively increased production 
capacity and revolutionised social life generally and the pattern of 
domestic life in particular, and was associated with the efficiency of 
'Fordism'. Henry Ford achieved dramatic gains in industrial output 
by automating production using a combination of existing 
technologies and 'scientific management'. This was the system of 
management theorist Frederick Taylor and included scientific 
selection of workers and application of knowledge to work in order 
to develop the 'one best way' to complete a task. Assuming close 
supervision of workers, this system (allied to new technology) 
ensured major increases in productivity so that the potential supply 
of industrial commodities could expand far beyond previous limits. 
Ford believed in a corporate led society, one in which major 
businesses regulated the economy as a whole, and also in the eight-
hour five day week for a disciplined work force whose income rose 
as productivity increased, thus allowing them to consume in the 
expanding market. 
This form of capitalist society was never established in its pure form, 
though the mass production/high output and scientific 
management aspects of his system were quickly pushed into 
industrial life as industrialised nations organised themselves to 
meet the mass production requirements of the First World War. 
State power also developed then, as it did in the Great Depression of 
the 1930s when governments expanded capacity for economic 
control through implementation of Keynesian ideas of economic 
manipulation. It was developed further still in the Second World 
War, which was ultimately won by the USA dominated allies 
13 
Chapter One 
because of the relative efficiency of their state co-ordinated factories. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, then, the links between 
industry, state (and broader political system), science, technology, 
culture and labour became ever more complex. Harvey suggests that 
this multi-linked system was not brought 'to maturity as a fully 
fledged and distinctive regime of accumulation' until 1945, but that 
it then formed the basis for a long post-war boom that lasted until 
1973 (Harvey 1989:128). Habermas' (1971) analysis extends beyond the 
outside lineaments of these complex linkages between institutions, 
and in an influential critique he suggests that the life world 
(everyday life) is 'colonised' by state administration, and that 
communication and possibilities for 'communicative action' are 
eliminated. The linkages between the state, capitalism and organised 
labour that concerned Habermas yield the term 'organised 
capitalism', a term suggestive of both its inherent order, and its 
ability to control individuals living within capitalist states. 
There are many variations on this model of organised (or mature) 
industrial capitalism, particularly given its global spread in the late 
nineteenth century and twentieth century, but all share a number of 
basic features. 
Firstly, they are all expansionary. Industrial economies must grow in 
order to accumulate the surplus necessary for development of 
infrastructure, distribution of wages and benefits to workers, and 
purchases of the new technology which ensure further success in a 
competitive business environment. This final point implies the 
very logic of industrial capitalism. Firms and states must compete in 
order to survive, and the only way to ensure that competitive 
advantage is maintained is to be growth oriented. Such expansion 
can be geographical (with local, national or international expansion); 
social, as new markets are opened up with associated processes of 
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commodification (for example selling care for the aged, or collectors' 
edition bottle tops); or technological, as businesses harness 
knowledge to develop entirely new products (Wallace 1990:2). 
Expansion is supported by an ideology which suggests that growth is 
good. In conventional economics (the discipline which seeks to 
explain, and is legitimated by, industrial capitalism) a 'recession' in 
an economy is defined in terms of lack of growth, a 'depression' in 
terms of a consistent pattern of lack of growth, and both are related 
to rising unemployment and under-employment in the economy as 
businesses strive to maintain profitability by laying off or not 
employing new workers. In the common representative democracy 
form of mature capitalism this creates political problems and further 
fuels policies designed to encourage growth. As Harvey (1989:180) 
notes: 'This implies capitalism has to prepare the ground for, and 
actually achieve an expansional output and a growth in real values, 
no matter what the social, political, geopolitical or ecological 
consequences'. 
The second related feature is that industrial capitalism is 
technologically dynamic. The logic of competition requires constant 
changes to technology which lead to increased productivity in order 
to retain competitive advantage, which provides impetus for links 
to scientific institutions, which provides a motive for the funding of 
Research and Development, and which therefore relies on 
accumulating economic surpluses that facilitate this expensive 
process. 
The third feature is that the system requires control over labour 
which must be co-ordinated in order that production can take place. 
In Marxist terms this means exploitation of labour and a separation 
between labour and capital, with all the dynamics of class struggle. In 
the language of new rationalists it means co-operative arrangements 
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between managers and workers, many of whom will be part owners 
of capital, but in either case some labour co-ordination is required. 
The terms used to describe the fundamental functions of managers 
and which are used to organise almost all basic management texts 
(see for example Bateman and Zeithaml 1993) are evocative. Based 
on Fayol's (1949) work (stemming from his working life as a mining 
engineer in France), they are 'planning', 'organising and staffing', 
'leading', and 'controlling'. All are predicated on the assumption of 
control of labour by management. 
The fourth feature is that capitalist growth is uneven, in both a 
geographical and temporal sense. Geographical unevenness refers to 
different levels of economic development in different areas, both 
within states and between them. Temporal unevenness refers to the 
cycles of growth and recession which characterise capitalism and are 
a major focus of economics and economic history. Until the 1930s 
neo-classical economists believed that the economy would naturally 
right itself from periodic declines but that the overall tendency was 
towards growth. The world-wide Great Depression of the 1930s 
shook this belief and led Keynes (1936) to his general theory which 
suggests how governments can even out the impact of the cycles by 
manipulation of their economies, and as already discussed, this 
indirectly led to an increase in state control in free enterprise 
nations. Kondratieff's theory of 'long waves', which is an influential 
attempt to plot the overall pattern of these cycles, suggests that such 
cycles are inevitable, although there is still fierce debate about the 
factors determining them. 
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Globalisation 
By 1973, the time of the global depression which is commonly taken 
as the final flowering of mature capitalism, the world was already an 
interdependent system. People have always traded, societies have 
always been interdependent to a certain extent, but for most of 
recorded history almost all people were engaged in subsistence 
agriculture in relatively self-sufficient communities. Economies 
based on production and trade however, only emerged with 
industrial capitalism. 
A useful modern attempt to understand the process is Wallerstein's 
world systems theory (1976). He starts by initially distinguishing 
between localised and self-sufficient or 'traditional' societies which 
are not part of a geographically extensive system, and world systems 
'defined by the fact their self-containment as an economic-material 
entity is based on extensive division of labour and that they contain 
within them a multiplicity of cultures' (1976:230). There are two 
types of world systems. The first controls politically the entire area 
within its boundaries, as was the case, for example, with the Roman 
Empire, which was a 'world empire'. The second is a 'world 
economy' which operates in an area larger than a political entity can 
control, for example the capitalist economic system within which 
capitalist economic organisations such as trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) have relative freedom to manoeuvre 
(1976:230). Within the capitalist world economy there are 'core 
states' which have dominance, and these include the countries 
which first industrialised, with some semi-peripheral states which 
are linked to the core by trade, but in a dependent way, and a 
'periphery' trading in simple goods. That part of the world that was 
not part of this system was 'external', and before industrialisation it 
included most of what is now the less developed world, which was 
drawn into the periphery via colonialism and the activities of TNCs, 
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carrying with it the trappings of modernist thinking, organisation 
structure, market oriented culture, and an instrumental attitude 
towards the natural world. 
Capitalist-led globalisation started with mercantilism, which was a 
system based on trade, or rather upon the massive plunder of new-
world valuables and the development of a slave labour system, 
processes which allowed the West to establish dominance. Business 
organisations were of critical importance in these processes. Acting 
with the protection of nation-states they were the agents of change 
which carried modernist culture to the periphery and actually gave 
effect to colonialist economic policy, as early critics of the process 
such as Hobson (1902, reprinted 1965) and Lenin (see Giddens 
1989:530) recognised. The integration of the world economy was well 
developed by the time of the First World War, most of Africa and 
South America and large sections of Asia having been drawn into 
the periphery or semi-periphery, either by colonisation or the setting 
up of trade patterns which favoured the industrialised nations. 
World War II saw another surge of integration as much of the world 
was linked in the effort of war, and even more so in the national 
economic restructuring that followed. 
Trans-national corporations were always important in the 
globalisation process but became particularly so after World War II 
when the reconstruction of Europe and Japan led to the 
development of large uni-national companies that then sought 
overseas markets and sites for their products and production. These 
added to existing activities by American and British Corporations so 
that more core nations were involved. This concentration in the 
core is evident in figures that show that 96.8 per cent of world 
foreign investment in 1978 came from companies with bases in the 
eleven most highly developed countries (Ghertman and Allen 
1984:14). Much of this investment was in other core nations; in fact 
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after World War II multi-nationals invested more in each other and 
less in the developing nations of the periphery, but the pattern of 
globalisation and the role of companies in its spread, was well set by 
this time. 
This pattern was (and largely remains) one with a rich North of the 
globe, and a poor South, and whilst it is easy for those living in the 
North to see this as an inevitable pattern, it was directly the result of 
the spread of capitalism. Richard Peet's summary of the process 
makes this clear : 
Capitalism was made possible by the raiding of stored wealth, the 
reorientation of trade routes, the imposition of unequal exchange, the 
forceful movement of millions of people in world space, and the 
conversion of the people and territories of whole continents into 
colonies where all aspects of existence were subject to the purposes of 
the Europeans. The term Third World' thus came to signify a spatial 
sequence of societies characterised by monoculture where previously 
diversity had prevailed, economies declining through disinvestment 
because indigenous surplus was captured by the European centre, and 
low productivity where craft skills had previously been common. The 
poverty of the Third World is not natural, inevitable or even 
historically typical. Instead the dependency school's thesis of the 
development of under-development proves a highly generalised yet 
accurate appraisal of the effects of the expansion of Euro-American 
capitalism on the rest of the world's societies (Peet 1991:145). 
The State 
The development of capitalism was partly preceded by and then 
associated with the development of the modern industrial state. 
Crook et al. summarise the related processes involved: 
The emergence of the modern industrial state in the late nineteenth 
century involved a set of related processes: the unification and 
centralisation of power centres which overcame the resistance of 
formerly independent corporate bodies; the autonomisation of State 
power, so that it rested on an internal principle of sovereignty rather 
than being derived from tradition or from 'external' sources; a 
broadening of the political community and popular support, achieved 
by an extension of suffrage and constitutional reform; the development 
of state-national symbols (flags, anthems, a national language, etc.) 
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which increased the popular legitimacy of the state; and the 
activisation of the state, so that the domain of its legitimate 
intervention extended beyond military and the law and order 
functions, especially to fiscal reform. (Crook et al. 1992:19) 
These changes were associated with the development of business 
organisations and a tremendous growth in the size of the formally 
rational central bureaucracies that co-ordinated an interventionist 
and active modern state which, among many other activities, 
controlled the economy and the legal system, administered the 
collection of taxes and redistribution of income, and funded the 
operation of major institutions such as education, law and order and 
scientific research. 
By the middle of the twentieth century three main types of state 
were evident. In ideal typical form these were the Western 
European corporatist state, the relatively free enterprise pattern of 
the USA, and the centralised pattern of the Soviet Bloc. 
Corporatism developed gradually, pushed on by such things as the 
two World Wars, which required that all states involved be at least 
briefly corporatist, and the Great Depression. As we have already 
seen, this led to the insights of Keynesian economics that suggested 
that there must be significant government intervention in the 
economy if period crises are to be avoided. The corporatist state 
features a concentration of power in a large bureaucracy which plans 
and co-ordinates almost all economic and social activities. It also 
regulates private business, operates major government businesses, 
operates a comprehensive welfare program, and the state has 
arrangements with organised labour that lead to wage control, all of 
which is legitimated by carefully organised and orderly 
representative bodies. 
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The relatively free enterprise model of the USA involves less 
organisation; a smaller bureaucracy, insignificant bodies of organised 
labour, few government businesses, less central planning than in a 
corporatist state, a more powerful business sector, and a legislature 
more obviously subject to lobbying by interest groups. 
The industrial states of the Soviet Bloc featured centrally planned, 
largely government-owned economies, large bureaucracies, and the 
theoretically total control of labour by the state. The state was 
effectively controlled by an elite of top party officials, bureaucrats 
and military officers. 
Science 
Modern science is the product of 250 years of change. From 1627 
when Francis Bacon's model of a scientific community New 
Atlantis was published, science changed from the dabbling of 
talented and genteel amateurs into an autonomous institutionalised 
system with close links to commercial and state interests. Modern 
science is the very model of a formally rational process featuring 
orderly abstraction and structured research which builds ever more 
sophisticated explanations to existing research questions. 
Science institutionalised gradually as various scientific vocations 
developed and organised research systems grew, based in 
universities and in government and military establishments. 
Modern 'big science', to use de Solla Price's (1963) popular term, is 
large-scale, wide in its interests and employs thousands of people; de 
Solla Price calculated that 90 per cent of scientists who had ever 
lived were alive in the 1960s and that 90 per cent of all knowledge 
was the product of the previous 50 years. 
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In the modern era science also became highly differentiated, with 
continually multiplying disciplines and sub-disciplines pursuing 
their own increasingly differentiated research questions, often using 
specialised language inaccessible to the generally well-educated. 
Habermas (1971) argues that modern science, commodified and 
linked to industry interests, is a 'leading productive force', and this 
rather anti-science point of view was and remains relatively 
common, since it picks up on the established fact that scientific 
research is a very expensive process that is almost all funded by 
government and business. The ideology of science suggests that it is 
ultimately independent of such interests, but by the mid 1970s in 
particular and the massive funding of science by the US military-
industrial complex this autonomy was obviously under threat. 
The modern scientific view of the natural world is largely 
instrumental. It is there to be studied and its secrets unlocked (see 
Leiss 1974). Modern scientific truth is based on 'the ideas of 
deduction, induction, observation and experimentation welded 
together by the symbolic formalism of mathematics' (Casti 1989:21). 
It also takes an almost purely anthropocentric view of the world that 
legitimates what would normally be regarded as pathological cruelty 
towards animals in the name of scientific progress. 
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Business Organisations and Organisation Theory in the 
Modern World 
In pre-modernity organisations existed but occupations themselves 
provided most of the structure that was needed to control 
production, and the products themselves were continuous with the 
occupations; for example a career as an apprentice, then 
journeyman, then master was continuous and limited as were the 
products of this sequence of tasks grouped within the occupation of 
mason. In modern society, however, organisations have became 
central features of social structure. They provide important links 
between increasingly differentiated components of labour and are 
therefore the crucible for supervision and control of labour in both 
the public and private sectors. 
Industrialised capitalism favoured larger firms which could 
complete effectively using economies of scale, swallowing up 
competitors as they grew. As capitalism became more organised the 
trend to large companies accelerated, but with different patterns in 
each of the industrialised nations. In the United Kingdom the 
pattern has been well summarised by Hugh Thomas: 'This history of 
[Armstrong Vickers] ...one of Britain's largest firms is characteristic 
of the modern enterprise generally: an inspired founder, mergers, 
growth — and in the end, a government subsidy when the firm had 
become so big as to be of national importance' (Thomas 1981:403). In 
the USA the growth in corporation size was quick; 24 per cent of 
business was done by corporations in 1900, 52 per cent in 1939 
(Thomas 1981:464). In japan the links between business were closer 
(the Keiretsu system in which firms work together for long periods 
on the basis of mutual trust) as were links between business and the 
government, but the results were the same. Mitsui, Mitsubishi and 
many others had become major firms by the late nineteenth century, 
and after World War lithe breakup of the 'zaibatsu' conglomerates 
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which had been closely associated with the Japanese war effort 
actually assisted the growth of firms, as individual organisations, 
with assistance in re-organisation from the United States of 
America, quickly became corporate giants by efficiently exploiting 
developing technologies. 
Large corporations, organised bureaucratically and operating with 
modernist formal planning processes that assumed a relatively 
stable resource base, product and markets, prospered in the first sixty 
years of the twentieth century. Their assumptions were, in fact, a 
model of rational modernist thinking, and conventional 
organisation theory that seeks to describe them is accordingly 'in 
many respects a modernist discipline par excellence' (Clegg 1992:4), 
with the fundamental contribution coming from Weber's 
pessimistic vision of bureaucratic organisations and many other 
theories which represent organisations in various terms (Morgan 
1986 presents a good coverage of theories). Modernist analyses of 
organisations share a vision of organisations as socially bounded 
units with 'internal' and external environments and which have 
highly specific impacts on the world. In Fordist form the modern 
organisation is classically bureaucratic, featuring unity of command 
in a hierarchal pyramid of control and clear lines of communication 
between clearly distinguished 'divisions'. Employment is based on 
credentials gained through special training and promotion based on 
these credentials — which in the USA tradition may involve formal 
training in the 'science of management' — and performance on the 
job is usually measured against specified objectives. The modern 
organisation also features and formalises the greatest degree of job 
differentiation possible in the particular area of work. Decision 
making in such an organisation is formally rational featuring, as 
introductory management texts describe, about seven separate steps 
from problem identification through to implementation of a 
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selected alternative (see for example Robbins 1994:ch.6; Bateman and 
Zeithaml 1993:ch.4; Schermerhorn 1995:ch.5). Basic beliefs of this 
tradition are that larger organisations must be bureaucratically 
organised and that organisation progress is assured with linear 
patterns of thinking and decision making. Such progress can be 
measured in terms of accounting numbers developed using 
accredited accounting conventions, and even impacts of 
organisations on the natural world can be measured using 
techniques developed within conventional neo-classical economics 
such as the travel-cost method and contingent valuation approach. 
This is a limited vision even within the formally rational modern 
tradition, as newer perspectives such as open systems theory and 
organisation patterns such as matrix configurations make dear, but 
it carries a core of truth for organisational arrangements in modern 
society. Assuming stable growth, relatively stable organisation 
environments and a cultural context which legitimates use of 
rational decision making and bureaucracy, the model described 
predominates in modern industrial society; there are boundaries 
around such organisations, it is possible to use formally rational 
decision making processes, there are identifiable impacts in the 
social and natural world, and it is possible to measure impact (and 
progress) relatively easily using available quantification. The 
substantive rationality of such processes is open to debate, but given 
an ideological position that legitimates growth as 'progress' such 
debate is still rare. Subsequent discussion of the organisation 
structure suitable for survival in a late or post-modern world will 
indicate further limitations and indicate areas of substantive 
irrationality, but for now it stands as an ideal typical representation 
of the modern organisation, one effective in a modern society and, 
given the continuing spread of modernisation world-wide, it 
continues to be an important model. 
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The Natural Environment 
All the processes of modernisation that have been discussed so far 
have contributed to environmental problems; indeed, the basic 
features of the capitalist system suggest environmental problems. 
Expansion requires natural resources, and is legitimated by a 'growth 
is good and necessary' ideology. Technological dynamism results in 
more efficient ways of exploiting the natural world — it can also lead 
to better ways of protecting it, but this is not part of the modernist 
project. The logics of competition and growth lead to short-term 
patterns in planning that result in reckless exploitation of resources 
by business organisations in pursuit of short-term profits. The links 
between the state, industry and science mean that science too is 
harnessed to further exploit the natural world. In sum, the process 
of modernisation is also a process of environmental exploitation. 
By 1970 the result was a perception, particularly in core nations, that 
the biosphere was in a state of crisis. It became apparent to many that 
for the first time the world's use of non-renewable as well as 
renewable resources had reached a point where the future of the 
human race was under question. This was not, of course, the first 
'eco-crisis'. For example, in the Mesopotamian basin a great 
civilisation had collapsed two thousand years ago because of 
mismanagement of irrigation systems (Rzoska 1980); Easter Island 
society collapsed through misuse of a bounded and inflexible ecology 
(Ponting 1992:ch.1); and Europe had been altered by humankind for 
several thousand years, assuming its basic pattern of landscape by 
AD1000 (Stevenson and Newsom 1992). It was however the first 
global eco-crisis and, given the instruments of modern media, the 
first such crisis to be globally discussed and the first to be globally 
produced. 
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By the early 1930s the core countries were all comprehensively 
industrialised and required large quantities of energy and raw 
materials to operate, and after World War 11 a range of other nations 
industrialised and adopted export oriented policies in order to 
develop: Japan in the middle 1950s, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan in 
the early 1960s, and the Latin American countries in the late 1960s 
(Peet 1991:ch.9). The Soviet Bloc nations were already pursuing 
policies that established environmentally unconstrained heavy 
industries, as was China. 
The highest profile 'doom scenario' that pointed out the problems 
of this approach was the business sponsored computer generated 
world model of Meadows, Meadows and Forester (1972) which used 
flawed assumptions about exponential growth in world production, 
energy usage, pollution, food production and resource depletion to 
predict that the limits to growth would be reached between 2050 and 
2100. There was a range of other pessimistic predictions at about the 
same time (for example Ehrlich 1975) and also a quick technocratic 
response which derided Meadows and his supporters. Herman Kahn 
typifies this : '...200 years ago almost everywhere human beings were 
comparatively few, poor and at the mercy of the forces of nature, and 
200 years from now, we expect, almost everywhere they will be 
numerous, rich and in control of the forces of nature' (Kahn, Brown 
and Martel 1976:1). 
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The Modernist Approach 
The processes of modernisation and the institutional structure of 
the modernist world produce, legitimate, and in central institutions 
in modern society are operated in advance with a specifically 
modernist approach, typified by the Kahn statement just quoted. 
It includes a rational approach to the world in all of the three 
Weberian senses. Knowledge should be the basis of action, and 
rational calculation is both possible and useful. The impersonality of 
the market place is accepted, as is the fact that the state, the economy, 
and other major social institutions should be seen to act rationally 
and predictably. 
The modern approach is ultimately optimistic. Economic growth is 
not only good and necessary but with the application of rational 
thought any problems created by growth can be solved. Part of this is 
a belief in managerial efficiency, another is faith in technology 
which will ultimately triumph if problems arise. The peak of the 
modern technocentric approach (to borrow O'Riordan's 1991 term) 
was the successful pursuit of space flight, symbolic of humankind's 
conquest of nature. Another element of the approach is faith in both 
the possibility and utility of objectivity; modern science was self-
consciously value free and believed that progress could be gained via 
systematic pursuit of knowledge through the use of the 
experimental method. In planning, the modern program was 
basically short-term, and used reductionist thinking to build 
complex models that were designed to reflect the world. Even at its 
height (the early 1970s Meadows world-model for example) this had 
what now seem obvious limitations, but these were consumed by 
the power of the modernist 'can-do' approach. 
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Concluding Comments 
Processes of modernisation and industrialisation transformed the 
globe between the seventeenth century and the middle of the 
twentieth century. They produced a world order centred on the core 
states of Europe, then the USA and later Japan, which together 
spread modernisation throughout the globe. They led to various 
arrangements of a powerful state apparatus and to complex and 
powerful 'big science'. They formed the context for, and were 
simultaneously the product of, major business organisations that 
were the agents of change, carrying the message of industrial 
capitalism to most of the globe, while the most centralised (Soviet) 
states also industrialised but under direct state control. The modern 
approach was rational, anthropocentric and technocratic, and the 
approach taken to the natural world instrumental. Consequently 
modernisation produced major environmental changes, many of 
which were obvious at the time, but also with other major 
environmental problems in a period of latency, to become evident a 
generation hence. 
Despite the use of the past tense in description of modernisation for 
the majority of this chapter, it retains its strength. The advanced or 
core nations which have, as the next chapter will demonstrate, 
entered a new period of 're-organised capitalism', are still heavily 
influenced by central elements of the modern approach, and the 
export of modernist thinking to other parts of the globe continues. 
Capitalism remains essentially modernist; expansionism, 
technological dynamism, control of labour and geographical and 
temporal instability remain a feature of industrial societies. 
Modernist thinking; rational, calculative, reductionist and 
technologically optimistic, remains the dominant world paradigm, 
unsurprisingly given that it is the product of and operates effectively 
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within basically capitalist enterprises. It is also, of course, highly 
suitable for formal credentialist education systems, because 
sequentially organised objective knowledge and rational calculation 
are readily teachable and examinable, and therefore continue to 
predominate in world education systems. 
Modernism and the style of industrialisation with which it is 
associated offer no hope for the natural world. Industrialisation is 
not only built on environmental exploitation, but is associated with 
modernist patterns of thought which are inflexible, formally 
rational and backed up by experts using limited forms of reference 
born of tight disciplinary boundaries working within institutional 
links that typify 'big science'. 
Changes to this system are required if the pattern of environmental 
destruction is to be revised; some of these are present in the moves 
to re-organised capitalism described in the next chapter. 
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RE-ORGANISED CAPITALISM: CHANGE IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 
Theories of Change to Industrial Capitalism 
Drucker and Bell 
Peter Drucker is a prophet almost unknown outside business and 
management circles who suggested in The Age of Discontinuity 
(1969) that there was a transition under way from a society 
characterised by relatively orderly change to one which changed 
quickly. His theories have remained consistent in a range of 
publications (1954, 1964, 1969, 1973, 1989) and are summarised in his 
most recent work (1993). Drucker suggests that knowledge is the 
axial principle on which change turns. Capitalism transformed the 
world so quickly, he believes, because, instead of being applied to 
'being', knowledge was applied to 'doing'; to tools, products, 
processes. This produced the Industrial Revolution and capitalism; 
speedy technical change, searches for new sources of energy, large 
scale production, and in the early phase, immiseration of workers. 
Application of knowledge to work and in particular the ideas of 
F.W. Taylor led to a 'productivity revolution' from 1880 to the end 
of 1945 which improved the lives of workers through redistribution 
of surpluses in terms of money and leisure, and now the final 
application of knowledge is creating the 'management revolution'. 
This is the application of 'knowledge to itself', in order to find out 
how existing knowledge can be used to produce results: 'in post- 
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capitalist society knowledge is the only meaningful resource ...' 
(Drucker 1993:38). Drucker also points out trends towards the decline 
of the corporatist state (in his terms 'the megastatee), trans-
nationalism and tribalism (ideas we will again turn to in later 
discussion) and suggests that we currently live in a 'society of 
organisations', managed entities which put knowledge to work and 
which are organised for the constant change which characterises post 
capitalist society (Drucker 1993:54). 
Daniel Bell's (1973) idea of a post-industrial society resonates with 
Drucker's view of knowledge as an axial principle. It also reflects the 
thinking current in the late 1960's in the USA, where for the first 
time workers in the tertiary sector outnumbered those in the 
combined primary and secondary sectors. The Bell thesis is that post-
industrial societies predominantly produce human and technical 
services, and services employment therefore expands to meet the 
increasing demand for knowledge to solve technical and social 
problems. The most professional of these service workers are 
knowledge workers who have better access to and control over 
theoretical knowledge and are better able to use the new 
information storage and retrieval technology. They therefore 
become an elite. 
The Bell ideas were attacked after publication. Kumar (1978) for 
example, pointed out that all the elements of Bell's post-industrial 
service sector are also present in industrial society. It is probable that 
the evolutionary tinge to the writing offended against the spirit of 
the times (see Block's comments 1992:6-7) and, as Crook et al. 
suggest, the criticisms have 'more or less stuck' (1993:31). Despite 
this, his key term is often used in public debate, and the trend to 
increasing numbers of service workers that Bell identified in the 
USA of the 1960s is now evident in all OECD nations, and within 
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the category of service workers the proportion of 'knowledge 
workers', those who work with ideas or information rather than 
supplying a routine service, is also growing. Bell, and Drucker before 
him, may overstate their case when they suggest that knowledge is 
the axial principle around which society changes, but their 
understanding of the power of knowledge in post-industrial society 
(and hence of the importance of knowledge workers and 
technologies that gather and store this knowledge) remains 
instructive. 
Changes to modern society go much further than Drucker and Bell 
suggest, and as the popularity of Toffler (1980) and Naisbitt (1982) in 
the early 1980s suggests, the direction of change was very much a 
focus of public concern at that time. Naisbitt's Megatrends (1982) is 
an interesting mix of borrowed theory and speculation, packaged for 
the mass market, but provides an early, and as it has turned out, 
generally accurate summary of major lines of change. He suggested 
that we are changing: 
• from an industrial society to 'an economy based on the 
creation and distribution of information' (Drucker 
revisited); 
• to a society in which technology is matched to humanity 
(high tech/high touch); 
• from a national to a global economy; 
• away from short-term and towards use of long-term time 
frames; 
• from centralisation to decentralisation (in tension with 
moves to globalisation); 
• from institutional reliance to self-help; 
• from representative democracy to participatory democracy, 
via use of 'initiatives and referenda'; 
• from reliance on hierarchal structures to use of personal 
networks, 'people talking to each other, sharing ideas, 
information, and resources' (1982:192); 
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• in the USA, because of globalisation and international trade 
and the move to service workers, from the ageing industry 
of the North to the -South; and 
• from either/or thinking, to consideration of multiple 
options. 
Lash and LIrry 
Naisbitt's major lines of analysis are part of the Lash and Urry 
argument (1987). They, too, point to globalisation and 
decentralisation, but they go further in arguing for a move from 
'organised' to 'disorganised capitalism'. Their basic arguments are 
presented early in the book (1987:5-7) where they bring together a 
range of ideas current in the late 1980s about the shape of change 
into a fourteen point summary which has been re-organised here 
into five points summarising themes important to the present 
argument: 
• Continuing expansion of the service class, a decline in the 
core working class. 
• The dismantling of the corporatist welfare state, emergence 
of powerful social movements, decline in the class 
character of political parties. 
• A growth in the world market, decline in tariffs, and spread 
of capitalism into Third World Countries. Large 
monopolies increasingly independent from state control. 
• Flexible work organisation, a decline in average plant size, 
substantial labour saving capital investment, a decline in 
importance of national level collective bargaining and a 
rise in plant level bargaining. 
• The spread of cultural post-modernism, and an increase in 
cultural fragmentation and pluralism. 
Whilst they refer to this as 'disorganised capitalism' it could more 
accurately be referred to as 're-organised' since the fundamental 
principles of the capitalist system continue to operate. Effectively 
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they present a vision of a more flexible capitalism which is more 
globally dispersed, more dominated by services, and more 
complicated because of the dismantling and loss of power of nation-
states and other elements of the 'steered society'. This system is 
certainly more complex, and requires new theories to explain its 
operation, for example new organisation theory which takes account 
of the smaller and more varied industrial units, but it is capitalism 
that is even more expansionary, technologically dynamic, and 
globally significant than before. 
The various elements of re-organised capitalism they outline have, 
as subsequent discussion will indicate, proved to be broadly accurate. 
Services have expanded, the state is dismantling, the world market 
growing, flexible manufacturing is growing in importance in core 
nations. Read in conjunction with Naisbitt's ideas in fact, they 
present a useful description of directions of change that have 
continued into the 1990s. 
Harvey 
Lash and Urry's work is, however, more a description of major lines 
of change than an attempt to explain the reasons behind them. 
David Harvey's work (1989) goes further and presents a useful 
synthesis of important lines of thought. He connects the breakdown 
of what he calls the 'Fordist system of accumulation' after 1973 to a 
basic problem of the capitalist system, that of the handling of over-
accumulation of goods, one that Marx was first to identify as of 
fundamental importance. 
His analysis begins with a description of Fordism's creation, starting 
in 1914 and finally resolving the issues of how much state 
intervention was required to stabilise the inevitable swings of 
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capitalist production and to control labour by 1945. The general 
results have already been described, and include in western nations 
Keynesian economic policies and a 'general if often tacit social 
contract' (Harvey 1989:134) in which labour was assured welfare 
benefits and controlled wage rises in exchange for disciplined work 
performance. Together with increased application of technology to 
work, these contributed to steadily rising productivity and living 
standards. 
In Harvey's account problems with Fordism were evident by the 
mid 1960s, and by the early 1970s there were major difficulties 
overcoming 'a number of important rigidities in the system' which 
relate to the problem of over-accumulation: '... long term and large 
scale investments in mass production systems that ... presumed 
stable growth in consumer markets' had resulted in a saturated 
market. Early solutions to this which fed the expansion of capitalism 
included cultivation of new domestic markets for existing products 
and expansion into new product markets. This pattern of 
development (often called neo-Fordism, see for example Piore and 
Sabel 1984) had probably reached a state of crisis by the early 1970s. 
Harvey's 'rigidities' outline the crisis; attempts to render the labour 
market more flexible and lower production led to a wave of strikes 
in the early 1970s; state welfare programs struggled to retain 
legitimacy in the face of restriction on the further expansion of the 
financial basis for state expenditure; large industrial concerns 
generally found it difficult to drop production levels. Harvey 
suggests that the loose monetary policies that resulted as major 
capitalist states strove to overcome these problems by expanding 
demand led in turn to inflation. This resulted in the recession of 
1973 which was produced by the Keynesian inspired policies to 
reduce aggregate demand, hence the inflation which proved to be so 
politically destabilising. 
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For Harvey, this led to economic and social restructuring which 
'may represent the early stirrings of the passage to an entirely new 
regime of accumulation'. This new system of 'flexible accumulation' 
features 'flexible labour processes, labour markets, products and 
patterns of consumption' (Harvey 1989:145-147). These changes are 
paralleled by the shifts in industrial organisation that have been 
described, but also include new opportunities for small business and 
also revivals for older forms of work organisation such as the 
artisnal and familial, both of which are well able to respond flexibly 
to new niche markets pursued by capitalist organisations anxious to 
take advantage of production capacity. In this system Harvey 
suggests that product innovation is accelerated ('the half life of 
products is itself halved'), and fashions change more quickly as yet 
more market niches are explored, and in this process marketing 
becomes vitally important. All this implies that entrepreneurs must 
be both more innovative and more efficient. Harvey suggests that 
the business environment features a tension between the well 
organised big corporation which is able to make quick decisions in 
the face of uncertainty, and the small and flexible business that also 
prospers in times of change. Contrary to Lash and Urry, Harvey 
suggests that capitalism has become 'more tightly organised through 
(his emphasis) dispersal, geographical mobility and flexible 
responses in labour markets, labour processes, and consumer 
markets, all accompanied by hefty doses of institutional, product and 
technological innovation' (Harvey 1989:159). This is an issue that 
will be considered again in the conclusion to this chapter. 
The Harvey argument further suggests that this tension between 
centralisation and dispersal is related to two other developments 
that are argued to be of prime importance by writers from across the 
ideological spectrum; increases in the power of information and 
developments in the international money market. He suggests a 
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conventionally powerful role for information in regimes of flexible 
accumulation, and analyses the re-organised, more complicated and 
more powerful international financial system that has accompanied 
the growth of the global capitalism. 
Harvey's analysis draws together many earlier accounts of the 
transition from industrial capitalism to a new form of capitalism 
and his general 'crises of accumulation' explanation of it is 
compelling and widely accepted, as Crook et a/. suggest: 'There is 
widespread agreement across the ideological spectrum that even 
neo-Fordism met the limits of a saturated global market around 
1970' (1992:173). There are differences in the detail of explanations of 
this crisis, but broad agreement as to its significance. 
One further general account of the change to post-modernism or late 
capitalism can be usefully considered, since it incorporates but also 
extends the analysis described to this point. 
Crook, Pakulski and Waters 
The Crook et a/. 1992 account of the transition is even wider ranging 
than those described so far, a 'grand narrative' which argues that 
there has indeed been a shift to a post-modern situation. The 
authors are sociologists, and in explaining their system we return to 
the concepts that introduced a description of the modernisation 
process in this chapter. They suggest that 'advanced capitalism' is the 
product of two main groups of processes. It is a highly differentiated 
society exhibiting high levels of specialisation and complexity which 
provide problems of integration; and it is also a highly organised 
society exhibiting high levels of rationalisation and 
commodification, processes which provide for centralised 
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management mediated through bureaucratic power and money 
(Crook et a/. 1992:32). Post-modernisation is the result of tensions 
between these two processes as differentiation extends to become 
hyper-differentiation so that the differentiation of function typical of 
modernisation extends to differentiation of structure (for example 
mass production units are now found beside market-niche 
producers, co-operatives, and home makers), and increased levels of 
centralised organisation which amount, in direct justification of 
Habermas' later work (Habermas 1985), to a 'virtual completion' of 
the colonisation of the life world. 
This presents a critical contradiction. The two processes, they argue, 
are not mutually sustainable. Hyper-differentiation produces a 
theoretically limitless range of social units and media of exchange 
(not just power and money) and 'there is no longer an oligopolistic 
set of sources for money and power and thus they lose their 
effectivity as sources of social control' (Crook et al. 1992:34-35). The 
complexities this situation produces also mean that the 
consequences of a given item of bureaucratic manipulation cannot 
be foreseen. Finally, there are so many different types of social unit, 
and such a mix in the steered society between the public and 
domestic that the boundaries collapse. The general results are well 
described in a central passage: 
Post-modernisation is characterised by an unprecedented level of 
unpredictability and apparent chaos. Action is divorced from 
underlying material constraints (or rather these constraints 
disappear) and enters the voluntaristic realm of taste, choice and 
preference. As it does so the boundaries between determined social 
groups disappear. So class, gender and ethnicity decline in social 
significance and so also do some of their characteristic forms of 
expression, including class-based political action and the distinction 
between high and popular culture. On a more abstract level the 
progressive differentiation of culture, society and personality 
characteristic of modernity involutes so that the very idea of an 
independent, purely social structural realm no longer makes sense. 
Rather 'society' must be understood in terms of 'culture' as patterns of 
signs and symbols penetrate and erode structural boundaries. (Crook 
et al. 1992:35) 
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For the state this means an unravelling of power and redistribution 
of it to society and to corporations (via privatisation), and to 
international bodies. Bureaucratic hierarchies dissolve, and 
'dispersed, diverse and small-scale economic organisations disallow 
radically different distributions of economic power', whilst the 
power of owners is constrained by the possibility of workers 
withdrawing their skills and knowledge and transferring them to 
other organisations (Crook et al. 1992:38). Politically traditional class 
based parties are displaced by variously constituted 'peoples parties' 
and a range of social movements representing global as well as 
ephemeral concerns. Crook's et al. vision for work and production 
refers to Harvey's ideas in suggesting that large industrial 
organisations will give way to a range of alternatives, in which 
flexible manufacturing is associated with flexible technologies 
(especially those using computers), flexible organisations (here 
Crook et a/. refer to the Japanese patterns) and flexible patterns of 
organisation in the labour market (Crook et al. 1992:ch.6). Post-
modern science, they argue, is the product of tensions as the 
differentiation characterising modern science 'threatens to become 
fragmentation, control through technology threatens to become 
control by technology, co-operation with government and industry 
threatens to become colonisation by them' (Crook et a/. 1992:206). A 
new 'post-science' is therefore displacing organised differentiated 
modern science, and it is trans-national and decentred and one in 
which disciplinary structures are eroded and communication 
between disciplines — and between the technical and social 
dimensions of a particular issue — becomes more important than 
communication within a discipline. This does not, they suggest, in 
an echo of one of Beck's lines of thought, 'imply a decline in expert 
knowledge; quite the reverse' (Crook et al. 1992:217), because of the 
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importance of scientific contributions to important debates such as 
'the damage control of the unforeseen consequences of the [societal] 
project for the control of nature' (Crook et al. 1992:211). 
This account is the most complete of those considered so far, and 
neatly draws together the points that analysis of the range of theories 
of the transition has so far revealed. It also makes significant 
mention of the position of the natural world in the transformed 
world, an issue that occupies centre stage in the work of Beck (1992a, 
1992b) and Giddens (1990, 1991). 
Beck and Giddens and Environmental Crisis 
Beck refers to the same patterns of change as discussed earlier, but in 
his analysis globalisation, flexible manufacturing and employment 
patterns and the associated increases in consumption and 
production, become part of a basically pessimistic analysis of the 
transition from 'industrial society' to 'risk society'. His major work 
in this area was intended primarily for a German audience and was 
first published in 1986, in the wake of the shock of the Chernobyl 
disaster and concern about acid rain and the pollution problems 
endemic to Middle Europe. Risk Society (1992b) reflects the German 
dialectical style in which ideas are teased out of contradiction, and 
thesis and antithesis lead to synthesis. Partly because of this and 
partly because he presents a wide ranging discussion in what Lash 
and Urry's introduction to the English translation refer to as a 
'personal and essayistic' style (Beck 1992b:1), there is support for a 
number of positions on issues in the book. Even Beck's basic stance 
is arguable; his specific intention is to suggest ideas and theories that 
will allow humanity to 'conceive the new which is rolling over us 
in a new way, and allow us to live and act within it' (Beck 1992b:12), 
41 
Chapter Two 
that is to say become a reflexively modern society, but the tone of the 
book is consistently pessimistic and a medieval notion of fate 
pervades discussion. Categorising Beck is already a focus of analysis 
(see for example Mol and Spaargaren 1993) and no doubt will 
continue to be so, but for the present discussion his work provides 
an opportunity to describe a significant attempt to consider the 
ecological dimensions of global change. For Beck the change from 
industrial society (modern society) to risk society means a transition 
from the logic of wealth distribution to risk distribution. In attempts 
to deal with risk 'modernisation becomes its own theme' and in this 
state of reflexive modernity the problem is: 'how can the risks and 
hazards systematically produced as part of modernisation be 
prevented, minimised, dramatised or channelled?' (Beck 1992b:19). 
This does not mean the end of capitalist development but the 
raising of it `to a new stage', (Beck 1992b:23), one that, Beck argues 
(along with others we have discussed), began developing in the early 
1970s. 
In reflexively modern society risks are the product of modernisation 
itself. They are pervasive; they multiply and despite some overlaps 
with existing socio-economic patterns they ultimately overcome 
class boundaries, as well as regional and national boundaries. The 
circulation of pollutants, for example, has the characteristics of 
'universality and supra-nationality .... risk society is in this sense a 
global society' (Beck 1992b:23). 'The latency period' of risks has passed 
and they are, Beck argues, now evident, 'but as distinct from earlier 
times when risks were detectable by the sense, the new risks evade 
human perceptive abilities [and] induce systematic and often 
irreversible harm' (Beck 1992b:22-23). 
In risk society individuals are ever more liberated from the 
established social bases of modern society - social class, work, the 
family - and biography becomes self produced. In this process the 
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individual is faced with constant decisions about such things as 
education, profession, job, numbers and even characteristics of 
children, and in the process biography becomes self-reflexive. Part of 
this is the globalisation of identity, as individual decisions, for 
example, the decision to drink coffee in the morning, make one 
complicit, Beck suggests, in the exploitation of plantation workers in 
South America. 
Science and technology are given a major role in the analysis of 
reflexive modernisation. Beck discusses the techniques of risk 
analysis used in environmental policy to develop a savage critique 
of science, arguing for 'the failure of techno-scientific rationality in 
the face of growing risks and threat from civilisation'. Science is 
incapable of answering the new questions posed by risks, and limps 
behind the social critique of industrial society. It is 'prominently 
involved in the origin and growth of risks', and the sciences actually 
'become legitimating patrons of a global industrial pollution and 
contamination of air, water, foodstuffs etc.' (Beck 1992b:59). 
The relationship between science and risk is presented as more 
complex than this too, in that as well as creating risks by 
contributing to industrial development it is required by the critics of 
growth to diagnose the problems it has helped create (Beck 
1992b:162-163). This criticism of science echoes in tone the 
pessimism about the scientific establishment produced in the early 
1970s, at the height of the modernist program (Habermas 1971, Leiss 
1974), but goes further in that it attacks the basic authority of science, 
the sciences monopoly on rationality is broken. In Weberian terms 
the instrumental rationality of its methods are questioned and 
claims for substantive rationality characteristic of modern science 
discredited. This has direct social importance because of the fact that 
therisks he identifies are pervasive and multiply (they are 'over-
produced'), and because the risks of this new form of capitalism 
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cannot be identified by the senses, the lay person requires an expert's 
assistance. Science, in short, has become more necessary but less 
adequate (Beck 1992b:156). 
Beck takes an ahistorical view of 'nature' arguing, with McKibben 
(1990) and Giddens (1991), that there is now an 'end of nature' in the 
sense that there is no part of the natural world left untouched by 
humanity (Beck 1992b:81). He goes further though, arguing for a 
second end in that almost all nature has been actually subjected to 
human control; in his analysis this has produced many of the risks 
of industrial society. In discussion of bio-technology, he also argues a 
third end, a 'mastery of nature' in the sense of the biological nature 
of humankind (Beck 1992b:204-212). Taken together these three 
'ends of nature' amount to a complete incorporation of 'nature' into 
'society', and for workers in the environmental sciences this means 
they are working in 'a branch office of politics, ethics, business and 
judicial practice in the garb of numbers' (Beck 1992b:82). 
Following his discussion of risks, complete with a catalogue of 
environmental disasters — Chernobyl, holes in the ozone layer, 
greenhouse, many types of pollution, medicine and science 
producing substantively irrational results, science unable to cope, 
toxins in the food chain, and more — Beck's positive thinking 
appears under-powered. Having referred to the breakdown of the 
(corporatist) welfare state and the waves of large-scale technological 
innovation with as yet unknown future hazards' (Beck 1992b:185) he 
suggests that there has been an 'unbinding of politics', and a rise in 
the importance of a range of 'sub-political spheres'. 
The list of sub-politics he offers widens as discussion continues but 
fundamentally includes business, science and technology. The realm 
of sub-politics includes all the powerhouses of change that lead to 
risk creation, and he suggests that 'they cannot continue to pretend 
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that they do not make policy by their own means ... the age of 
excuses is over' (Beck 1992b:233-234). They must become reflexive, as 
must politics, which should overcome 'fictitious power 
constructives' and regulate the possibilities for sub-politics to exert 
influence. Beck finishes by repeating his call for the 
institutionalisation of self-reflection within the important sub-
political spheres, a notion that sits poorly with his earlier analysis 
which suggests that important sub-political areas are structured to 
produce yet more risks. 
The notion of the power and increased responsibility of sub-political 
spheres is in keeping with earlier thinkers, and makes an extremely 
useful contribution to this discussion. The dismantling of 
corporatism, the increasing flexibility and spread of capitalist 
production, the rise of work place bargaining, and the increasing 
pace and power of technological change all point to a growth in 
influence of important (usually institutional) elements of the global 
system. Beck's optimism is at least partly misplaced in that there is 
little likelihood of states voluntarily abandoning the power they still 
have (which Beck arguably understates, given their power of 
coercion by police, armies and regulatory bodies) and merely acting 
as regulators of the sub-political. Nevertheless, there are indeed 
strong indications of the power of the sub-political elements of 
society, particularly that of business. There are also indications that 
business corporations are thinking reflexively and behaving with 
greater social and environmental responsibility. 
Giddens' works on changes to modern society (1990, 1991) were 
written not long after Beck, and he offers a very similar set of 
insights, but a more extensive analysis of the development of 
individual identity in what he calls late modern society (he denies 
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'post-modern' is a reasonable category) and a more specific analysis 
of globalisation, which he takes to be fundamental to the 
transformation taking place. 
Like Beck, Giddens suggests that identity has to be reflexively created 
'amid a puzzling diversity of options and possibilities' (1991:3), up to 
choices involving the body itself (Giddens 1991:8). Late modernity is 
also a risk society. Although risks have reduced in some areas (for 
example in medical procedures) 'yet at the same time [it] introduces 
new risk parameters largely or completely unknown to previous 
eras. These parameters include high consequence risks deriving 
from the globalised character of the social systems of modernity' 
(Giddens 1991:4). Amongst high consequence risks he discusses 
nuclear weaponry and the possibility of nuclear war, and a range of 
global environmental problems related to our treatment of already 
'socialised nature' . (Giddens refers to McKibben's work, just as Beck 
does). 
The suggestion, in summary, is that individuals are capable and 
knowledgeable, but that there are great stresses placed on them by 
life in a risk society, and by the fact that this society is dynamic. 
Giddens in fact refers to it as a 'runaway world' (Giddens 1991:16) 
characterised by the fact that people must place trust in a range of 
'expert systems' (for example domestic water systems) which intrude 
into everyday life and expropriate individual autonomy. 
Individuals survive in such a world through building up a 
protective cocoon which insulates them from the anxiety that would 
otherwise prevail. The cocoon is punctuated by fateful moments, 
such as the Chernobyl disaster (echoing Beck's 'anthropological 
shock' related to Chernobyl) and expert knowledge becomes more 
important at such times because individuals use it in their risk 
assessment. 
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The Giddens' view of knowledge is basic to his notion of reflexive 
modernity. Knowledge is no longer certain, it is always susceptible to 
revision as new information is developed. As a social scientist he 
refers mainly to knowledge in that area, but also to science: '...the 
reflexivity of modernity actually undermines the certainty of 
knowledge, even in the core domains of natural science' (Giddens 
1991:21). This view of knowledge is similar to Beck's, as is his point 
that the individual relies on knowledge in important situations, 
fateful moments. It reflects a widespread attitude to scientific 
knowledge in current society, one fed by the quickly changing nature 
of the stack of knowledge and by the fact that new information 
technologies mean that greater numbers of people and organisations 
have access to such knowledge — even though in conditions of 
hyper-differentiated areas of knowledge narrowly specialised experts 
may be required to interpret it. (These points will be developed in 
the next chapter.) 
Giddens' overall view is pessimistic. He refers to reflexively modern 
society as 'juggernaut society' (comparing the driving of a careering 
juggernaut to a 'well-driven motor car' (Giddens 1990:53). The idea 
that the world is no longer subject to prediction and control is 
related to a number of factors. The first is design faults, where expert 
systems are designed incorrectly, and these can be remedied. The 
second is operator failure, where a well designed system is poorly 
used, and this is ineradicable because it relates to human nature. The 
third and fourth reasons are more significant. The third is the broad 
category of 'unintended consequences' of system use which is related 
to the complexity of the social world, and to the fourth, the 
reflexivity or circularity of social knowledge which means that the 
social world is never stable; that it is altered as new knowledge not 
only renders it 'more transparent, but alters its nature, spinning it 
off in novel directions' (Giddens 1991:153). This is an extension of 
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the frequently discussed problem in the social sciences of double 
hermeneutics in which the object of enquiry is influenced by the 
results of investigation, and to that extent is hardly revolutionary, 
but it does serve as a good way of indicating the impossibility of 
coming to grips with certainties of knowledge in a world which is 
not only quickly changing, but is altered by the advance of 
knowledge. 
Beck and Giddens provide the most eco-centric analyses of change of 
the theorists considered. In both cases the intentions of the writer 
were wider, but for both most of the examples used to demonstrate 
'risk society' and 'reflexive modernity' come from humankind's 
treatment of the natural world, and for both writers the eco-crisis is 
critically important. 
Re-organised Capitalism in the 1990s 
The basic line of argument in this section is that capitalism is 
continuing to re-organise, broadly along the lines that the theorists 
already discussed have suggested, but with some important changes 
becoming evident in the 1990s. 
Knowledge and Services 
The analyses of Drucker and Bell have continued to prove accurate. 
The post-industrial society (to use Bell's term) is certainly here, and 
is spreading. Changes since the mid-1970s have, if anything, 
strengthened the significance of knowledge in society. The USA has 
the biggest services sector of all, in 1992 employing 76 per cent of 
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workers and accounting for 72 per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), with consistently similar patterns of change in other 
countries extending through to the mid 1990s. 
Table 1: Growth in Services Employment 
1850 80 1900 25 50 75 92 
 
     
(Source: The Economist 20 February 1993:61) 
Services are also the fastest growing element of international trade, 
making up 20 per cent of the total not including services delivered 
by subsidiaries of MNC's in foreign markets. In core nations the 
percentage of total exports made up of services is also increasing. In 
the USA for example it was under 20 per cent in 1980, but just over 
30 per cent in 1990 (The Economist 20 February 1993:62). 
These figures — and others produced world-wide — probably 
understate the importance of the services sector, since many 
activities and much of the employment in manufacturing is really 
services. For example, workers at The Economist magazine are 
included in the manufacturing category even though few 
manufacture anything. Services and manufacturing are increasingly 
inter-connected, with services predominating. General Motors 
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(USA) for example, is a major manufacturer, but its biggest single 
supplier is a service provider (Blue-Cross Shield) and one of its 
biggest products in dollar terms is financial and insurance services. 
As Drucker and Bell suggested too, within the general category of 
services the greatest growth is in 'knowledge work'. This can again 
be demonstrated with reference to the USA, the most service 
oriented economy in the world, using US labour statistics presented 
in the following table: 
Table 2: Growth in Employment within Services 
US private-sector services, 1980-9I.% 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Legal services 
Business services 
Heath 
Recreation 
Hotels 
Education 
Retail trade 
Finandal services'. 
Wholesale trade 111 
Transport and III 
communications IN 
(Source: The Economist 20 February 1993:63) 
Significant in this table is the growth in legal and business services, 
almost all of which would be knowledge based, far outstripping 
growth in non-knowledge based services. Growing employment in 
the computing and telecommunications industries, widely predicted 
to be the chief source of growth in the world economy in the 1990s, 
will extend this trend (see The Economist 11 February 1995:20). 
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Growth in services is significant — there are indications, as Bell 
predicted, of knowledge workers becoming an elite. In an 
increasingly complex world they are the interpreters of complexity 
and change and their general position is analogous to that which 
Beck describes for scientists: more required than ever before, but less 
adequate. 
In a world increasingly run by knowledge workers, and with most 
such workers produced in core countries, it is more obvious now 
than before that the growth in size and power of knowledge workers 
is a key (along with others such as control over technology) to 
control by the core of peripheral nations. This growth in services 
employment is significant too, because it suggests that the nature of 
work, and the capacity for managers to control work is changing. 
Offe suggests that services labour is different to industrial labour for 
two reasons. Firstly, because of the 'heterogeneity of the cases that 
are processed in service work' it is difficult to set standards that 
define adequate performance. Secondly, 'service work differs from 
productive work in the lack of a clear and uncontroversial criterion 
of economic efficiency'. This means that the 'non-standardisation [of 
service work] must to a great degree be accepted and replaced by 
qualities like interactive competence, consciousness of 
responsibility, empathy and acquired practical experience' (Offe 
1985:138). This 'acceptance' has not yet been established however. In 
the 1990s there were numerous moves to develop numerical 
measures of performance in services employment, particularly in 
attempts to apply Total Quality Management (TQM) to services. 
TQM is a Japanese/American management practice based on 
statistical analysis of quality measures and 'control of quality' in the 
entire production and sales process and has been the most widely 
discussed management technique of the mid 1990s. The success of 
these attempts is arguable and in any case future attempts to impose 
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formal (and in this case numerical) rationality on 
services/knowledge employment will be hampered by the ever 
increasing complexity of this employment, continuing growth in 
numbers employed and opposition from the workers themselves. 
Offe's basic insights into the difficulties of measuring and 
controlling services work therefore remains valid. They have been 
further developed by Waters (1989) who suggests a collegial 
organisation structure for knowledge workers characterised by, 
among other things, formal egalitarianism, formal autonomy, peer 
review of products, collective decision-making and a professional 
career. 
A Global Finance System 
As Harvey suggested, the global financial system is very complicated, 
but within this complexity some developments stand out. In the 
1980s, and flowing through into the 1990s, many of the regulatory 
boundaries that inhibited the flow of capital and of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) collapsed and by the end of the 1980s what could 
fairly be called a global capital market had emerged. It is difficult to 
accurately measure the size of such capital flows; for example what 
forms of money exactly count as cross-border transactions? How do 
we measure the reinvestment of funds abroad by a wholly owned 
TNC? Should one include changes that are merely the product of 
exchange rate variations? The number of financial products that 
must be measured is also bewildering to statisticians; you should 
include all forms of bank lending, trades in all sorts of bonds 
(including those actually issued offshore), all forms of foreign direct 
investment, trade in options and futures, and trade in financial 
services such as insurance (in all its forms). The list could continue. 
The increasing complexity of the system (which ironically defies the 
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modernist rational approach which has produced it) is the point, 
and the difficulty regulators would have controlling the system, 
should they choose to do so, is an obvious corollary. 
Nevertheless, some measure of the increasing size of the system can 
be gained from broad statistical categories. Between 1980 and 1991 the 
size of international bank lending moved from $US324 billion to 
$US7.5 trillion, over a twenty-fold increase. To put that in 
perspective the combined GDP of OECD countries increased by a 
factor of about 2.5 (from $US7.6 trillion to $US17.1 trillion) and bank 
lending therefore rose from 4 per cent of the OECD GDP to 44 per 
cent (The Economist 19 September 1992:8-9). In 1986 the global 
measure of what are technically called 'principal derivatives' 
(options, futures and transactions involving interest rates and/or 
currencies) was $US1.1 trillion, in 1991 SUS6.9 trillion. The outflow 
of FDI, which is 'increasingly the driving force of international 
economic transactions' (UN 1992:6) also changed dramatically. Using 
some core nations as a measure, between 1986 and 1990 the value for 
the USA, Japan, West Germany, Britain and France climbed from 
$US61 billion a year to $US150 billion, and the 1992 global estimate is 
$US1.7 trillion (The Economist 19 September 1992:4). The U.N. 
global estimate for 1990 is substantially lower at $225 billion, but they 
also suggest that it is growing at 'unprecedented rates' and is of 
critical importance in the world economy (UN 1992:1). Turnover of 
foreign exchange in 1992 was about $US900 billion, grown from 
about $US650 billion in mid 1989 and $US325 billion in 1986 (The 
Economist 19 September 1992:9). 
This growth trend will probably continue, despite cyclical downturns 
(for example, the world recession led to a drop in FDI in 1991) for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it is related to the expansionary nature of 
the capitalist system. Secondly, it is fed by and feeds the international 
trade that now characterises the integrated world economy. Thirdly, 
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it was driven in the 1980s and continues to be driven by continuing 
deregulation of the global economy as well as by continuing 
innovation in 'financial products' (such as portfolio insurance) 
which give traders better access to money. Fourthly, new 
information technologies facilitate faster and more effective 
communication and have made possible the practice of 24-hour 
trading world-wide. This does not mean the world economy is fully 
integrated (the labour market certainly is not, nor is direct 
investment), but it does indicate that general finance flows are doser 
to being fully deregulated than ever before. 
Mass Marketing 
Within the 1990s world economy the patterns of mass consumption 
and mass marketing that Harvey analysed have become even more 
significant. A larger and less constrained market assisted by modern 
telecommunications technology means marketeers can cover the 
world with images and sales plans almost instantly. New products 
for consumption are developed for new world markets daily; major 
clothing manufacturers, for example, can change their styles in 
factories world-wide using the flexible technologies of computers 
and modem links, and using 'just-in-time' systems (no inventories) 
and highly trained staff who report on changes in consumer taste on 
a daily basis, have few problems in reacting to changing demand 
with new products within a matter of days. Benetton, a major world 
brand name in clothing, has taken the process one stage further. It is 
in reality a marketing and sales organisation that co-ordinates 
manufacturers using modern technology. The power of 
telecommunications effectively draws the world together, so major 
brand names, for example Coca-Cola, Sony, and Nike, are recognised 
world-wide, and advertising is so successful that the models used in 
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their images become the most widely known humans alive; Michael 
Jordan, for example, an American basketball player who advertises 
shoes was the most popular sportsman amongst Australian youth in 
1993 (The Age 15 May 1994:26), and Michael Jackson, an American 
song and dance man, may well have been the best known human 
being ever in late 1993 because of his central role in Pepsi Cola 
advertisements, broadcast and discussed world wide. 
Increased Power of Information 
Changes in the importance of services employment, a deregulated 
world finance system and changes to mass consumption and 
marketing all suggest increases in the power of information in the 
1990s. The corpus of scientific information continues to grow, the 
rate of change of technological knowledge, particularly in electronics 
and communication, is increasing as more workers enter the field, 
and in business the capacity to change and adapt to quickly changing 
markets depends on instantaneously available information. Other 
factors contribute to the increased value of knowledge: a more 
complicated world market, a bigger and faster world financial 
system, the growing complexity of the network of international 
obligations and treaties, and more efficient, more widely used and 
more affordable technologies to handle information. A direct 
consequence of this is that the growing class of knowledge workers 
also becomes more important. 
The increased importance of information has been associated with 
changes in information technology, especially the growing links 
between computing and telecommunications technology. This can 
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be illustrated with two brief discussions, the first of the vision of 
Microsoft, the world's biggest producer of software, the second of 
coming changes to the hitherto technically-simple television set. 
Microsoft got its initial success by supplying the Microsoft Disk 
Operating System (MS-DOS) to IBM, and then to other computer 
suppliers, with such success that MS-DOS and 'Windows' (its more 
user-friendly successor) became the standard operating system for 
personal computers (PCs). Microsoft sold over 100 million copies of 
DOS alone. Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft, also made deals with a 
wide range of other software suppliers, so that his systems were 
associated with most world PC usage. This made the company 
extremely profitable in the early 1990s. For example in nine months 
to March 31, 1993, the company made profits of $US688 million on 
sales of $US2.7 billion. In mid 1992 it had no debt and two billion in 
the bank (The Economist 22 May 1993:22). Profit making became 
difficult about mid 1992 as the lowered prices obtained for PCs in a 
saturated world market also forced prices of software down. One 
answer was to arrange co-operative arrangements with other 
companies in the field of computers (these will be described in later 
discussion), another was to enter into extensions of computer use, 
particular in the information area. Compact Disk Read Only 
Memory (CD-ROM) facilities were added to PCs, and information 
packages developed and sold; encyclopaedias, games, films, music. 
The head of Microsoft's advanced technology unit expects a future 
in which information is spread via fibre-optical and wireless 
networks to a new breed of small computers which could be in 
telephones, facsimile machines and television sets. The problem 
then becomes one of selecting the right information to package and 
sell, a further role for Microsoft (The Economist 22 May 1993:23). 
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The background to this bold vision deserves further discussion. The 
technology of TV, relatively stable from the 1930s to 1992, changed 
quickly in 1993. High definition television (HDTV) became a 
commercial reality after twenty years development; it yields much 
sharper images and facilitates information transmission, particularly 
of graphs and figures. There is likely also to be a transition from 
analog signals to the digital signals that are used for computers, 
which yield sharper pictures and allow compression of images so 
that far more data can be transferred in a given period. Once PCs are 
allied to television, viewers can also use the digitally based system 
and associated technologies to edit the material as it is viewed. A 
third change is in the method of delivery of signals; in mid 1994 
most signals world-wide still came by air (traditionally), but 
increasingly they will also come from digital direct broadcast 
satellites, from microwave transmitters or, in a significant change, 
via fibre-optic cables that can transmit far more information than 
the copper cables that were previously used. These technologies are 
spreading through the core nations quickly; in the USA perhaps $420 
billion will be spent in the next 20 years updating the telephone 
system, and Telstra Australia expects to provide fibre-optic/co-axial 
cable (an efficient hybrid system) to 1.1 million households within 
three years from 1994, competing with Optus for clients. The 
'information super highway' (to use the media's own term) is being 
built rapidly (see Meredith 1994). 
As Microsoft employees suggest, these innovations will effectively 
change the potential of television, both for entertainment (for 
example with video-on-demand, which means that viewers can 
look at any film or video release whenever they like) and for 
information dissemination. This, added to existing electronic mail 
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(e-mail) which is now spreading from business and academia to 
households, and electronic banking and shopping, suggests that the 
'information society' is more a reality in the mid 1990s than ever 
before. 
Computers and Flexible Manufacturing 
The process of flexible manufacturing which is discussed by Lash 
and Urry, Harvey, and also Crook et al. has also been further 
developed in the 1990s. The term encompasses a variety of computer 
assisted planning, design, drafting, and manufacturing processes 
(induding robot controlled production), and had already changed 
the industrial map by the late 1980s. It facilitates small scale 
industrial units, flexible work practices and technological solutions 
to problems. 
Developments in the 1990s which have further advanced the 
capacity of small and medium sized firms to compete in national 
and international markets have centred on computers. Mainframes 
were routinely used until the late 1970s in big business and research 
establishments, and there were relatively few producers of these 
machines, with International Business Machines (IBM) the 
dominant force. Personal computers were developed in the late 
1970s and sold to individuals and small business. This was also 
associated with the entry of a range of new manufacturers and 
sellers into the industry. In the mid 1980s these were increasingly 
networked, so users of individual machines could communicate 
without using a mainframe. IBM lost much of dominance by being 
slow to respond to this market. In the late 1980s, and with increasing 
rapidity in the 1990s, personal computers became far more powerful, 
smaller and more portable, and networking became more 
sophisticated with use of 'client-server' networks in which a large 
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number of personal computers are connected to a central and more 
powerful mini-computer which can do most of the things that a 
mainframe could do. This has meant that a medium sized 
organisation in the mid 1990s can, without great cost, operate with 
what have become powerful personal computers in an even more 
powerful network, and using modems and other 
telecommunications technology link with national and 
international affiliates and collaborators at little cost. In sum, the 
moves to flexible manufacturing identified and discussed by 
researchers using the mid to late 1980s as a measure, have continued 
but with ever increasing flexibility. The basic computer technology is 
becoming even more powerful and affordable since the cost of 
'computing power' drops by year. Given the rapidly decreasing size 
of components it is also more portable. 
There are a range of other important implications of the changes to 
information and telecommunications technology: 
• International and geographically dispersed business can be 
readily co-ordinated (this point will be further developed 
shortly). 
• Business is harder for the state to control, but more 
effective (a reiteration of Beck's point about the growing 
importance of the sub-political sphere). 
• There is however a general increase in the capacity for state 
control because it is easier and cheaper to collect, store, 
centralise, process and access information on citizens. This 
trend is, of course, balanced by the countervailing tendency 
for a decline in the economic importance (and absolute 
size) of most states, and the increasing influence of social 
movements, and other sub-political spheres (including 
business). 
• Sharing of scientific information is cheap and easy. The 
world's professional intellectual community was, by 1992, 
already linked by computers and e-mail. The American 
Academy of Management for example, an association of 
several thousand academics and management practitioners 
in over forty countries, is one 'tribe' linked by e-mail, and 
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has more than twenty separate special interest groups 
linked by e-mail. These links are difficult if not impossible 
for the state, and for academic or business interests, to 
control, if only because they provide such a wide range of 
options for virtually instant cross-border communication. 
Such tribalisation is increasing world-wide, a point Drucker 
stresses in his analysis. 
• Whilst individual items of new technology are cheap 
relative to average weekly earnings in core nations (and as 
the price drops for PCs and software demonstrate, this 
affordability is ever more evident), a number of important 
inequities are also appearing. There will be a class of 
'information-poor' in core nations, by virtue of lack of 
finance and lack of (educated) capacity to understand the 
new information. There will also be inequities 
internationally because the infrastructure that supports 
changes in telecommunication is expensive and the more 
complex aspects will be established in rich core nations well 
before their widespread adoption by the periphery. This 
will strengthen the already strong position of the core. 
The Nation State, Trade Blocs, and Renaissance of Market 
Philosophy 
The world political map has changed dramatically in the 1990s. 
Much, but not all of this, is related to the breakdown of the USSR 
into smaller units. There are 88 republics and semi-autonomous 
regions in Russia, and other already independent new nations, 
including three Baltic states and Georgia (Stalin's birthplace) 
completely outside Russian control. Georgia makes a good example 
of the world trend. The total population is only 5.5 million, but 
includes two regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, each of which is 
already striving to become independent. Elsewhere, Yugoslavia has 
split (at great human cost) into at least five autonomous nations; 
Yemen (united only three years ago) is likely to split; and ethnic 
quarrels in Rwanda suggested that the already shaky nature of many 
non-tribally based national boundaries in Africa will come under 
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pressure within five years. The quest for autonomy is also reflected 
in core nations. In 1993 moves to split the State of California into 
three states gathered force; the Governor of Hawaii asked for 
recognition of the 'Hawaiian nation'; and even in Japan a 1993 best 
seller by the former secretary general of the Liberal Democratic party, 
Plans to Re-build Japan, suggested breaking up the country into 300 
autonomous regions. Naisbitt (1994) suggests the world is moving 
towards a situation in which there will be around 1000 nations. 
The details of these moves to autonomy are unimportant to the 
argument at this point, but support the proposition that there are 
already significantly more nations in 1994 than there were in the late 
1980s and that the trend is likely to continue. Whilst most of these 
changes are initiated by national feeling and shared languages and 
culture, the moves are also pushed along by advances in 
telecommunications technology, which enable ideas of change to 
disseminate much more quickly and effectively. Increasing public 
awareness of the value of resources within regions is also a 
significant factor, and the media help foster a desire to control them 
(the Ukraine, and Yeltsin's home republic of Yakuti provide 
examples of this). There is also a growing understanding that the 
world economy is more important for economic survival than the 
old 'parent country'. This last point is of particular significance. It 
implies the 'global paradox' that Naisbitt (1994) argues for: the 
moves to political independence are accompanied by the formation 
of economic alliances. They are also associated with (but not caused 
by) improvements in technology that assist world integration, and 
by a variety of international treaties that extend beyond the purely 
economic into environment and social matters. 
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Economic alliances not only facilitate the survival of smaller states — 
and therefore the increased influence of the world economic and 
financial system — but also they facilitate entry of small and medium 
businesses into other nations, and generally provide additional 
options for business expansion. The 1990s have featured a range of 
economic alliances of major importance. The 1994 North Atlantic 
Free Trade Association (NAFTA) sets up what is in world terms an 
enormous trade bloc covering Mexico, Canada and the USA; the 
European Community (EC) has gradually refined its economic 
alliance and has moved towards a common currency and common 
transport structures; the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has set up an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) which 
covers Asia, the region in which many multi-nationals plan to 
concentrate investment in the next decade (see Hitt, Ireland and 
Hoskisson 1995:ch.8; Chai, Campbell and Spain 1993); the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which covers almost all 
significant nations in the world economy and was designed to 
stimulate growth by eliminating barriers to trade, was signed after 
more than a decade of negotiation in late 1993. 
This list does not imply that nation states have lost all power, but 
added to the already increasing importance of the world economy, it 
suggests that they are, in economic terms and in terms of business 
opportunities, losing importance relative to a growing network of 
grand alliances. Protectionism is, however, still a factor in the world 
economy. It was a prominent feature of the 1980s, as the USA, the EC 
and Japan negotiated to protect industries they regarded as essential, 
and within the scope of GATT there remains significant scope for 
protection of industries, and there will no doubt be protectionist 
policies between trading blocs. Significantly, too, there is potential 
for important social and environmental agreements that overlap 
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major economic agreements and control business behaviour, as the 
Biological Diversity Convention (which will be discussed along with 
other 'environment treaties' in the next chapter) demonstrates. 
As well as increasing the number of world nations, the breakdown 
of the Soviet Bloc serves as a signal of another major world trend; a 
move towards less regulated market economics. The dismantling of 
the corporate state that Crook et al. (1992) emphasised has proceeded 
apace in the late 1980s through to the mid 1990s and is globally 
evident. The old Soviet states are now attempting to re-organise in 
order to operate as free market economies, the corporatist states of 
the EC and Northern Europe have dismantled significant sections of 
their corporatist centres, China is slowly entering the world 
economy, and Latin American states are attempting market oriented 
economic reforms. The majority of African states have not begun 
significant privatisation. 
An important element of this process is the privatisation of state 
owned assets, which serves as a signal of state intentions and turns 
important services over to market control, thereby providing 
significant opportunities for world business. Privatisation serves 
both to shrink the state and raise finance, and the surge in Third 
World privatisation in the early 1990s may have been related to a 
slowdown in the world economy, hence problems attracting FDI. 
Whatever the justification, the trend is strong. The EC has largely 
privatised, or is in the process of doing so. Germany, Spain, Sweden, 
Finland, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Norway, Portugal and 
Turkey all have privatisation programs. In the early 1980s Latin 
America was the region with the highest level of privatisation, 
succeeding Asia, which had occupied that role in the late 1980s 
(though India has not significantly privatised assets). An ironic 
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feature of this pattern is that the US, the home of free enterprise, 
now has a larger set of public assets than most of the active 
privatisers of the EC and sections of Asia. 
Privatisation is likely to continue, and to further spread both within 
states (as the progress of privatisation in the Victorian Government 
within the Commonwealth of Australia illustrates) and to other 
states. Within states it has already spread from infrastructure which 
was always commercial or semi-commercial, for example France's 
sale of its share in Renault, and shares in oil companies that have 
been sold world-wide, to sale of public services, for example 
privatisation of health and prison services. States with saleable 
assets are now under pressure from conservative sections of the 
community to privatise, as for example in Italy and the USA. The 
trend will therefore continue. It is legitimated in the short term by 
the fact that it results in large sums of money being raised (Nippon 
Telegraph for example was sold for $12.4 billion in 1986), and in the 
long term by the promise of more responsive and efficient service 
delivery. It fits in with moves to more flexible organisations world-
wide, which in turn are associated with developments in 
information and computer technologies. For business this means 
opportunity and increased influence. 
Changes to the Pattern of Core Nations 
There has been a gradual shift in the relative economic power of 
core nations. In Wallerstein's (1976) terms the USA, Japan and the 
EC are now in the centre of the core, whilst the growing importance 
of such 'Pacific Rim' nations as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and the 
other 'Asian Tigers' has arguably moved them closer to the core. On 
the edge of this and now entering the world economy more fully is 
China, which has the biggest market in the world, the largest work 
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force, and despite a low per capita income (and depending on which 
currency is used to calculate it) one of the three largest GDPs in the 
world, trailing only the USA and Japan (Naisbitt 1994:ch.5). As it 
enters the world economy more fully, the shape of the core will alter 
further. Southern China is already entering the world economy 
quickly, assisted by a range of co-operative agreements with 
businesses based in core nations, for example Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI). This opening of China, following the opening of the 
Soviet Bloc, presents further opportunities for international 
business, which will chase new markets and resources, and spread 
technologies and cultures. 
Business Alliances and Smaller Firms 
The pattern of world capitalism has also changed in the 1990s 
because of the trend towards co-operative ventures of various kinds 
between firms which may nevertheless remain competitors in other 
areas. Alliances are not new - they have always been a feature of 
industrial life - but whilst no nation state or international body 
collects complete statistics on alliances in the 1990s it is clear that 
they have become a standard feature of re-organised capitalism. The 
form of alliance is extremely varied; joint ventures are common, as 
is sharing of research costs. Funding agreements between suppliers 
and producers are also increasingly common, as are licensing 
agreements between businesses. 
Change at IBM provides a good example of the new pattern. In its 
time of complete dominance, up until the 1980s, everything was 
done without co-operation from other firms, but in attempting to 
catch up with the PC market IBM developed alliances with 
Microsoft, Intel and Lotus. It also has an agreement with Apple 
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computers to develop new operating software, while at the same 
time competing with Apple for a share of the PC market. The car 
industry provides another example. There are no longer any 
completely independent car manufacturers, and most cars are 
therefore a result of complex agreements between manufacturers, 
and between manufacturers and suppliers who enter into long term 
agreements that ensure prompt supply of goods and thus allow a 
just-in-time system to become established. This is self consciously an 
imitation of the Japanese Kieretsu arrangement which for decades 
provided Japan with a competitive edge over other core nations. 
The crankshaft used in the American Honda car demonstrates this 
point, whilst at the same time demonstrating the difficulties of 
determining what is a foreign product and what is not in the global 
economy. The crankshaft is manufactured in the USA from a steel 
bar produced by Copperweld Steel Company (63.4 per cent Japanese 
owned). The bar goes to TFO Corporation (100 per cent Japanese) to 
be forged, then to a 100 per cent US owned plant for heat treatment, 
then back to TFO, and is then sent to Honda, which can say it is 100 
per cent American because all fabrication takes place on US soil 
(Emmott 1993:58). 
Alliances will continue because they offer advantages to firms. A 
survey of 4,182 technological alliances by the University of 
Leninburg concluded that they were concentrated in bio-technology 
and information technology and found that the three most common 
reasons given for forming alliances were to exploit complementary 
technologies, to gain access to a market, and to reduce the time taken 
to innovate something, basic to survival in the quickly changing 
world market (The Economist 27 March 1993:16). This is admittedly 
a survey of a specialist area, but the same reasons also apply more 
generally. The pace of change and the technological dynamism of 
modern capitalism suggest that this trend will continue, and the 
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pattern of developments in high technology industries further 
demonstrate this. As earlier discussion has indicated, there is a 
growing convergence between diferent elements of the industry, 
and this is already leading to aliances of various kinds between 
firms with major interests in one of the areas. The folowing 
product map, drawn by Apple computers on the basis of work done 
at Harvard University, indicates the possible complexity of such 
aliances in future. It represents the vision for the 'information 
industry' in the year 2001 of Mr Sculy, then head of Apple. The 
horizontal axis moves from products which act as carriers of 
information on the left, to products whose value lies in the 
information they contain on the right. The vertical axis has tangible 
products on the bottom, ranging to intangibles on the top. The 
implication is that aliances on the bases of shared technologies are 
likely: 
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A related trend that is superimposed on alliances is that of the 
decline in the unit size of the giant corporations. In a world 
economy that demands fast changes to product lines in order to 
meet the quickly moving market, and in which technology changes 
rapidly, a key to success, as we have seen, is the capacity to adapt 
quickly. This is difficult for a large corporation, especially one with a 
many tiered bureaucracy. The answer for big corporations that wish 
to remain competitive with small and medium organisations is to 
dismantle (or deconstruct), creating a new organisation structure 
with a number of smaller independent or semi-independent units. 
Some figures from the US indicate the dimensions of the problem 
for big organisations. Already 50 per cent of exports are the product 
of companies with 19 or fewer employees, and only 7 per cent of US 
exports come from organisations with more than 500 employees. 
The Fortune 500, the biggest 500 corporations in the US, now 
account for 10 per cent of the American economy, compared to 20 
per cent in 1970 (Naisbitt 1994:13). Some examples demonstrate the 
pattern at the level of individual businesses. IBM (US) in December 
1991 re-organised into 13 autonomous businesses, and in 1993 IBM 
(UK) re-organised into 30 separate businesses. Xerox, General 
Electric, Coca-Cola, Honda, and Alcoa are all deconstructing. Paul 
Allaise of Xerox: 'We are trying to get the small company benefits of 
quickness in time to market, decision-making and the elimination 
of bureaucratic activities' (Naisbitt 1994:14). Jack Welch, the Chief 
Executive Officer of General Electric, one of the top 20 world 
companies in aggregate assets and sales, suggests that the corporate 
message for the 1990s is 'think small. What we are trying relentlessly 
to do is to get that small company soul — and small company speed — 
inside our big company body' (Naisbitt 1994:14). 
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This process has been accompanied by a reduction in staff numbers, 
particularly of numbers in the central administration of large 
companies, thereby rendering the organisation 'lean'. This too, is 
designed to increase flexibility and reduce response time, since it 
means that fewer people will be involved in the decision making 
process. IBM (US) reduced total staff numbers by 25 per cent (to 
300,000) between 1986 and 1993 (The Economist February 27, 1995:14). 
Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), the world's largest power engineering 
group, is now made up of 1200 companies (with $30 billion revenue 
overall) and a headquarters staff in Switzerland reduced from 4000 
to about 200 (Naisbitt 1994:14). IBM (UK) has reduced its 
headquarters staff from 2500 to 100. These are examples of a world-
wide trend, made necessary by the need for quick responses, and 
made possible by new technology which enhances the information 
handling capacity of management. 
In addition to entering alliances of various kinds and reducing 
central office, staff business organisations have also developed and 
implemented new organisation structures that facilitate flexible 
operations in a dynamic environment. The direction, as already 
suggested, is toward 'lean' organisations with few steps in the 
management hierarchy, and a minimisation of bureaucratic process. 
Additionally it is towards network style organisations in which 
individuals are empowered to take decisions, collaborating with 
their peers in small units which are loosely coupled. The new 
structure is backed up with a management mindset that is more 
willing to look at the advantages of alliances, to alter planning 
techniques to include (as far as is possible) discontinuities, and to 
cope with chaotic business environments. 
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Trans-National Corporations 
Major elements of the context within which TNCs operate in the 
1990s have already been discussed. There has been an unprecedented 
growth in FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and this has both 
spread the impact of TNCs and meant that for many developing 
countries FDI makes up the principal source of foreign capital (UN 
1992:1). Rapidly changing technologies mean that it is easier to co-
ordinate TNCs, and easier to establish and maintain co-operative 
relationships. This is the only way to gain access to innovations 
since there is simply not enough time for developing (periphery) 
nations in particular to gain access with 'arms-length' arrangements 
(UN 1992:3). The globalised finance system and increasingly de-
regulated world economy means that it is easier to obtain finance 
for, and to set up, international operations, and the fact that flexible 
technologies are available means that small and medium sized 
firms can not only establish themselves as TNCs, but given their 
capacity for flexible response to quickly changing markets they can 
also prosper relative to the larger firms. The world trend towards 
market based economic organisation, reflected in the wave of 
privatisation that is global in scope, has also contributed to a rise in 
the importance of TNCs since they are now in keeping with world 
thinking that favours capitalist operation. 
TNCs, to quote the 1992 UN report's first sentence, 'have become 
central organisers of economic activity in an increasingly integrated 
world economy' (UN 1992:1). Now favoured by the patterns of world 
change, in 1992 there were 35,000 identified parent TNCs and 147,200 
foreign affiliates. Most TNCs were small or medium sized, but the 
largest control the majority of total TNC assets. The top 100 - 
excluding banking and finance - control $US.3.1 trillion, including 
$US.1.2 trillion held outside home countries. This pattern also 
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applies to FDI. For example, in what was then the Federal Republic 
of Germany, in 1992 the 50 largest TNCs which make up less than 1 
per cent of the total number accounted for nearly 60 per cent of FDI. 
Whilst the spread of TNCs is global, neither their activities nor the 
spread of FDI is evenly distributed. About 75 per cent of world 
investment takes place within and between the most developed 
countries, and as the 1992 UN World Investment Report pointed 
out, it is concentrated in what they call the "Triad'; the USA, the EC 
and Japan. Additionally almost two-thirds of investment into 
developing countries comes from ten advanced nations (UN 1992). 
TNC investment, generally speaking, is based on Triad regions, 
reflecting business opportunities and familiarity with culture and 
customer demands. Companies in the EC currently tend to invest in 
Europe, US companies in the North American continent and 
Japanese in Asia (The Economist 27 March 1993:12). 
Analysis of currency flows, sales and investment however, 
underestimate the importance of TNCs in the world economy of the 
1990s. Capital inflow may be significant in itself, for example, it 
made up more than 10 per cent of gross domestic capital formation 
between 1986-89 in countries as varied as Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
Belgium, Singapore and the United Kingdom (UN 1992:61), but also 
because of other less tangible benefits. These include flows of 
technology from parent to affiliate, which the UN suggested 'make 
up a good part of international technology flows' (UN 1992:1). They 
include flows of information, particularly about research and 
development, made more significant by the scale of TNC research; 
the combined research and development expenditure of the ten 
biggest US TNCs exceeds that of the whole of France or the United 
Kingdom (UN 1992:18). More general knowledge is also transferred - 
about organisations, about management about how to train people, 
about the entire range of matters with which a business is involved. 
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These intangibles amount to the demonstration and at least partial 
transmission of the organisational culture of the parent company, 
itself the product of its home country culture. In this sense TNCs 
spread a world culture that reflects the culture of core nations, in 
particular the Triad (which makes up what has hitherto been called 
'the core' in this discussion). 
The Individual in Re-organised Capitalism 
All the theorists examined suggested that major changes have taken 
place to the world since the 1970s, and for Beck and Giddens in 
particular these have had severe repercussions on identity 
formation. The changes of the 1990s present two broad aspects that 
can be examined. 
The first is positive; technological change has effectively empowered 
many individuals. For those with access to the range of 
telecommunications and computer equipment it can be 
emancipatory, allowing access to knowledge previously unavailable 
and access to other people previously either non-contactable or 
available only after delays that may prove significant, and via means 
that could be readily censored. This empowerment extends to 
individuals virtually irrespective of geographical location (and in a 
wireless computer future this will be even more the case), but is 
tempered by demographic and socio-economic factors that limit the 
availability and capacity for effective use of the technologies. 
The rise of free market ideology is also potentially empowering for 
individuals, as is the deconstruction of the corporatist and (Soviet) 
centralised state. A free market system potentially offers greater 
opportunities for relatively unconstrained advance by interested and 
appropriately skilled people, and in what Naisbitt and Aburdene 
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(1990:278) call 'the era of the individual' an entrepreneur-driven 
system arguably spreads a range of market driven opportunities 
more widely than ever before. 
There is also an argument that rising levels of education and 
expectations in workers are forcing organisations to allow them 
greater freedom. This is associated, as Offe (1985) suggests, with the 
difficulties of supervising services work, and also with the 
requirements of operating organisations based on collaborative 
networks (see Boudette 1989, Kanter 1985). 
The cultural pluralism that is part of post-modern culture is also 
empowering for individuals in sections of advanced societies. The 
overall suggestion of much post-modern theory is of a deconstructed 
society in which meaning is multi-layered and reality constructed by 
individuals free from structural constraints. This may be seen in a 
pessimistic light. Foucault for example, suggests: 'Nothing in man - 
not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as a basis for self-
recognition, or even for understanding other men.' (1977:153) The 
overall emphasis however, is freedom from constraint. 
The second broad aspect of individual life in the 1990s is pessimistic. 
For Beck and Giddens, the uncertainty of reflexively modern society 
creates important ontological insecurities. Giddens argues that 
'...systematic knowledge about social organisations cannot be 
obtained' (1990:2), and extends this with frequent discussions of the 
hazards of globalisation. Beck, as earlier discussion indicated, is also 
basically pessimistic in his overall line of argument and choice of 
examples. This idea of insecurity stemming from change is hardly 
new, and appears to strike a chord with readers in the mass market; 
Toffler (1980), for example, sold several million copies of his analysis 
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of 'future shock', which he argued stems from difficulties of coping 
with the fast pace of change in what was even then, 15 years ago, 
perceived to be a dynamic society. 
Assuming a basic truth in these lines of analysis, the position of 
individuals in the 1990s would be worse than in the 1980s, given 
that the pace of technological change has quickened, global 
environmental problems worsened, and the structure of nation 
states become far more complex. 
Positives and negatives are therefore easy to find in assessments of 
the position of the individual in the 1990s. A balanced conclusion 
may well be one that recognises that there are potentials for 
emancipation in the changes discussed, and potentials for anxieties 
of various kinds that contribute to personal destabilisation. These 
potentials co-exist, are multi-layered, and are structured, as with all 
impacts of change, according to demographic and socio-economic 
variables. 
Concluding Comments 
The foregoing discussion of change in the 1990s has suggested the 
broad accuracy of Lash and Urry's analysis, but with a twist: for them 
it was 'disorganised capitalism', in this discussion it is 're-organised 
capitalism'. The distinction is more than semantic, since any 
consideration of the role of business in the new world economy and 
the impact of business organisation on the natural world must start 
with the basic understanding that a new and more flexible form of 
capitalism with a greater global impact and greater influence than 
ever before is emerging. It is, as will be argued in the next chapter, a 
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force that can work positively as part of a process of change that will 
lead to at least partial resolution of world environment problems, 
even as it continues to operate in the short term as a force for 
environmental destruction. 
At this point the basic dimensions of the current transformation can 
be summarised, and key contributions of the theories of change 
considered earlier assessed. 
The basic insights of Drucker and Bell that services employment and 
knowledge will become increasingly important have been borne out 
by a continuation of the trends into the 1990s. The proportion of 
workers employed in services is increasing in all nations and they 
now make up the biggest sectoral category of employment in all 
advanced nations. Within the service workers sector 'knowledge 
workers' are also increasing in numbers and influence, and this can 
be expected to continue since the world as a whole is, as Beck and 
other theorists point out, becoming more complex and difficult to 
'operate', and people as well as institutions are increasingly in need 
of expert advice. 
The increasing availability and power of telecommunications and 
computer technologies, which both create more opportunities for 
'knowledge employment' and increase the power and flexibility of 
such work, is a significant part of this pattern. Offe's insight that 
services work is more difficult to control within the modernist 
frame of reference will therefore become more significant with time, 
despite attempts through use of systems such as TQM to impose 
modernist thought. This tension between an emerging general trend 
and the modernist reaction is reflected in many of the changes that 
have been discussed, and demonstrates the continuing power of 
modernism within advanced societies. 
75 
Chapter Two 
Globalisation, propelled by a variety of influences, continues to be 
the most powerful process evident in the world of the 1990s. A 
decline in the power of nation states, increases in the power of 
telecommunications technology, rises in the power of TNCs, 
increases in the scope and number of international agreements, and 
a growing integration of the world economy led by financial 
deregulation have all contributed to an increasingly integrated globe. 
This process has impacts varying from reductions in the ability of 
the state to control business, to increased influence of international 
agreements on local cultures, and to direct influence on the makeup 
of the individual identity of citizens (echoing the Beck and Giddens 
analyses). 
The structure of production in re-organised capitalism is one that 
merely extends the trends evident in the analysis presented by the 
theorists considered in Section One. The power of flexible 
consumption that Harvey suggests as a driving force has remained 
evident. The world market changes even more quickly, as six 
monthly changes to the size, power and software associated with 
personal computers amply demonstrates. (This industry is, in fact, 
the very model that illustrates Harvey's central point about 'flexible 
manufacturing') The technologically sophisticated processes that are 
associated with the dynamic nature of change in the pattern of mass 
consumption have also spread further, impacting in new areas, such 
as the manufacture of clothing in China. This has been associated 
with developments in telecommunications and personal computer 
technologies, which have increased the speed with which separate 
businesses and the various divisions of individual businesses can 
communicate information, and design and manufacture new 
products. The technology is such that orders can be communicated 
from individual markets to an international base which re-designs 
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the range — of clothing for example — and then, via modem, 
communicates the re-design immediately to factories located in yet 
another country. 
In such a dynamic market the trend is to smaller firms, towards 
deconstruction of larger firms, and away from stolid bureaucracies. 
The advantages offered by small organisation structures have 
proved compelling to the established giants of industry; fewer 
management levels consider decisions, communication is faster 
throughout the organisation, and they are facilitated by and work 
effectively with the new technologies. 
The impact on workers of these patterns of change has been 
dramatic, as Harvey and Crook et al. emphasise. Flexible 
employment patterns are now even more evident, and challenges to 
organised labour are obvious. In Australia, for example, the trend to 
work-place 'enterprise agreements' is a natural outcome of the 
overall patterns of change within capitalist production, and it is 
therefore not surprising that the rate and total number of 
agreements formally entered into has increased since they became 
legally possible in the previously highly regulated Australian labour 
market.Harvey's argument that capitalism has become more tightly 
organised through these changes (1989:159) has proved simplistic. 
The position of individual business and capitalist production 
generally has been enhanced because of a number of trends that 
open up their environment. There are more opportunities because 
of the opening of international markets and the availability of 
international finance; because of new technologies that are 
increasingly affordable and facilitate flexible production; because of 
the popularity of market philosophies world-wide; and because the 
capacity (and willingness) of nation states to control their activities 
has lessened. 
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This last element should not be left without further clarification. In 
earlier discussion it was suggested that the state is also better 
equipped by new technology for control of individuals and that 
business is also more constrained by regulations (such as 
environmental controls) that reflect the concerns of powerful 
interest groups. This suggests tighter organisation, but the forces that 
favour a less organised capitalistic system in which business 
opportunities are greater than ever are clearly of greater significance. 
Ultimately the basic process of the decline of the corporatist state 
ensures a less organised capitalism than Harvey's argument 
suggests. 
Individuals in re-organised capitalism are, as Beck and Giddens 
indicated, faced with a far more complex and obviously more 
globalised social world within which identity is formed and 
individual decisions are taken. The 'risk society' is everywhere 
apparent. Technological change in the 1990s however, has 
empowered many individuals. More people than ever before have 
access to complex information and can communicate globally. 
The elements of re-organised capitalism considered in this chapter 
suggest a more significant role for business organisations in a more 
globalised world economy. Successful business organisations will 
make use of sophisticated and flexible technologies, will themselves 
be flexible and able to respond to the quickly changing demands of 
an increasingly complex world market and whilst still constrained 
by the state, be freer to operate than ever before, empowered not 
only by technology but by now dominant market philosophies that 
legitimate their operations and by the availability of finance and 
opportunity in the world market. 
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Successful firms will continue to be those that fit in with the already 
evident trend to small organisation structures; either small or 
medium sized firms or deconstructed large firms. Whilst there will 
continue to be a diversity of organisation structures evident in the 
world economy, those firms operating in dynamic markets will tend 
towards organisation structures that allow for flexibility, so they will 
not only be relatively small but will use network systems that 
maximise opportunities for quick response as well as increasing the 
ease with which alliances can be formed with other organisations. 
Despite the significance of the trends that have been discussed, re-
organised capitalism is not unchallenged as a form of industrial and 
social organisation. Flexible technologies and organisation 
structures, knowledge workers, and all the other trappings of this 
emerging system, overlap with modern forms, even in advanced 
economies, whilst in the less developed world modernist forms are 
probably dominant. The point is that change is taking place, 
complete with tensions and reactions from powerful and in many 
cases highly efficient modernist institutions and mind-sets, and this 
change favours re-organised capitalism.In both situations, 
modernism and re-organised capitalism, business is a significant 
agent of change, and a highly significant factor in the creation of 
environmental problems. The Beck analysis which suggests the 
rising importance of sub-political spheres, including (amongst 
others) business, technology and social movements, is borne out by 
the directions of change in the 1990s. In the next chapter this point 
will be expanded, and a positive role for business in its relationships 
with the natural world will be suggested. 
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THE NATURAL WORLD, BUSINESS AND 
RE-ORGANISED CAPITALISM: 
A WAY FORWARD 
The Negatives 
I have shown that the systems of organised and re-organised 
capitalism are part of a continuum; they operate with the same basic 
assumptions and share fundamentally the same ideological 
positions. Capitalism is anthropocentric, expansionary, 
technologically dynamic and cyclical, and as it has spread globally 
these characteristics have structured activities which are 
environmentally damaging at global, regional and local levels. This 
spread becomes more profound as the influence of market 
philosophies becomes more significant and TNCs gain access to 
more markets. Resultant economic growth requires natural 
resources and continual growth has therefore meant continual 
exploitation; it is tempting to agree with Giddens when he suggests 
this is a 'juggernaut society', or with Jacobs when he suggests that 
'market forces generate an overall result which no one has 
determined' (1991:25). 
Jacobs argues that the resulting environmental destruction is a 
combination of actions that are deliberately nature-averse and also 
the result of the totality of millions of individual decisions that lead 
to global problems such as the greenhouse effect. For him, the world 
economy is 'environmentally unconstrained'. The size of expected 
economies is difficult to gauge precisely, but is likely to continue at 
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above 5 per cent annually, a figure which will see a doubling within 
10 years. Brown (1994:5) suggest a quintupling of 'global economic 
output since mid-century', and points out that as much was 
produced in the first two and a half months of 1990 as in the entirety 
of 1950 (Brown 1994:6). The impact of this on the environment will 
vary according to the economic condition of the countries where 
growth is greatest and on the extent and power of constraints placed 
on environmentally damaging activity. This will become more 
significant in coming years. 
Related to this is the fundamental problem of population increase. 
Estimates vary, as the following figure indicates, but given that a 
simple way to calculate total impact is to multiply population by 
current resource usage per capita, any rise is likely to be significant; 
even in the best case world population will double. 
Figure 1: World population projections under different population 
trends, 1985 - 2160 
Billions of people 
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Slow decline in fertilityc 
10 11.41171 
Rapid decline in fertilityb 
0 
1985 2010 2035 2060 2085 2110 2135 2160 
a. Countries with high and nondeclinirtg fertility levels 
begin the transition toward lower fertility by the year 21305 
and undergo a substantial decline , by more than half in 
many cases- over the nut forty years. All countries reach 
replacement fertility levels by 2060. 
b. Countries not yet in transition toward lower futility begin 
the transition immediately. For countries already in transition, 
total fertility declines at twice the rate for the base case. 
c. Transition toward lower fertility (triggered when life 
ccpectancy reaches 53 years) begins after 2020 in most 
low-income countries. For countries in transition, declines 
are half the rate for the base case. 
(Source: World Bank, 1992:26) 
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The final fundamental that deserves mention is the gap between 
rich and poor nations which, I have argued, has its roots in the early 
period of colonialism, and which has increased since World War II. 
Re-organised capitalism has seen a continuation of a trend which 
was summarised by the United Nations. They suggest that in 1960 
the richest 20 per cent of the world's people absorbed 70.2 per cent of 
global income, and that this had risen to 82.7 per cent in 1989. The 
poorest 20 per cent absorbed 2.3 per cent in 1960 and 1.4 per cent in 
1989, and the ratio of richest-to-poorest has therefore changed from 
30:1 to 59:1 (Brown 1994:5). Problems for the environment occur 
because those at either end of the economic continuum are the 
likeliest to damage the earth; the rich because of high consumption 
of energy and raw materials, the poor because they harvest natural 
resources to raise money and pay debts, thus enabling the rich to 
externalise the true environmental cost of their activities. 
The results of these processes are environmentally destructive at 
every level, but can usefully be summarised with reference to a 
distinction between macro (global) and meso (national or regional) 
levels. Additionally, impacts are well described using the distinction 
between the 'stock and sink' functions of the globe. Stock include all 
the resources required for life, divisible into renewable and non-
renewable resources. The sink function is the capacity of the globe to 
absorb wastes. 
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The Macro Level 
At the macro level it is possible to argue a new case that the natural 
world has reached its limits. The earlier (Meadows, Meadows and 
Forester 1972) scenario was based on exhaustion of non-renewable 
resources, and has proven incorrect because market adjustment and 
technological change rendered their assumptions invalid. Spread of 
industrialisation and associated increases in total resources and 
energy usage, and the end of 'the latency period' of many pollution 
problems, have led to a new crisis, different in scale and type. There 
are now clear indications that the globe's renewable resources - 
topsoil, forests, water, fish - are being used at faster than replacement 
rate (Jacobs 1991, Brown 1989, Ehlich and Ehlich 1990). This process is 
pushed on by the continual growth in the world economy and world 
population. 
The sink function also provides evidence of crisis. Production of 
wastes is well above the recycling capacity of the biosphere, and the 
resulting pollution (where waste reaches levels that harm living 
organisms) is, as Beck and Giddens argue, now a feature of life in the 
global 'risk society'. With the growing size of the world economy 
(and its pattern of operation) it is now commonly argued that this 
sink crisis is of greater importance than the source crisis (Goodland 
1992:6). 
With this as background, a 1990s eco-crisis scenario is easily and 
frequently developed. Goodland (1992), chosen from a number of 
influential works (see for example Brown 1994, Gore 1993, Daly and 
Cobb 1989, Ehlich and Ehlich 1990), provides a useful summary of 
the current shape of this argument by putting forward five 
'evidences' that suggest the world has reached its sink and stock 
limits. 
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The first is that the level of human appropriation of the net primary 
product of terrestrial photosynthesis, estimated by Vitousek et a/. 
(1986) to be 40 per cent (or 25 per cent if oceans are included), will be 
unsustainable with little more than a doubling of population. The 
argument is that the world will quite simply be too full. The second 
is global 'greenhouse' warming caused by burning of fossil fuels and 
release of other pollutants such as methane, CFCs and nitrous oxide 
into the atmosphere. The effects, if this is indeed taking place, will 
include partial melting of polar icecaps and flooding of low lying 
areas - where most world population lives. The third evidence is 
holes in the ozone shield caused by release of CFCs, first detected 
over Antarctica in 1985. These allow harmful ultraviolet B radiation 
to leak through the atmosphere, damaging animal health. The 
fourth evidence is land degradation. Goodland suggests that '35 per 
cent of the earth's land already is degraded, and is largely irreversible 
in any time scale of concern to society. Such degradation is a sign 
that we have exceeded the regenerative capacity of the earth's soil 
source' (1992:13). The fifth is the decrease in biological diversity; the 
scale of this is, he suggests, largely unknown, but ranges between 
5000 to 150,000 species extinctions annually. Additional macro 
problems which deserve mention include air pollution, which the 
World Bank suggests affects 400-700 million people worldwide 
(1992:4); deforestation, which has negative impacts on biodiversity 
and the oxygen cycle and which is accelerating (Goodland 1992:6); 
and water scarcity, which is now impacting throughout the 
Wallersteinian periphery. 
This cursory analysis is sufficient to suggest that there are indeed 
major problems for the environment at the macro level. This is not 
to suggest that there is a complete understanding of the relevant 
processes, indeed there is considerable debate about the first and 
second evidences in the list, and generally speaking global 
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environmental change, as O'Riordan and Rayner suggest, 'remains 
a shadowy and elusive phenomenon whose indistinctness poses 
challenges to [risk] management response' (O'Riordan and Rayner 
1991:91). 
The implications for the future of these macro-scale problems is 
therefore unpredictable, even if they are analysed in terms of 
modernist (data collection/analysis of cause and 
effect/extrapolation/modelling) terms. They become even more 
problematical in a Gaian (Lovelock 1979) or Vernadskeyite 
(Vernadskey 1945) framework, both of which suggest that even these 
profound changes have a connection to a homeostatic world state. 
For Vernadskeyists the biosphere (his term) would adapt via 
complex feedback loops that would restore (a new) equilibrium. For 
Gaians the earth would protect itself, though it is possible the new 
world could be without humans. 
These reservations do not alter the immediate extent of global 
environmental problems and certainly do not deter those who, like 
Goodland, suggest that it deserves the description of a global 'eco-
crisis'. It is, however, too soon to suggest that the crisis is beyond 
control. Institutional change and expansion of knowledge may well 
resolve elements of the current eco-crisis. Nevertheless this remains 
a 'decisive decade' for the natural environment (see Hinrichson 
1991:5). The spread of re-organised capitalism and the continuing 
influence of industrial capitalism create major problems for the 
natural world. Decisions taken now by governments and industry, 
given the size of the world population and the world economy, are 
of enormous significance for the future. 
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Meso-Level Analysis 
At the meso level, these global environmental problems have 
obvious impacts; globalised risk translates to localised risk. The 
extent and type of risk changes according to a number of factors 
however. Values placed on the environment by government and 
business - particularly in the early stages of modernisation - are of 
critical importance. In the old Soviet Bloc minimal values were 
provided, hence the extent of environmental degradation is greater 
than in the neighbouring E.C. For example, in Poland and what was 
Czechoslovakia sulphur dioxide deposits in 1990 averaged 12,000 
micrograms/m2 every month, from four to eight times that of 
Western European countries. Lead, arsenic and other toxic elements 
released from the burning of high sulphur content coal in power 
stations have also accumulated in the soil and as a result one-third 
of children have bone growth retarded by ten months or more 
(Chandler, Makarov and Zhou 1990:76). In China economic loss 
caused by all forms of pollution rob GDP of about 2 per cent of value, 
and in Northern China the suspended particulates from coal 
combustion in all cities average 740 micrograms/m3, compared to 
averages in most of the USA of about 50 micrograms/m3 (Chandler 
et al. 1990:76). 
Community attitudes to the natural world and willingness to 
support stringent environmental regulations also affect the extent of 
environmental problems. The general tendency is for those 
countries with higher per capita income to have the tightest 
regulations, but as the following figure, which compares 
expenditure per capita on environmental waste management 
equipment, systems and services (EWMESS) with real GDP per 
capita, demonstrates, this relationship is not uniform. 
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Figure 2: Income levels and EWMESS expenditure, selected OECD 
countries, 1990. 
a In purchasing power parities. 
(Source: Industry Commission, 1993:24) 
The table only represents an indication of the situation since it does 
not reflect total environmental impact, but it is nevertheless an 
indication of the impact of diferent legislative and cultural 
networks on environmental crisis at the meso level. 
A more complete picture would include analysis of the extent of the 
environmental problems that EWMESS seeks to resolve (though it 
is safe to assume that these are wel beyond the scope of current 
expenditure in al the countries included in the table). It should also 
include the extent to which these countries externalise their 
environmental damage, by imports of rare timbers and woodchips 
for paper and chopstick manufacture for example, or by the extent 
and form of harvest they extract from the largest of the global 
commons, the ocean. GDP per capita and the distribution of power 
both globaly and within particular nation states has a more direct 
impact on the environment that should be specified. As Beck 
indicates, the poorer countries, poorer regions within countries, and 
87 
Chapter Three 
the poorest people suffer most from environmental exploitation 
and risk creation. Countries of the periphery export their resource to 
the core, usually for meagre gain. The oil rich Arab states remain a 
notable exception to this pattern, having asserted their resource-
based power in the early 1970s, but the experience of Brazil which 
exports rainforest timber to core nations is more usual, as is the 
export of woodchips from Tasmania to Japan for prices well below 
true value. Regions within wealthy countries dependent on global 
trade to a significant extent and with little of value to trade except for 
natural resources (which have demonstrated lower rises in price 
than value-added commodities over the past two decades) are 
almost as likely to have their remaining stocks of natural resources 
exploited as regions or countries with low GDP per capita. 
Differences come with the extent of control over this exploitation, 
and with the degree of environmental damage that is tolerated by 
the community. 
The poorest people in all societies end up suffering most from 
externalities produced by industry, particularly so in countries with 
unequal distribution of power and low GDP per capita. As Jacobs 
points out: 'It is almost universally true that poor people live in the 
worst environments [and] in many parts of the world degraded 
environments practically define poverty'(1991:17). 
The importance of the rate of national economic growth has already 
been mentioned in discussion of macro level impacts. The more 
specific meso level problems at different levels of GDP per capita are 
interestingly varied, as Table 3 demonstrates. 
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Figure 3: Environmental indicators at different country income 
levels 
(Source: World Bank, 1992:11) 
This supports the contention that meso level analysis reveals 
difering degrees of environmental damage at the national level. 
The same conclusion applies to analysis at regional level. Diferent 
regions within states have their own profile of environmental 
damage and chalenge: for example, Mexico City, which represents 
possibly the world's most heavily poluted area, and economic 
regions such as the Australian state of Tasmania. Similarly, 
identifiable geographical regions may have distinctive profiles of 
damage. The Aral basin in West Asia, which currently includes al 
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of, or major sections of, the newly established states of Uzbekistan, 
Turkistan and Kazakstan, is now suffering from disastrously inept 
government development policies centred on the Aral Sea. 
The broad conclusion from this macro/meso analysis is that 
industrialisation continues in many parts of the rapidly globalising 
world, while populations rise and with this the total use of both 
renewable and non-renewable resources. The basic elements of the 
capitalist approach to the natural world continue, and the 
sophisticated world economy of re-organised capitalism facilitates 
both exploitation of natural resources and creation of global risks. At 
the meso level, discussion indicates however, that such exploitation 
and risks are unequally distributed throughout the world. The 
picture is not entirely bleak though. There are positive changes in 
the global economy and society, and some characteristics of re-
organised capitalism offer real hope for the natural world. These 
ideas are explored in the next section. 
The Positives 
Global Agreements 
As globalisation of social and business life in the late 1980s and 1990s 
has spread the impact of various forms of capitalism, it has also 
raised the importance of international agreements. Nation states are 
now bound in complex networks of bilateral and multilateral 
cultural, trade, defence and, significantly for the natural world, 
environment agreements. GATT talks recognised 127 such 
environment agreements, 17 of which contained specific trade 
provisions (The Economist 30 May 1992:10). The trend towards 
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them can be gauged by the number of multilateral treaties signed by 
the USA which handle trans-border issues. Two came into force 
between 1940 and 1959, ten in the twenty years between 1960 and 
1979, and eleven in the decade of the 1980s (see Brenton, 1994, for a 
full coverage of this issue). 
Their usefulness for environmental protection varies, dependent as 
it is on the level of real agreement between nations involved and on 
limitations in the actual wording of the document involved, but 
they are nevertheless a powerful tool for environmental protection, 
and the most direct route towards resolution of the macro problems 
that have been discussed. Because of the encompassing nature of the 
global economy they are the obvious way to tackle the problems of 
the global commons (atmosphere, the polar regions, outer-space and 
the seas). This opinion, however, requires qualification which can be 
provided through examination of one agreement. 
The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer provides the best example of the complexities involved in 
developing a major international agreement. In the words of 
Richard Benedeck who played an important role in its development 
when USA Ambassador: 
On September 16, 1987, a treaty was signed that was unique in the 
annals of international diplomacy. Knowledgable observers had long 
believed that this particular agreement would be impossible to achieve 
because the issues were so complex and arcane and the initial 
positions of the negotiating parties so widely divergent. Those present 
at the signing shared a sense that this was not just the conclusion of 
another important negotiation, but a rather historic occasion. 
(Benedeck 1991:1) 
The agreement required a reversal of the trend towards emission of 
ozone depleting CFCs, and therefore major re-adjustments and job 
losses in larger chemical companies. The agreement is also 
instructive for the lessons it provides on what turned out to be 
workable structures for development of the protocol, and problems 
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of its implementation. The former included the failure of the 
traditional model of development for international agreements and 
later success of a cross-disciplinary trans-national, networking-based 
process. The latter provides a cautionary message about the power of 
existing institutional arrangements which cannot be overcome by 
more agreements at international level. In this case DuPont, ICI and 
other major CFC producers had planned to fit in with the treaty by 
phasing out CFCs over the next few years, stopping altogether by 
1996. Unfortunately, major CFC users, transport companies, building 
firms and the refrigeration and air-conditioning industries have not 
co-operated, and demand has not slackened sufficiently to cease 
production. In Britain the refrigeration industry has begun to lobby 
the Government for extensions to the deadline, and in the USA, 
DuPont, which intended to cease production this year, has actually 
been asked by the Environment Protection Agency to continue 
production in 1995 because of concerns about the nation's 140 
million CFC-using air-conditioned vehicles (The Economist 24 
January 1994:67-68). For the companies concerned the moving target 
of industrial demands has proved difficult to hit and they therefore 
must factor a degree of industrial uncertainty into already complex 
planning processes (ideas further discussed in chapter eight). 
This is not a unique situation. International arrangements are 
powerful but certainly not the sole or even perhaps the best answer 
to the problem of global environmental degradation. Individual 
nations must also take action to preserve their own environments, 
as must individuals and business. Macro answers must be integrated 
with those at meso and micro levels. 
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A Worldwide Growth in Community Concern for the 
Natural World 
Brenton's comprehensive survey of the history of the last 20 years of 
international environmental negotiations (1994) suggests that there 
are strong indications of the emergence throughout the world of a 
powerful constituency that believes the natural world is of critical 
importance. Naisbitt's broad summary of global change also 
concludes on this point, 'that protecting and preserving the earth is 
now seen everywhere as both politically correct and economically 
expedient' (1994:158). Such support for the natural world is solid. In 
Australia, for example, a credible Saulwick/Age Poll in May 1994, 
taken at a time of 11 per cent unemployment, found that 57 per cent 
of the 1000 surveyed suggested that Australians should concentrate 
on protecting the environment even if this means that economic 
growth will suffer, whilst only 33 per cent believed that there should 
be economic growth even if it means some damage to the 
environment. The percentages for a time of better economic 
conditions four years earlier on these questions were 62 per cent for 
the environment and 26 per cent for economic growth above all else 
(Richards 1994). 
This pattern of support for the environment is also evident in the 
global rise of environment groups, which operate with increasingly 
sophisticated networks to influence business and government. They 
represent a powerful indication to established institutional 
structures of the feelings of people confronted with a growing body 
of information that suggests that there are major environmental 
problems. Such groups vary in the scope of operations: some such as 
Greenpeace, are global in scope; others, such as the Australian 
Surfrider Foundation, cover a nation; still others, such as the Save 
Our Coast group of the North West Coast of Tasmania, operate in a 
relatively small region (see Hanson 1992, 1994b for context 
93 
Chapter Three 
descriptions). They vary with respect to tactics: some, such as the 
Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) employ professional 
lobbyists; others, such as Save Our Coast, lobby government 
informally; some, such as Earth First!, espouse radical or violent 
tactics; others, such as the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
operate as part of existing structures. Some have led to, are 
influenced by, or influence, one of the Green Parties formed in the 
late 1970s and 1980s worldwide (see Eckersley 1992, Pybus and 
Flanagan 1993, Porritt 1992, Eckersley and Hay 1992). 
The impact of such organisations is hard to judge precisely, but with 
every major environmental issue that can be identified they have 
had some influence. On whaling, Greenpeace has been influential 
for twenty years; in Australia green voters and groups have been an 
electoral prize that ensured the Commonwealth Government 
remained in Labor Party hands for the first two elections of the 
1990s; environment groups in Tasmania, together with Green 
parliamentarians, have been a significant voice in that state's 
environment policy for the whole of the 1990s; the most vocal 
objection to exploitation of Brazilian rainforest (and related 
exploitation of workers and indigenous inhabitants of the forest) has 
come from local environment groups. 
In the USA groups have been powerful for decades. Ralph Nader, 
for example, was able to mobilise the consumer movement behind 
environment issues: 'Public Citizen; the combined interest group 
that he put together, was able to launch an attack on GATT featuring 
environmental issues that was signed by over 300 groups, including 
such varied bedfellows as the International Garment Workers' 
Union, the American Cetacean Society and the Sierra Club' (The 
Economist February 27, 1993:19). 
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Such groups are more powerful in core nations than in the 
periphery, but are nevertheless evident worldwide. The changing 
membership of the International Organisation of Consumers 
Unions (IOCU), which fights aspects of TNC activity, including 
environmental matters, provides an indication. It was founded in 
1960 with early membership from the USA, Australia, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These were joined by Asian 
organisations in the early 1970s, and subsequently by Latin American 
organisations. The main office for the IOCU is The Hague, but it has 
been supplemented by regional offices in Penang (Malaysia) in 1974, 
and Montevideo (Uruguay) in 1986 (Bollier 1989:91). 
The strength of consumer organisations, according to Anwar Fazal, 
the IOCU President from 1978 to 1988, lies in a non partisan 
approach: 'Governments can deal with sectarian party politics by 
saying, "these people are saying it because they oppose us and they 
are trying to score political points." But the consumer movement, 
dealing with gut, concrete issues, can build campaigns in a way that 
other movements cannot. It is a power that can frighten 
governments because it can draw so much interest' (Bollier 1989:94). 
This, in Becldan terms, is effectively a comment on the power of a 
major sub-political sphere, as is the range of other discussion that 
demonstrates the power of environmental groups. Increases in the 
power of such organised social groups are a major feature of the 
deconstruction of the corporatist state and the development of re-
organised capitalism, and analysis of their power suggests the truth 
of Beck's assertion that the state has become progressively less 
powerful in the face of the challenges presented by such sub-political 
spheres. They will continue to push governments and businesses to 
behave in a more environmentally friendly manner. 
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Business and the Environment 
The negative impact on the natural world of global business has 
already been described. In the 1990s, however, there is also a 
significant body of business opinion and activity that represents an 
increasingly powerful shift towards environmental consciousness in 
the world business sector. This has developed in response to public 
opinion, to government regulations (which reflect both public and 
expert scientific opinion), and to a growing realisation within 
business of the negative social, environmental and economic 
impacts of many business activities. A number of aspects of this 
'greening of business' are worthy of special mention: 
• a greening of the market place; 
• the regulation-led waste management industry; 
• environmentally friendly business rhetoric and activity in 
the 1990s, business and sustainable development, and 
business operating in advance of likely regulations; 
• the significance of a growing environmental 
consciousness in large corporations and TNCs; and 
• the fact that, taking all these trends together (and they are 
intertwined), the move towards environmentally 
responsible activity is growing in power. 
A general greening of the market place is an obvious business 
response to public concern for the natural world. Green consumers 
and green marketing are now a significant part of suburban 
supermarkets throughout core nations, and since the late 1980s 
business and marketing texts and journals have grappled with issues 
such as labelling of environmentally friendly products (as do 
regulators, attempting to overcome cynical manipulation of the 
market by misuse of already vague notions such as 'recyclable' and 
'bio-degradable') and the development of environmentally friendly 
packaging systems which nevertheless also satisfy the market's 
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concern for 'attractiveness' and 'hygiene' (see Bennet 1991, Carson 
and Mouldon 1991, McKinsey and Company 1991 for a coverage of 
these activities). 
Much of the early response by business to consumer concerns was 
pure marketing, with no change to the products, although it also 
included attempts to develop green products such as plastic bags and 
batteries made from recycled products, and cosmetics made with 
minimal processing and pure ingredients which are minimally 
packaged. There are now many successful business organisations 
that have prospered largely because of their appeal to green 
consumers, possibly the best known being the 'Bodyshop' 
organisation, which sells environmentally friendly cosmetics, 
employs staff on the basis of their espoused social and environment 
consciousness, and attempts to source products from local 
communities without exploiting them. It started in the early 1970s 
and now has 1000 stores in 44 countries (see Roddick 1993). 
The power of environmentally ethical processes in the modern 
market place can also be gauged from the growing impact of ethical 
investment funds in western nations. In the US ethical investment 
is financially significant, with per capita investments in such funds 
standing at US$ 2,200 (Ball 1995). Much of this comes from major 
superannuation funds which are increasingly significant players in 
the world investment market, and which can readily redirect funds 
according to their perceptions of stake-holder expectations. They can 
be expected, world wide, to increasingly reflect environmental 
concerns in investment strategies, thus prompting business to 
become more environmentally aware. 
Reference has already been made to the regulatory response of 
government to consumer (citizen) demand. This response is also 
related to the advice of experts within bureaucracy (often the 
97 
Chapter Three 
controllers of Beck's 'expert systems') and to the advice of the 
scientific establishment, as for example in the greenhouse effect and 
ozone hole debates in which national and international 
governments relied on scientific advice. In combination these forces 
have led to regulations which are major contributors to growth in 
the global waste management industry, also called 'environmental 
services', or, to use the OECD classification, Environmental Waste 
Management Equipment Systems and Services (EWMESS). The 
basically positive but nevertheless varied correlation between rising 
GDP per capita and rises in demand for such services has already 
been referred to, and worldwide the market is significant. The 1990 
OECD estimate for the world market was $US200 billion, with a 
projected annual growth at 5 per cent leading to a prediction of 
$US300 billion by the year 2000 (Industry Commission 1993:27). This 
may well be an under-estimate since it does not adequately reflect 
demand in 'large developing nations' such as Brazil, China and 
India, and the market may well be worth $US290 billion in 1990, and 
around double that in the year 2000 (see Hanson 1993). 
This scale of investment is obviously significant but is only part of 
major business investment in environment-related areas. The force 
of the various influences that have been discussed on management 
and workers is profound, and the fact that the staff of corporations 
are also part of the concerned public that drive and share such 
concerns is also of major significance. The precise extent of sincere 
environmental concern amongst corporate executives is difficult to 
judge, but it is apparent in both actions and words. Business Ethics 
has, for example, called the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
Monsanto, a major corporation, 'an unlikely revolutionary' because 
of his repeated statements of commitment to the goal of sustainable 
development (Naisbitt 1994:160). 
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The DuPont CEO has also made himself its chief environment 
officer because he believes that this will ensure progress towards a 
series of environmental goals. Such statements of environmental 
concern are now common in business. It may be mere rhetoric in 
many instances, but the list of business actions which provide more 
concrete evidence of an environmental concern in excess of that 
required by regulation is also lengthy. A few examples provide an 
indication of the pattern: IBM has cut the use of CFCs by 38 per cent; 
ICI has a globally enforced minimum or no pollution policy and has 
shut down factories in Sydney when they could not comply with 
company policy; Proctor and Gamble (which sells 160 brands in 140 
countries) have significantly cut solid waste by reducing packaging; 
Volkswagen and other German car manufacturers are now working 
in advance of government recycling legislation (Schmidheiney 1992 
includes a list of such initiatives, as do Knight and Hailes 1992 and 
Fischer and Schott 1993). 
Such initiatives have been associated with a significant number of 
firms espousing support for 'sustainable development' (SD). 
Schmidheiney's book, for example, is the product of the Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) which indudes 
representatives from some 50 firms, all large organisations in the 
global economy. They do not claim to represent business generally, 
but nevertheless provide a solid indication that global business 
concern for the environment is already of significant proportions. 
The flexibility of the notion of SD provides problems when making 
general statements about business support for the environment 
based on adherence to its principles (the Pearce et al. 1990 'gallery of 
definitions' indicates the size of the problem), but at the least the 
BCSD initiatives indicate that sections of business are including the 
natural world as a significant factor in planning. 
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In part, support for the environment and for the 'balanced growth' 
that SD represents is an indication of the fact that many businesses 
now find it pragmatic to operate in advance of expected changes to 
environment laws. This ensures that costs of adherence to 
regulations are incorporated into long term plans, and assists entry 
of firms into sections of the global market place: environmental 
responsibility is one of the most visible marks of being a good global 
citizen. This is short of eco-sensitivity which operates in advance of 
pragmatism, but is nevertheless a useful transition from conscious 
exploitation. 
TNCs are significant players in this growing concern for the natural 
world. They are obviously more geographically mobile than 
domestic firms, and historically have been able to exercise greater 
leverage than domestic firms in negotiating financially favourable 
terms for entry to host nations. This is changing as the processes of 
globalisation provide a contradictory pressure to maintain a good 
image worldwide in order to ensure entry to new nations. The best 
corporate citizens (including the environmentally concerned), have 
an advantage over others when negotiating with foreign 
governments for access to new markets and rich resources. 
This is particularly important given that TNCs are 'extensively 
involved in environmentally significant activities' (UN 1992:226). 
For example, the largest 20 pesticide manufacturers accounted for 94 
per cent of world petro-chemical sales in 1990, whilst DuPont, a 
single company, accounts for about 25 per cent of world CFC 
production. TNCs also have managerial, technological and financial 
resources superior to most domestic firms and better access to 
knowledge. This raises government expectations about their 
environmental performance within host countries, just as their 
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global visibility and the speed of global information exchange in the 
1990s ensures that their performance is scrutinised by a global public 
and hence by efficient and active pressure groups. 
This does not mean that TNCs are purely agents for good in the 
world environment. They remain the agents for the spread of 
resource-exploiting industrialisation (either directly or through 
collaborative arrangements with domestic firms or government 
organisations) and continue to own a range of pollution intensive 
industries (although according to the 1992 UN report on TNCs there 
is no systematic trend towards such a practice; UN 1992:232). These 
factors do not change the basic line of argument offered here; TNCs 
are ready vehicles for the global transfer of new ideas, they are under 
pressure to demonstrate environmental responsibility, they have 
the skills, knowledge and technologies to do so, and they are 
engaged in environmentally significant activities. 
The processes examined so far demonstrate an environmentally 
positive pattern of change. Business is, for a variety of inter-related 
reasons, becoming more environmentally conscious. Business 
people generally now tend to consider the natural environment as a 
significant factor in planning, and for a growing number of powerful 
business people and organisations it has become a major 
consideration in planning. Reference has already been made to 
important results of this in terms of business investment in 
pollution control equipment, in recycling programs, in changes to 
packaging and in changes to marketing. An additional and 
important point is that these initiatives have, since the early 1980s, 
and particularly since the early 1990s, become increasingly common, 
and both the depth of response from individual organisations (the 
significance of individual initiatives and their impact on the 
organisation) and the breadth (the range of such initiatives) have 
increased. 
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The current approach to environmental management by business 
can be seen in terms of three eras, though Fischer and Schott (1993) 
suggest only two eras, beginning in the 1970s. The first went from 
1970 to almost 1985, and in this era Fischer and Schott (who refer to 
mainly American material) suggest that companies adapted 
unwillingly to the environmental challenge, and were happier to 
see the natural environment as a separate issue, hence their term 
'resistant adaptation'. In the mid to late 1980s the regulatory context 
for business became more restrictive, the appreciation of 
environmental issues more profound, and environmental strategy 
common in business. Major improvements in environmental 
performance were instituted. Texaco, a major US corporation, for 
example, was able to obtain an 8 per cent reduction in toxic 
emissions through use of new technologies and tighter monitoring 
and control between 1989 and 1991. Fischer and Schott (1993) called 
this 'embracing environmental issues without innovating'. The 
improvements to environmental performance were nevertheless 
highly significant, and because of the relative ease with which they 
have taken place, a number of prominent business writers have 
suggested that this means business activity and environmental 
protection are solutions to the pressure to become ecologically 
responsible. 
Michael Porter, perhaps the world's best known writer on business 
strategy, has suggested that strict environmental regulations actually 
enhance business competitive advantage because they lead to a re-
engineering of technology (Porter 1991, Porter and Van der Linde 
1995). Al Gore, now Vice President of the USA, has argued similarly 
(Gore 1993) and in making his argument about the need for 
government involvement in environmental issues suggests a 
variety of ways that corporations can benefit directly from the world 
trend towards more restrictive regulations. 
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This position does not, however, stand up to close scrutiny. It is true 
for major operators in the EWMESS area, and it is true if 'benefit' is 
defined in terms of the environmentalist's long term holistic 
vision, but for most corporations the impact of tighter regulations 
and the need to operate in accordance with established community 
pro-environment thinking creates major problems and yields 
significant short term costs. The breadth and depth of 
environmental initiatives demonstrates this point. The 'depth' is 
relatively obvious: as regulations tighten worldwide the standards 
for control over pollution and techniques used in resource 
exploitation (for example in timber extraction) become more 
difficult to meet. 
The 'breadth' is more subtle. It includes scrutiny of suppliers so that 
environmental problems are not 'imported' into the organisation. 
Scott Paper in the USA, for example, produced an inventory of 
suppliers ranked according to environmental performance and then 
dropped the worst 10 per cent (Elkington 1994:94). It may also 
include new training programs for staff (and suppliers), corporate 
environmental reporting and new organisation structures which 
include environmental roles at all levels. The financial implications 
of these activities suggest the possible difficulties created by these 
changes. 
In the USA the total annualised cost of environmental protection 
tripled as a percentage of GDP between 1972 and 1992, and on current 
trends is expected to increase still further towards the year 2000 
(Wally and Whitehead 1994:47). The likely emergence of new 
environmental problems, further raises in community awareness, 
and yet more legislation and tighter regulations will, if anything, 
increase the trend for business environment costs in advanced 
nations, and for TNCs in every nation of operation. 
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A 'third era' can therefore be suggested with roots in the changes to 
world business that have become evident in the 1990s, and in the 
increased costs of business compliance with environment-oriented 
thinking. In this era, characterised by improvements in 
communication technology, collaborative alliances, flexible 
manufacturing, ever-faster changes in markets, and greater costs of 
compliance with environmental regulations, business organisations 
will be required to extend environmental expenditure well beyond 
the obvious 'win-win' levels that have been achieved to date, and 
further extend both the depth and breadth of business compliance 
with regulations and public perception. 
This is a difficult task in which business organisations will need to 
take decisions that have little short term commercial benefit and 
obvious costs, and which provide no guarantees of long term 
benefits either. Such benefits may flow, for example, there may be 
improved public regard for the organisation and ready access to good 
people in recruiting campaigns, but this cannot be guaranteed. 
The third era therefore requires far greater commitment to 
protection of the natural world than that required in early times. It 
represents a sort of enlightened pragmatism that will be difficult for 
a business community, based on exploitative, expansionary 
assumptions of capitalism, to achieve. 
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A Way Forward 
At this point central elements of the business/environment 
arguments offered to date can be summarised before suggesting a 
way forward for business in its role in the environment crisis. It has 
been argued that there is major cause for concern about the impact 
of business on the natural environment in both the system of 
organised (modernist) capitalism and re-organised (late modern) 
capitalism. The system of capitalism featuring market philosophies 
and a fundamental role for business is currently oriented towards 
the continuing destruction of the natural world. 
The systems of modernist capitalism and late modern re-organised 
capitalism will continue to co-exist, so that the styles of thinking and 
organisation patterns characterising them may even be present in 
the same organisation. The pattern of change however, is towards 
re-organised capitalism. This favours organisations which are 
flexible (hence better able to adapt to a quickly changing market); able 
to make the best use of new information technology (itself a major 
pressure directing organisation forms towards flexible structures); 
compatible with the needs of late-modern service, and more 
especially knowledge, workers (who are harder to control than the 
traditional modernist workers); and more able to cope with the 
needs of the collaborative alliances that form an important feature 
of re-organised capitalism. 
Market and hence business-centred thinking has become more 
globally significant in the 1990s, and this suggests that changes to 
business attitudes and actions with respect to the environment will 
become even more important in the next decade than was 
previously the case. Business, working within the market system, is 
responsible for much environmental destruction, but it can also be a 
vehicle for positive change. 
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Such change is already evident in world business operations, and 
business concern for the environment will continue to increase 
because it is driven by broad and well established community 
concern, by powerful and well organised environment groups, and 
by government regulations that set increasingly vigorous standards 
for environmental protection. This is particularly significant in an 
increasingly globalised world which favours TNC's which are both 
numerous and operate in environmentally sensitive areas, and 
which need to operate in an 'environmentally friendly' fashion in 
order to ensure entry to foreign markets. TNCs also have the 
potential to operate as role models for business in host nations. In 
Wallersteinian terms, they are able to carry the environmental 
message from the core (where almost all are based) to the periphery 
of the world economy. 
As has already been suggested, we are now entering a third phase of 
business response to the environment which will require greater 
commitment from many firms than was required in early phases. 
Business organisations, in sum, are a powerful cause of 
environmental damage, but include elements that allow for this to 
change. The changes required of business are profound, but there are 
no ultimate 'ends' capable of precise and final definition in what is 
better seen as a process of continual and positive change made up of 
many incremental advances in a wide range of areas. Pinning down 
a valid and precise definition of a desirable end is intellectually 
impossible because, as Beck and Giddens have pointed out, 
knowledge is inevitably incomplete, and its worth subject to 
continual revision as new knowledge becomes available. At any one 
time the state of knowledge is inadequate. 
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Another problem is double hermeneutics. The very acts of 
definition, analysis and modelling distort the character of the 
phenomenon under consideration. Finally, the human world is 
infinitely complex and reacts to challenges, often solving them. This 
forces continual revision of the boundaries of definitions of 'ends' 
(see O'Riordan and Rayner 1991 for a development of this point). 
We do not therefore know the precise dimensions of the 
environmental problems that we now face and we must feel our 
way gradually towards solutions, making use of advances in 
knowledge as they become available. Such progress is based on the 
reflexive patterns of thought that Beck suggested as basic to late 
modernity. This does not mean that a guiding vision cannot be 
expressed - the direction of desirable change is clear even if the 
precise nature of particular targets is elusive. 
For business the vision as it can currently be expressed (bearing in 
mind that it will be subject to continual revision) is one in which 
business organisations in the complex global economy operate 
within ecological limits and seek to preserve the quality and 
diversity of natural resources. Expressed in terms of a continuum 
that describes the orientation of business action to the environment, 
the changes indicate movement between a position of total 
domination of nature to one which moves towards a position of 
eco-sensitivity which is beyond even the third era responses that 
have been discussed. 
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Figure 4: Business Action Orientation Towards Nature 
first era second era 	 third era eco-sensitivity Domination 
The points along the continuum approximate positions discussed so 
far. Domination is the capitalist position, anthropocentric, 
exploitative, expansionary. The first era represents unwiling 
business response to environmental regulations, the second era 
win-win responses, the third I have caled enlightened pragmatism. 
The final position is that of eco-sensitivity in which organisations 
strive to operate in harmony with the natural world, within 
ecological limits, irespective of any consideration of commercial 
pragmatism. 
The third era actions, culture and eco-sensitivity are steps along the 
way towards the goal of ecologicaly benign organisations. They are 
distinguishable by the degree to which organisation culture and 
practices reflect ecological, non-anthropocentric concerns and 
culture. In 'third era organisations' culture remains fundamentaly 
exploitative. Whilst more enlightened, the key to this approach is a 
far-sighted pragmatism that defends expansionary ideals. In eco-
sensitive organisations the culture is non-exploitative and far less 
anthropocentric, and the ideal is not ultimate expansion but 
ultimate ecological benignity. This is far more chalenging than 
third era thinking and indicates a break with the paterns of 
capitalist and re-organised capitalist action. The way towards this 
position for most organisations, however, is via third era actions 
and ideas since they prepare people and re-orient cultures towards 
eco-centricity. 
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The process is one of transition rather than a leap forward. The 
power and success of capitalism is such that any great leap is 
difficult, if not impossible, for commercial organisations in the 
complex world economy. 
This argument therefore does not rely on any 'great leap forward'; 
business organisations will rarely be founded on the basis of eco-
sensitive values and practices. It is even more unlikely, given the 
power of established profit oriented organisation cultures, that 
existing organisations will suddenly become eco-sensitive. An 
opportunity for transitions towards this ideal is, however, presented 
by the current system of re-organised capitalism. A range of 
government and community pressures to adopt gradually more eco-
sensitive approaches to the world is confronting global business and 
as it responds people and culture become steadily more eco-
sensitive. A movement through first and towards third era 
orientation towards nature takes place, accompanied by organisation 
learning at all points in the transition. 
This process of transition is aided by the structure of global business 
organisations. They are increasingly flexible in structure and 
therefore able to alter to meet new challenges; they rely on exchange 
of information to meet the demands of the fast changing global 
economy; and they are increasingly responsive to consumer and 
government pressure simply because this facilitates the process of 
profit making. All these processes, however, also help spread 
knowledge about eco-sensitive practices and eco-centric ideas. The 
transitions therefore take place both because of organisation learning • 
that results from an attempt to be competitive, and because of 
organisation learning that is directly related to the growing 
ecological awareness of communities and governments. 
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The transition may not take place quickly, nor will the process be 
evenly spread, since some organisations and some communities are 
more responsive than others. It is, however, taking place and can be 
assisted with new theory that shows the way, or at least generates 
debate. New ideas about the shape of eco-sensitive visions, new 
organisation cultures, new techniques for planning, new styles of 
leadership, new organisation structures, and more help from 
relevant areas of academic discourse are required. The second part of 
this thesis aims to provide such help. 
Before this, one final element of necessary background is provided 
in the next chapter, wherein the full magnitude of the task of the 
eco-sensitive organisation is made clear via a discussion of the 
complexities of the ecological systems with which they deal. 
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BIODIVERSITY: COMPLEXITY IN THE 
NATURAL WORLD 
Preceding discussion has indicated the deep roots of capitalist 
exploitation of the natural world and also suggested that while the 
world of re-organised capitalism continues to exploit nature it also 
presents an opportunity for positive action by business 
organisations, which form a powerful sub-political sphere. 
The challenge to those that seek to operate eco-sensitively is, 
however, huge. Eco-sensitivity means both willingness to act so as to 
protect rather than exploit nature and the capacity to do so. The 
question of willingness has already been discussed briefly and will be 
extended in the coming chapters. The question of capacity is, of 
course, affected by the level of skills and understanding within firms 
(something which this thesis seeks to address) but also by 
characteristics of the natural world. 
The following discussion aims to establish the extent of this 
challenge, using the notion of biological diversity as an exemplar of 
the problems of dealing with the natural environment. 
Chapter Four 
What is Biodiversity? 
Biological diversity ('biodiversity') includes the 'total variety of life 
on earth' (United Nations Environment Program [UNEP] 1994:146). 
According to Norse (1993:9) the term only appeared in conservation 
circles about 1980, and even then its originators either did not define 
it or did so inadequately. Knowledge has since advanced, and the 
most commonly accepted definition now includes three levels: 
ecosystem, species and genetic diversity (Norse et a/.1986), while 
others suggest a more differentiated system with five levels (Soule 
1991). The three level definition however, provides a useful basis for 
this discussion. 
Species diversity is the easiest level for decision makers and the 
general public to understand. It simply means the variety of living 
things on the earth. We do not know the total number of species, as 
Edward Wilson points out, 'not even to the nearest order of 
magnitude' (1992:132). The number of species so far identified, 
including all plants, animals and micro-organisms, is in one 
estimate about 1.4 million (Wilson 1992) but again from Wilson, 
'this figure could easily be off by a hundred thousand, so poorly 
defined are species in some groups of organisms and so chaotically 
organised is the literature on diversity in general' (1992:133). 
One of the problems in this regard is the lack of trained taxonomists 
to describe and classify species. Norse (1993) echoes Wilson in 
suggesting that there are only about 1500 people trained and 
competent to deal with potentially millions of newly located tropical 
organisms, and goes on to point out that the training of new 
taxonomists for work in marine conservation 'has all but ceased, 
and many of the most expert taxonomists are nearing retirement' 
(1993:198). The enormous variety of already identified plants, and 
their global spread, are important factors making classification 
112 
Chapter Four 
difficult. Of the 1.4 million species identified there are 751,000 species 
of insects known, 281,000 other animals (including 4000 mammals), 
30,800 protozoan, 248,400 higher plants, 26,900 algae, 69,000 fungi, 
4,800 bacteria and about 1,000 different virus species. The challenge 
for taxonomists is correspondingly large, and in a field of endeavour 
which achieves little public recognition and is complex, there is little 
likelihood it will be answered. 
Such variety is indeed impressive but there are certainly even more 
species on the planet than those already identified. Erwin's (1982) 
estimate is far higher still than that reported above. He suggests that 
there are 30 million arthropods in tropical rainforests alone, a 
calculation based on the number counted in one rainforest tree, a 
series of assumptions about host specificity, the total number of 
tropical trees and the proportion of beetles in the total fauna 
population. Given the significance of these assumptions to the final 
calculation, and the possibility of them being in error, other 
estimates from his research suggest between five and ten million 
anthropoids, but it is also possible that even Erwin's estimate is an 
underestimate (see Kitching 1993:19). 
Micro-biologists also suggest greater diversity than that already 
identified. A Norwegian group found between 4000 and 5000 
bacterial species in a single gram of beech forest soil, and a similar 
number (with no overlap) in a gram of sediment from shallow 
water off the coast of Norway. It is also probable that not even all the 
large and obvious species have been discovered yet. Since 1908 
eleven new species of whales and porpoises have been found, 
approximately 13 per cent of all whales and porpoises now known 
(Wilson 1992:158). 
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To add to the problem of recognition and classification species 
diversity is unevenly distributed throughout the globe, with 
equatorial regions richer in species than the poles, and a graduated 
level of richness between. There are less species with increase in 
altitude, and less with reductions in rainfall. In the sea, there are 
more known species on continental shelves than in deep sea 
communities. 
It is probable that species closest to or most accessible by humans are 
best known, while those far from the centres of human population 
or difficult to access are less likely to be discovered and classified. 
Marine species biodiversity is particularly hard to determine. For a 
start there is more sea than land - Norse points out that the Pacific 
Ocean could contain all the continents even if there were two 
Australias (1993:42). More significantly though, the difference 
between the bulk of marine and terrestrial worlds is huge. While the 
average thickness of the terrestrial portion of the biosphere is about 
20 metres, for the sea it is nearly 4000 metres and there is therefore 
simply more room for species (1993:42). Marine environments are 
also harder to research because we are terrestrial beings who cannot 
readily cope with the hostility of the marine environment. 
Consequently much of our knowledge of the sea has come about 
randomly, through such indirect means as nets and scoops, and 
even using scuba equipment divers are basically limited to the 
uppermost 40 metres of sea. 
The second level of biodiversity in the standard classification is 
ecosystem diversity which 'relates to the diversity and health of the 
ecological complexes within which species occur' (McNeely 1988:3). 
Ecosystems provide the natural cycles of nutrients that species 
require, and efforts to conserve species must therefore also aim to 
conserve the relevant ecosystems. Ecosystems vary according to type 
(for example estuarine systems are quite different from deep-water 
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systems) and, as Soule (1991) points out, within types (Middle 
Eastern and Scandinavian estuarine environments differ markedly 
for example), and any individual ecosystem is, in any case, unique 
because of differing local conditions. They are complex structures, 
and as will be argued shortly, incompletely understood. As with 
species diversity, attempts at understanding are inhibited by a lack of 
trained professionals, in this case ecologists, as well as by the 
complexity of the systems and the lack of existing knowledge upon 
which to build. 
For biodiversity management, the ecosystem level is harder to deal 
with than that of particular species because the boundaries of 
communities are variable (DASET 1993a:9). One response to this has 
been to use simpler 'habitat' definitions in order to better focus 
management effort. The notion of habitat, an environment of a 
particular kind such as a lake shore, or a particular environment in 
one place, such as the mountain forest of Tahiti (Wilson 1993:400), 
avoids the difficulties involved in making technical distinctions 
between ecosystems. DASET suggests that 'measurement of 
ecosystem diversity is still in its infancy' (1993a:9) and that further 
developments in knowledge are required before it can usefully be 
employed as a focus of environmental management by 
organisations. 
This said, it is also important to point out that a habitat or ecosystem 
focus is of particular significance to business organisations since for 
many of them their fundamental impact on biodiversity will be at 
this level. The falling of a large section of rainforest may result in 
the loss of a large number of hitherto unknown species (in Erwin's 
analysis) but will not, in the short term, impact on known species 
diversity; particularly not on the diversity of charismatic species 
which enjoy high public regard. The impact on a particular habitat 
or ecosystem may, however, be profound. 
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The third level in the biodiversity classification, genetic diversity, 
incorporates the notion of variability within a species, as measured 
by different genetic composition. Each species consists of at least one 
population of individuals, and those within distinct populations are 
more likely to breed within their local population than outside it. As 
Norse points out, the populations need not be separated by breeding 
location, but by timing. For example, Chinook salmon intermingle 
when feeding but separate for breeding into distinct populations 
(1993:13). Separate populations tend to differ, as a result of mutation, 
natural selection and genetic drift (random changes in the gene pool 
not due to mutation, selection or immigration). Within populations 
too, some individuals differ, and this is basic to evolution, since 
such differences may allow them to cope with environmental 
change. The 1992 World Conservation Monitoring Centre estimate 
is that there are 109 different genes distributed across the world's 
biota (1992:xiii), while Wilson (1992:161) provides a total of 10 17 
'nucleotide pairs specifying the full genetic diversity among species', 
but as with other estimates about biological diversity, these are out 
by several orders of magnitude: full knowledge is not yet available. 
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The Values of Biodiversity 
Biological diversity (of whatever type) has a number of 
distinguishable values, and in a protection program many of these 
values will be involved. 
Signifying values is a reductionist analytical process and a more 
holistic point of view should be set against it. This is well put by 
Ehrenfeld in his lively contribution to an ongoing debate about the 
usefulness of identifying specific values: 
Value is an intrinsic part of diversity; it does not depend on the 
properties of the species in question, the uses to which particular 
species may or may not be put, or their alleged role in the balance of 
global eco-systems. For biological diversity, value is. Nothing more and 
nothing less. No cottage industry of expert evaluators is needed to 
assess this kind of value (1988:214) 
Wilson extends this point, describing why biodiversity is of basic but 
general importance: 
Biological diversity is the key to the maintenance of the world as we 
know it. Life on a local site struck down by a passing storm springs 
back quickly because enough diversity still exists. This is the assembly 
of life that took a billion years to evolve. It holds the world steady 
(1992 : 15). 
However, as Ehrenfeld himself points out, the 'dominant economic 
realities of our time' (1988: 212) encourage analysis of specific values 
because they compel conservationists to justify efforts on behalf of 
diversity in economic terms. This is a response to the decision-
making environment of management, which is strongly influenced 
by the profit motive and market values for 'biological resources'. At 
its simplest this means that, if the 'resource' is to be preserved, the 
market value of retaining a biological resource in its pristine state 
must be greater than the profits that are likely to be generated by its 
exploitation. Such an approach sits squarely within a modernist 
approach to the natural world. In the more complex world of re-
organised capitalism, a more complex approach to valuation is 
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required. Recent thinking which seeks to answer this challenge is 
reflected in the following taxonomy of values, which can provide a 
useful summary, in a diagrammatic form, of major distinctions 
between human and nature centred values: 
Figure 5: A Taxonomy of Biodiversity Values 
Human 
Centred 
- Consumptive recreation 
- Subsistence consumption 
- Market oriented consumption 
- Non-consumptive recreation 
- Education 
- Research 
Indirect—I - Eco-system services 
- Option 
- Bequest 
- Existence 
Direct — 
Nature 
Centred 
 
I - Nature centred 
 
Human centred values include both current and future uses of 
biological diversity, while nature centred value is the value of 
nature in and of itself without regard to human use or interest. It is 
well expressed in the quote from Ehrenfeld offered earlier, by a range 
of deep ecologists, and even by eco-theologians like Thomas Berry: 
'the earth belongs to itself and all the component members of the 
community' (Berry 1993:48). This is perhaps the most difficult value 
for business to take into account in decision-making, and is logically 
impossible to measure because any use lies outside the human 
sphere. 
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Human centred values are more comprehensible, but for many of 
these too, measurement (and, hence, ready inclusion into 
conventionally rational planning systems) is either extremely 
difficult or impossible. 
Direct current use includes hunting and sport-fishing, which 
generally result in the death of individual animals, and is the basis 
for sections of the tourist industry. In Canada the total benefits of 
wild-life related recreation activities has been estimated at $800m 
annually (McNeely 1988:22). Direct current use also includes 
subsistence consumption, which is undertaken by locals in order to 
support a non market way of life, for example the Amazonian 
jungle provides forest-dwelling people with food, firewood, 
construction material and medicines, as well as the capacity to trade 
for other goods (Prance et a/.1987). 
Market based consumption values involve direct contact between 
organisations and the natural world. Resource based industries 
provide the most obvious examples of the potentially destructive 
impact on biodiversity of such activities. It is significant to note that 
the value of this use is the only one of those discussed that is 
routinely measured in money terms, since this suggests that 
organisations which confine themselves to such readily available 
measures of value will tend to develop resources irrespective of 
impacts on other values of the resources. 
Biological diversity is an integral part of non-consumptive 
recreation; activities such as bird-watching, bushwalking, and 
wilderness sight-seeing via bus or boat, are based on appreciation of 
species and eco-systems. In Nepal and Kenya such tourism is the 
leading foreign exchange earner. McNeely (1988:18) points out that, 
as a result of tourism, Amboseli National park is about 50 times 
more productive in money terms than the best possible agricultural 
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use of the land. In Australia 85 per cent of Japanese visitors and 70 
per cent of European and American travellers identified such factors 
as beautiful scenery and wild-life as key elements of their travel 
decisions (DASET 1993a:21). Eco-tourism, the industry term that 
covers this sort of activity is, in the mid 1990s, widely seen as a 
saviour for struggling regional economies blessed with tourist-
friendly natural resources (See Australian Heritage Commission 
1994). 
Education and research into biodiversity is a separable value, since it 
is directed at the gaining or dissemination of knowledge. Unaltered 
eco-systems and wild species are important for such research, which 
may result in new medicines and new insights. 
Indirect uses of biodiversity include the range of 'eco-system 
services' provided for humans. DASET (1993a) discusses protection 
of water resources by natural vegetation; sand protection; nutrient 
storage and recycling of nutrients; break-down and absorption of 
pollution (for example sewerage or oil-spills); climate stability; and 
(echoing Wilson) improving the capacity of nature to recover from 
unpredictable events such as fires or floods. This list summarises a 
complex array of values, deceptively difficult for organisations to 
include within conventionally rational planning programs because 
their money values are, even for an optimistic neo-classical 
economist, difficult to quantify (see however, Barde and Pearce 1991, 
for a more confident prediction). 
The category of future use values has become more important in the 
last decade, reflecting world concern with the notion of 'sustainable 
development', a notion that has been variously defined (see, for 
example, Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 1989, for a 'gallery of 
definitions'), but minimally involves use of long term 
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(generational) time horizons in planning and consideration of inter-
generational equity. The notions of option and bequest value are 
aspects of such a concern. 
Option value is that of preserving biodiversity in order to retain the 
option of developing at some future time (see Bishop 1986). A 
variation on this idea is Pearsall's (1984) concept of 'serendipity 
value', which is the value that might arise from preserving eco-
systems or species if this results in significant discoveries. The 
discovery of the maize species zia diploperennis illustrates this 
neatly. A Mexican university student discovered zia diploperennis 
in the west central Mexican state of Jalisco in 1979 ( hence 'Jalisco 
maize') and it was found to be both resistant to disease and a 
perennial, hence unique amongst maize species. When discovered it 
occupied only 10ha. of mountain land, and Wilson claims that it 
was 'only a week away from extinction by machete and fire' 
(1993:281). McNeely (1988) refers to it as teosinte and puts its 
potential world value at US$6.8 billion because of the possible 
contribution of its genetic attributes to domestic maize. 
Bequest value has been defined as the personal or social benefit 
received by the present generation from leaving resources for future 
generations to enjoy or use (Dixon and Sherman 1990:201). 
According to Pearsall (1984) it dominates all other benefits for 
wilderness areas (hence the biological diversity that such areas 
represent). For managers, however, it is a complex notion, and 
despite advances in the techniques used by economists to value 
benefits such as this, and particularly the increasingly refined 
versions of the contingent valuation technique, it is unrealistic to 
suggest that the reliable money values that managers would seek to 
incorporate into conventional planning processes can be readily, 
inexpensively or reliably obtained. 
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The existence value of biodiversity relates value to an individual or 
species unrelated to its actual or potential use. It is the value to 
people of a species, or an ecosystem and its genetic resources, simply 
by virtue of the fact that it is. This is separable from the notion 
(discussed above) of non-anthropocentric nature centred value, the 
value that is inherent within a subject irrespective of human 
valuation. 
Is Biodiversity Threatened? 
Despite the weight of opinion from biologists and ecologists that 
there are serious problems with biodiversity, and in particular with 
species extinction, there is an ongoing debate between optimists who 
suggest minimal rates of extinction (for example, Baily 1993) and 
pessimists such as Myers (1986, 1992) who suggests a total extinction 
rate of 30,000 species per year. Any precise figures are highly 
uncertain though, since the debate hinges on acceptance of the 
number of species in existence. Myers' estimates, for example, uses 
Erwin's problematic calculations and may be widly inaccurate as a 
result. 
Adding to this theoretical debate are the admitted facts that there are 
not enough taxonomists to identify already located species; that the 
term 'species' is far from standard; and that historical records of 
animal and plant extinction are unreliable (UNEP 1994:148). This 
last problem makes accurate extrapolation of rates of extinction 
difficult, and also makes it even more difficult to identify natural 
extinctions (those not associated with human impact), adding to 
difficulties already posed to that project by our uncertain 
understanding of biological processes. 
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Despite the difficulties of quantifying species extinctions and the 
impact on genetic resources and ecosystems, it is still clear that there 
are many problems for world biological diversity. The World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre (1992) suggests that species 
extinctions caused directly or indirectly by human activity are 
occurring at a rate that far exceeds natural rates of extinction. 
According to the UNEP: 'Extinction rates, although highly 
uncertain, tend to predict an accelerated and unprecedented loss of 
species diversity if current rates of tropical deforestation continue 
into the future' (UNEP 1994:148). They also suggest serious losses of 
genetic resources, while Reid (1992) suggests that the current rate of 
deforestation will lead to the loss of between 2 and 8 per cent of the 
planet's species over the next quarter of a century. The International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature's Red List of Threatened 
Animals broadly supports such pessimism, listing about 4,500 
identified species as threatened (IUCN, 1990), and this is certainly an 
underestimate given that we have not identified all the species, nor 
do we know the threat-status of all those which we do know. The 
news on the marine world is similarly bleak. Despite major 
uncertainties about numbers of sea species and eco-systems 
identified, Norse records the conclusions of a group of eminent 
marine biologists meeting at the Smithsonian Institute in 1990: '... 
the entire marine realm, from estuaries and coastal waters to the 
open ocean and the deep sea, is at risk' (1993:87). 
This general analysis can be given flesh by consideration of 
Australia, an island continent exploited within global capitalism for 
only about 200 years. Australia has, by current estimates: 
• 20,000 species of higher plants, of which more than 90 per 
cent occur naturally only in Australia; 
• 850 species of birds, of which 70 per cent occur naturally 
only in Australia; 
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• 146 (52 per cent) of the world's 280 marsupials, and 2 of 
the world's 3 monotremes (egg laying mammals); 
• 276 native land mammals, some 6 per cent of the world's 
total, plus 25 that have been introduced in recent times; 
• 700 species of reptiles, of which 88 per cent are endemic, 
the reptile fauna of Australian deserts being the richest in 
the world; 
• 54,000 known species of insects with at least as many still 
to be identified; many other invertebrates are equally 
poorly known; and 
• 3,600 species of fish and tens of thousands of species of 
molluscs; the flora and fauna of Australian coastal waters 
is one of the most diverse in the world. 
(Source: ABS 1992:15) 
The full impact of human activity on these flora and fauna species 
is, as with all nations, difficult to judge, because of inadequate 
knowledge both of the number of species in Australia, and 
(probably) of extinctions and threats. Michael Kennedy, however, 
claims that 'Australia has seen more mammal species go extinct in 
the last 200 years than any other continent or country on Earth' 
(1990:18). Of vascular plants 97 species are extinct and 3,329 are rare 
or threatened. Of mammals, 20 species and sub-species are extinct, 26 
species and sub-species endangered, and 17 species and sub-species 
vulnerable. Of fish, 7 species are endangered and 6 vulnerable. Of 
reptiles 6 species are endangered, and 14 species and one sub-species 
vulnerable. Of birds, 10 species and 11 sub-species are extinct, 11 
species and 13 sub-species endangered, and 15 species and 12 sub-
species vulnerable. Of amphibians, 7 are endangered and 2 
vulnerable (ABS 1992:49-50). 
Australia is obviously a nation facing a considerable challenge to 
retain current levels of biodiversity. Why is this the case? 
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Managers who appreciate that a problem exists also need  to bear in 
mind the reasons for possible threat. The macro level analysis of 
why the pattern of 'life at risk' is evident has been extensively 
presented in the first three chapters of the thesis. At this point, 
however, it is more useful to discuss meso-level reasons for the 
threat. If the macro-level focuses on general trends, then the meso-
level concentrates on the more or less direct reasons for problems; 
the direct threats to biological diversity. A good summary of the 
relative importance of threats to mammals is presented below in 
Table 4. 
Table 4: Relative importance of different threats to mammals 
Percentage of species affected 
0 	 10 	 20 	 30 	 40 	 50 	 60 
Cultivation and setknent 
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Meat 
Fur and hides 
Live trade 
Predators 
Competitors 
Limited distribution 
Persecution 
Disturbance 
Incidental take 
Disease 
Habitat loses •Exploitation III Introductions ElOthers 
(Source: UNEP 1994:150) 
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Habitat loss or alteration is the most important cause of loss or 
threat to species (and, obviously, given that it results in their 
destruction, to eco-systems). Loss of natural habitat is common 
worldwide, including loss of wetlands (a major issue now in the 
USA; see UNEP 1994:140); tropical rainforests (a major problem in 
Borneo, Indonesia, South America, and Australia; coral reefs (a 
problem worldwide, see UNEP 1994:150); and mangroves (a major 
problem in many nations as population clusters on the coast line, as 
for example in Australia). All such losses, either directly or 
indirectly, are the result of organisation policy, and in all cases there 
is a possibility for more eco-friendly activity from such 
organisations. 
Exploitation of species for meat, fur, medicine, and to satisfy demand 
for pets is also a significant cause of problems, on land and at sea. 
The list of species rendered extinct or threatened by such activity is 
too long to list, but for any such species the path to threatened 
conditions or extinctions will have been the result of a network of 
many decisions by individuals and organisations, often with those 
who take the massively injurious and (by then) final decisions being 
seen as most culpable in an increasingly environmentally conscious 
world. The complexity of such a progress towards extinction can be 
demonstrated with respect to current threats to sea turtles. 
These marine reptiles are long lived and slow to mature, taking up 
to 50 years in some cases. There are seven species, six in danger of 
extinction, having once been abundant in world tropical and 
temperate seas (Norse 1993:102). They have been hunted by 
traditional fishers for a number of reasons: food; for leather back oil, 
used by folk healers in the British Virgin Islands to cure respiratory 
complaints, or for use as a boat sealer by Asian fisherman; and eggs 
for use as aphrodisiacs. They are also hunted for thriving markets in 
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tortoiseshell, meat and turtle-leather (UNEP 1994:151). Such is the 
demand that they are hunted opportunistically by fishers; for 
example Honduran spiny lobster fishers kill all turtles they see 
because they know Japanese dealers will buy the shells (Norse 
1993:102). 
The impact of this exploitation is obvious from the current situation 
of Kemp's ridley turtle. In 1947, despite years of hunting and egg 
collection, more than 42,000 females nested in a single day on what 
Norse calls 'a remote Mexican beach', while the UNEP asserts more 
than 40,000 females were nesting there (Tamaulipas beach) in the 
early 1960s (1993:151). With egg collection, and incidental drowning 
in shrimp trawls however, numbers dropped dramatically. Norse, 
(1994:102), suggests that by 1968 the largest nesting aggregation was 
5,000 animals, and Lehrer (1990) records only 400 turtles in the late 
1980s, with Norse quoting Pritchard's (1990) estimate of 362 (Norse 
1993:102). 
The life cycle of sea turtles makes them particularly vulnerable to 
the exploitation that Kemp's ridley has suffered. All sea-turtles 
spend most of their life at sea, but lay eggs in batches on land in two 
to four year cycles - they are therefore predicably vulnerable targets 
who are without natural protection on land; slow moving, non-
venomous and basically non-aggressive. 
Sea turtles are also affected by pollution. Oil and tar injures the skin 
of baby turtles, and many die from ingesting oil (UNEP 1993:151). 
Chemical pollution, plastic waste and shore-litter which alters 
nesting sites also affect turtle numbers. 
The introductions category in the table includes problems with 
competitor or predator species introduced by humans, often 
exacerbated by habitat destruction which results in lower numbers of 
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native species. The impact of this pattern of threat varies globally, 
but an indicator of the magnitude of the problem can be gained from 
analysis of the Australian situation. 
At least 10 per cent of Australia's flora consists of introduced species, 
a total number of between 1,500 - 2,000 such species (Humphries, 
Groves and Mitchell 1992). Not all threaten native eco-systems, but 
many do; of 825 introduced in Victoria 412 are established among 
native vegetation, and of these 69 (8 per cent) are classified as a very 
serious threat and 15 per cent a serious threat (Humphries et al. 
1992). Native Australian animals are also threatened by 
introductions, who make up about 10 per cent of land mammal 
species. They include notable predators such as the fox and domestic 
cat, which can prey on native species for food; camels and donkeys, 
which graze on desert trees and render waterholes difficult to use for 
native animals; and rabbits, which have been a major problem for 
both the pastoral industry and native animals throughout all but 
North Australia (See Bureau of Rural Resources 1990, O'Brien 1989, 
Wilson, Dexter, O'Brien and Bamford 1992). There are also 96 
introduced species of birds, including 32 that have become 
established (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1992:35). Fish have also 
been introduced. For example, the European Carp presents major 
problems for the Murray River system and its native species. 
The overall pattern in Australia is therefore one in which 
introduced species have had a major impact on biodiversity, and 
control measures by Government have been largely unsuccessful; 
once established introduced species are exceptionally difficult to 
eradicate. There is no better world example of this than Australian 
attempts to eradicate the rabbit. 
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Pollution, persecution, opportunistic harvesting and disease also 
impact on species, as Table Four (p. 125) indicates and the brief 
discussion of the career of the sea turtle exemplifies. 
The overall lessons in this pattern of world threat to biological 
diversity are that: 
• it is occurring at an increasing rate; and 
• there are a variety of reasons for extinction, though, as 
the turtle example indicates, more than one factor will 
tend to impact on each threatened species 
These conclusions provide the background for discussion of 
impediments to planning for conservation of biodiversity. A 
number have already been considered, including difficulties in 
pinning down definitions of the notion of biodiversity itself, and 
also of defining the term 'species'; problems in identifying particular 
species; and problems in developing values in biodiversity. A range 
of further difficulties for management of biodiversity can now be 
indicated, in a discussion centred on the current lack of world 
knowledge about biodiversity, and in particular the sort of site-
specific knowledge that is particularly helpful to organisations. 
Further Difficulties for Managing Biodiversity 
Before identifying the complexities and various aspects of this 
uncertainty it is useful to note the level of general understanding 
that we now possess. Small populations and eco-systems that have 
been almost entirely wiped out are particularly at risk, since they are 
subject to extinction by chance events, by attacks from predators, by 
epidemics and by the actions of individual organisations. A single 
oil spill or serious storm, for example, could wipe out all of a small 
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population, and small, localised populations are more vulnerable in 
both the short and long term because they lack genetic variety (see 
Norse 1993:73-74, and discussion of aspects of this problem by Gilbert 
1986 and Soule 1986). Populations with low recruitment (either 
because of low fecundity or poor survival rates among the young) 
are also vulnerable, since they cannot replace lost members. Species 
with specialised habitats, diet, or other particularly specialised 
requirement in their ecological niche are also especially vulnerable, 
as for example Ridley's sea turtle, which has only one major nesting 
site even though it ranges widely in other aspects of its life. 
Problems with the relationship of species to the human world also 
provide basic lessons: species with high value to humans, especially 
those that satisfy specialised demands with few or no substitutes (as 
with use of rhinoceros horn as an aphrodisiac) are especially 
endangered; species living in close proximity to humans are 
endangered (as with whitebait in the Australian State of Tasmania); 
and large animals that are readily located and exploited are 
vulnerable (as the highly endangered Sumatran rhinoceros 
demonstrates). 
Reid and Miller (1989) summarise specifically ecological knowledge 
of use to managers in a discussion of the value of biodiversity in 
maintaining ecological processes. In their analysis they use the same 
definition of biodiversity as the current discussion, and define 
ecological processes as 'the interactions among species and between 
species and their environment' (1989:4). 
They begin by suggesting that no simple relationship exists, but that 
in a 'somewhat chaotic view of nature', six ecological relationships 
of use to managers can be identified. 
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First: regardless of how static they appear the mix of species making-
up communities and eco-systems changes continually (1989:6). 
Species within communities respond to environmental change 
differently, so, Reid and Miller argue, the object should not be to 
maintain the exact composition of 'communities' but to maintain 
species in such a way that allows eco-system changes to continue. 
The example provided to support this proposition suggests that it 
can best be interpreted at a general level as applying to broad climatic 
changes, rather than specific alterations of eco-systems, as for 
example with the alteration by BHP of the Fly River system in Papua 
New Guinea, where pollutants from mining have led to significant 
changes to the river ecology and adversely affected its use by local 
people. 
Second, 'species diversity increases as environmental heterogeneity 
- or patchiness of habitat does' (1989:6). 
Third, environmental heterogeneity 'affects not only the 
composition of species in an eco-system, but also the interactions 
among species' (1989:7). 
Fourth, periodic natural disturbances play an important role in 
creating the patchy environments that foster high species richness. 
Examples of such disturbances include periodic earthquakes and 
bushfires, and for organisations this means that it 'is often necessary 
to allow natural patterns of disturbances to continue, or at least to 
manage the environment so as to preserve natural patterns of 
succession' (1989:7). For government instrumentalities in control of 
national parks this is difficult, just as it is for commercial 
organisations that regard the wood that may be burned in a 'hazard 
reduction fire' as a resource. 
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Fifth, 'both the size and isolation of habitat patches can influence 
species richness, as can the extent of the transition zones between 
habitats' (1989:7). 
Sixth, 'certain species have disproportionate influences on the 
characteristics of an eco-system' (1989:7). Such keystone species are 
therefore of central importance to organisations striving to 
maximise eco-system integrity. (Of course, for organisations to use 
the idea there must be adequate knowledge of the eco-system, and of 
the relevant keystone species). 
Behind such generalisations is a wealth of ecological knowledge. We 
certainly know far more about interactions in the natural world now 
than ten years ago, and a modern ecology text such as Colinvaux 
(1993) provides a range of insights. 
Despite these accounts of 'useful lessons' we know far less about 
ecological processes generally and those specific eco-systems affected 
by organisation activities than we need to, and this lack of 
knowledge provides a major obstacle to environmentally sensitive 
organisations. Individual eco-systems are vulnerable and complex, 
defying all but the very broad, minimally useful, generalisations 
offered in the previous paragraphs. Consequences cannot therefore 
be tied to a single cause and for managers the reverse is also 
unfortunately the case; single events can lead to varied 
consequences in both the short and the long term. 
Swingland's basic conclusions on the relationship between loss of 
habitat and loss of biodiversity provide a good indication of the 
extent of understanding. He suggests that '... [it] has never been 
satisfactorily characterised and there is no predictive model for 
policy-making and planning' (1993:122). Dietz and van der Straaten's 
conclusions on the effect of pollution on eco-systems are similar, 
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and again representative of modern research. They assert that: 'In 
general processes in nature, and hence, human interventions in the 
processes, appear to be hardly predictable for at least three reasons' 
(1992:334). The first reason is that of synergistic effects, when the 
combined effects of pollution are greater than the sum of the 
separate effects. The second is the presence of threshold effects in 
eco-systems, and the fact that the threshold level is unknown. The 
best example of this broad pattern in operation is acid rain which 
caused a sudden dying off of forests in Europe in the 1980s, startling 
scientists. The buffeting capacity of soil had protected trees, but once 
its hitherto unknown threshold was reached, trees died. The third 
effect - now widely publicised by Beck (1992a, 1992b) - is that many 
emissions have delayed effects. A generation after a chemical spill, 
for example, there may be major impacts. 
Concluding Comments 
The foregoing discussion suggests fundamental scientific reasons for 
the current lack of knowledge about biological diversity; it may well 
be that precise knowledge about individual species and eco-systems 
is, given current levels of understanding, simply not available 
irrespective of the level of resourcing for research. Added to this, 
however, there are a number of socio-political reasons for our lack 
of knowledge. 
The knowledge of traditional users of the land and sea is not 
generally available, and little valued by the dominant cultures 
within the world economy. This means that insights gained over 
many generations are denied policy-makers. Within the scientific 
community too, problems occur, Norse suggests, because 'most 
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scientists would rather generate information that is stimulating 
than information directly pertaining to modern challenges, no 
matter how much it is needed' (1993:155). 
There are also problems gaining sufficient funding for research into 
biological diversity generally, and into specific sites in particular. 
Research is expensive, and long term research especially difficult to 
justify in conventionally legitimated short term planning systems. 
The transfer of knowledge already gained is an additional problem. 
Problems with transfer of traditional knowledge has already been 
mentioned, but added to this is the fact that much useful 
information is retained within the scientific establishment, within 
certain particular government agencies, or contained within 
nations, rather than made broadly available. This pattern will 
ultimately change as a result of the developments in world 
communications technology analysed in chapter two, but it will 
remain largely as it is for many years yet. 
Within the government sector too, overlapping national and 
regional jurisdictions create further impediments to preservation of 
biodiversity. Overlapping jurisdictions may create problems for 
organisations that seek to develop since they suggest many 
regulatory bodies that must be satisfied. On the other hand they may 
create a policy vacuum as bureaucrats argue over who has the power 
to do what. Less ambiguously, gaps create opportunities for 
unregulated (or at least less regulated) exploitation by organisations. 
The largest 'gap' in global regulation comes with the fact that about 
two thirds of the world's seas are not under any national 
jurisdiction (Norse 1993:174), and this provides some explanation 
for the problems Norse and others see with this fundamental 
resource. 
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In a world economy which remains fundamentally committed to 
continual growth and which is organised by an anthropocentric 
money-values driven market, the pattern is for exploitation of 
biodiversity to continue in the absence of knowledge. This can be 
demonstrated by a brief examination of the history and current 
situation of representative species in the Australian south-east 
fishery. 
This is a diverse multi-species trawl fishery catching more than 80 
species, including 16 species on which quotas have been placed. The 
total commercial value of the fishing in 1991 was approximately 
$64m (Bureau of Resource Sciences 1992a). However, despite the 
significance of this fishery to the Australian economy, relatively 
little is known about the stock of the 16 quota (controlled take) fish 
that are central to the fishery. Adequate information on stock 
structures is known for only four of these fish, and the Fishing 
Status Report (1992) suggested a need for greater efforts to gather 
baseline data, whilst admitting that 'lack of knowledge of stock 
structure and inability to derive yield estimates for most species 
highlights the uncertainty surrounding the assessment for this 
fishery'. (Bureau of Resource Sciences 1992a). This lack of knowledge 
creates obvious problems for policy makers attempting to set quotas, 
and also for managers of fishing operations dependent on the 
fishery for a profit. The nature and extent of these problems becomes 
more obvious with analysis of the Orange Roughy, Giant Crab and 
Gemfish. 
Orange Roughy principally inhabit cold (4-7°C) deep (700m to about 
1,400m) waters between Port Stephens in New South Wales and 
Cape Naturalist in Western Australia. They were first recorded in 
Australian waters in a 1972 trawl survey, but it was not until the 
discovery of a large aggregation of them off St Helens in Tasmania 
that they became a commercial possibility. They are believed to grow 
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slowly and live to about 150 years. Maturity comes between 30 and 32 
years when the fish are 28-32 cm long and weigh between 500-800 
grams (Bureau of Resource Sciences 1992b). Because they aggregate 
tightly they can provide very high catches; trawl 'shots' of 30-40 
tonnes were common after a few minutes trawling off St Helens 
Hill, a major gathering place for the fish. 
Incentives to fish are great, and in 1992 the price to fishers for whole 
fish was A$2.50 per kg, and domestic consumers were paying 
A$12.00 to A$18.00 per kilogram for white fillets. Using the $2.50 
figure, a good trawl 'shot' was worth A$300,000. The financial 
incentive to over-fish the resource is therefore huge. There are 
Tasmanian East Coast anecdotes of fishermen 'paying off' modern 
fishing boats in a single trip to the Orange Roughy fishery. 
At its peak in 1990 the fishery yielded 40,000 tonnes, up from a few 
hundred tonnes in 1984. The 1992 tentative estimate of sustainable 
yield, however, was a mere 2,900 tonnes. The fishery was clearly 
over-exploited in the golden years of 1989-1991. In this time scientific 
knowledge necessary to obtain a good estimate on the total mass of 
fish, of their growth rate, and their fecundity was lacking, and with it 
the background necessary to set up a sustainable fishery based on 
well researched regulations (Hanson 1993, 1994a). 
This problem of lack of scientific knowledge was, however, only a 
problem for experts, not for small business people in a conventional 
free-enterprise situation. Fishers took the short term profits and 
worried about the species only when it looked possible that the 
future of the commercial fishery may have been jeopardised. The 
scope of responsibility for small business faced with good 
possibilities of high profits was limited so much in this case that it 
arguably did not exist. In the absence of regulations and quotas most 
fishers appear to maximise short term profits. The profits in sections 
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of the fishing industry are so good and, given the basic characteristic 
of non-excludability, the likelihood of detection for breach of 
regulations so remote, that a regulatory approach is often inadequate 
and poaching and quota evasions in the fishing industry generally 
are common. The 1993 Professional Fishermen's Association 
Conference in Tasmania centred on the problems of poaching, and it 
was claimed that the $95m abalone industry was under threat 'from 
sophisticated mainland operations using small high speed boats and 
helicopters' (The Examiner 28 September 1993:5). 
A similar experience is evident in the even shorter 'career' of the 
King Crab, a red and white crustacean weighing up to 15 kg which 
comes from waters usually more than 400m deep. In 1990 the 
harvest was only a few hundred kilograms a year; in 1992, according 
to the Tasmanian Department of Primary Industry, it was almost 200 
tonnes. The King Crab's lifespan, age at maturity and estimated 
population remain a mystery, but with up to $200 obtainable from a 
single large specimen there is a strong financial incentive to fish the 
resources as quickly as possible (Darby 1993:2). In this case 
management of the biological resource, reliant as it is on knowledge 
that it is difficult to obtain, still lags behind the operations of 
conventionally motivated free enterprise operators. 
The south-eastern trawl Gemfish also presents a similar picture. It is 
found along Continental slopes from Cape Moreton in Queensland 
to Shark Bay in Western Australia. Annual catches in the fishery 
before 1970 were less than 280 tonnes, but rose rapidly to 5,000 
tonnes of 'eastern' Gemfish in 986 and 360 tonnes of 'western' 
(Tasmanian) Gemfish in the same year. Quotas were set in 1988 (and 
exceeded in that year) but by 1989 the quotas could not be filled, and 
the Fishery Status Report said that: 'All available evidence therefore 
points to a dramatic decline in the recruitment of young fish in 
recent years. The magnitude of this severe recruitment decline 
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causes grave concerns about the continued viability of the Gemfish 
resource' (Bureau of Resource Sciences 1992c) There was, 
accordingly, a 'nil quota' set for 1990. Scientists are still, some 20 
years after the fish was first commercially significant, uncertain 
about the number, size, and extent of Gemfish stock, and about the 
causes of 'recruitment failure'. 
To this point it has been suggested that biodiversity, and in 
particular site specific biodiversity, is largely unknown and perhaps 
unknowable. It is little researched and this situation is likely to 
continue. For organisations seeking to plan with protection of 
biodiversity in mind however, the situation is even more complex 
and uncertain. Any business is already subject to numerous 
uncertainties with respect to changing markets, competitors, 
governments, and internal factors such as work force opinion and 
leadership style and changing technology. In combination the 
uncertainties and imponderabilities of biodiversity and those of the 
business environment are truly a complex system 'in the sense that 
many independent agents are interacting with each other in a great 
many ways' (Waldrop 1992:12). There is no inherent order in this 
interaction and no entirely predictable course can be charted. 
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Preceding chapters have discussed important processes in the 
'external world' facing organisations. They can be categorised using 
the distinction between 'remote environment' and 'competitive 
environment'. The former includes influences outside any 
particular industry, the latter (adapting Porter 1980) includes firms 
within a particular industry, their suppliers, substitute products, 
potential new entrants, and (going beyond Porter's model), firms 
with which they exchange or obtain staff and ideas. The remote 
environment - the major focus of the discussion so far - provides a 
pervasive influence on organisations, affecting fundamental values 
and providing basic guidance for organisation activity, while the 
competitive environment is of more immediate influence on 
strategies within a particular industry. This 'external world' of 
organisations is presented on the next page in a figure which shows 
the remote world in detail, but in order to simplify matters, it offers 
only the general descriptor for the competitive environment. All 
influences, however, can be assumed to be systemicaly connected to 
all others. 
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Figure 6: The External World of Organisations 
REMOTE WORLD 
This is a simplified picture of a generic organisational environment, 
offered here for heuristic purposes rather than as the picture facing 
any particular organisation. It provides necessary background for a 
discussion of organisation (meso) level matters because it makes 
clear the 'whole' within which organisations are placed, and as 
Senge (1992:42) suggests, the capacity to see patterns within a whole 
is essential to understanding. In this case the complexity of the 
whole is a fundamental message as is the realisation of the rate of 
change in the system. 
The importance of inter-relationships is also clear in the diagram; 
change in one element of the remote system affects others. For 
example, environmental lobby groups influence governments to 
change environmental regulations in a process facilitated by 
developments in global technology. As well, any remote element 
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can influence any element of the competitive environment with 
consequent impact on individual organisations. Finally, any 
element of the remote environment may (ultimately) influence 
organisations directly. As more detailed discussion in chapter five 
will make clear, this does not mean that organisations are here 
viewed as open systems (as for example in Kast and Rosenzweig 
1979, and Lawrence and Lorch 1967) but, consistent with an 
autopoietic view, as basically self-referential. Their relationship with 
the broad environment is largely self determined, mediated by 
organisation culture and the perception of staff (see Morgan 
1986:237-238). 
Organisations are therefore slow to change, even though forever in 
a state of flux as the components within the system that make up 
any organisation respond (in their own terms) to challenges from 
the broad environment. Such organisations are best conceived of as 
non-linear feedback systems in which components are connected by 
feedback loops. So, for example, the relationship between 'planning' 
and 'world view' (components which will be further defined 
shortly) is one in which a change in, say, planning, because of an 
altered world view, may be either more or less proportional to the 
'force' of that change. A minor change in world view may therefore 
create a major change in planning processes. In other words, 
components are connected in a network of indeterminate mutual 
causality. 
Relations between internal components of any organisation and 
between the organisation and the broad environment are therefore 
in a continual state of flux. There is unending change, but, given the 
autopoietic (self-referential) orientation of such systems, this change 
is of an incremental rather than significant nature. Nevertheless, as 
Morgan (1986:254) points out: 'An understanding of mutual 
causality in complex systems shows it is extremely difficult to halt 
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change, to eliminate all positive feedback, or to preserve a given 
mode of organisation indeterminably'. Organisations do change 
slowly in order to fit in with changes in the broad environment, but 
on their own terms (this process is further explored in chapter five). 
To further complicate matters, as the separate discussions in 
chapters one and two have suggested, the external world facing 
organisations is affected by the multi-layered pattern of change in 
sections of the world's periphery towards industrial capitalism, and 
in these and other sections of the Wallersteinian periphery and core, 
towards reorganised capitalism. Whatever the position of 
individual organisations on the capitalism/reorganised capitalism 
transition, however, the world economy in which they operate 
remains growth oriented and anthropocentric. Nevertheless, as 
discussion in chapter three suggested, the pattern of re-organised 
capitalism offers an opportunity for organisations to move towards 
greater eco-sensitivity. They are pressured by governments and a 
concerned public, and as the following discussion will make clear, 
many of the organisational practices that facilitate eco-sensitive 
activity are already taking place for a variety of other reasons as well. 
For example, moves towards more flexible and responsive 
organisation structures are indeed part of eco-centric management 
but are also required if manufacturing organisations are to compete 
in the volatile world economy. 
Such change towards eco-sensitivity by business will, however, be 
slow and unevenly spread, since not all organisations will respond 
equally to the pressure from elements of the remote environment to 
become ecologically aware. Those working to meet tight regulations 
or in particularly sensitive social environments are likely to be more 
responsive than others. TNC's which need to be responsive to many 
different nations are likely to be sensitive if even one of those 
nations requires them to be so because they have need of a good 
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trans-national reputation. On the other hand, small organisations 
that have relatively little obvious impact on the environment, local 
cheese makers, for example, are likely to be less reactive to broad 
changes in social and political sensitivity - ultimately they too must 
react, but their position is less vulnerable than TNC's or more 
identifiable targets such as polluters or forestry operators publicly 
cutting 'charismatic' rain forest. 
Some organisations, irrespective of position in the world or 
production process, may be more sensitive than others because of 
the experience and values of individual managers within the 
competitive environment. For example, a bicycle manufacturer with 
few apparent problems may have a leadership team that both 
believes in preserving the natural environment and has some 
knowledge of how to do this, and as managers shift around within 
the world economy this becomes more likely. A Malaysian bicycle 
manufacture leadership team may be very alert to pollution 
problems, to biodiversity in the company grounds, and to recycling 
operations, because they worked with environmentally aware 
managers in Holland where managers were already sensitive to 
such issues. 
In order to encompass such variety in a discussion of organisation 
level change and also as a reflection of the idea that change within 
organisations will be gradual, discussion in Part B focuses on 
'transitions' required in fundamental internal components of 
business organisations if managers are to operate with greater 
sensitivity towards the natural world. 
Four components (each in itself a non-linear feedback system of 
inter-related elements), will be discussed: organisation world view; 
planning and information development; organisation structure; and 
leadership. 
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The notion of 'world view' is used here to describe 'the conception 
of reality that a person or group uses to explain how the pieces of 
their experience fit together' (Cavaleri and Obloj 1993:82). This group 
of elements most obviously reflects the impact of change in the 
external world, and the characteristics of the broad culture that 
moulds organisation culture and ideas.It is also of central 
importance to any transition towards gradualy less anthropocentric, 
expansionary and exploitative positions with request to nature 
because it 'colours' al thinking and practice. Discussion is divided 
into two chapters. Chapter five considers broadly conceived 
elements of world view of fundamental importance to 
organisational orientation towards the natural world. Chapter six 
discusses important areas of change in external academic discourse 
and expert opinion that have an important impact on organisation's 
world views. 
In chapter five, therefore, transitions 
considered: 
unrestrained 
anthropocentricism 
resource exploitative 
organisation self 
limited (anthropocentric) 	  
risk stance 
Chapter six discusses transitions from: 
in elements such as these are 
normal science 
conventional economics 
-■ new science 
4. ecological economics 
Chapter seven discusses the model of strategic planning most 
suitable for ecologicaly sensitive planning including discussion of 
transitions such as these: 
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eco-leader 
tolerance of chaos in issues 
and diversity in staff 
transformational 
leadership 
concentration on process 
and culture 
network organisation 
communication bias 
conventional leader 
emphasis on order 
transactional leadership 
concentration on 
immediate issues 
bureaucratic organisation 
authority bias 
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strategic planning 
primary use of single 
discipline knowledge 
bias towards single focus 
solutions 
eco-learning based 
strategic management 
primary use of multi-
disciplinary knowledge 
bias towards multi-
focus solutions 
Chapter eight develops this idea further, discussing the planning 
and information handling systems that are related to eco-learning: 
emphasis on short term 
expectation 
linear language 
considering detail 
complexity 
emphasis on long term 
expectation 
feedback language 
considering dynamic 
complexity 
Chapter nine comprises discussion of two components, structure 
and leadership and includes mention of these transitions: 
Some elements of these transitions can now be presented in a figure 
representing aspects of both their internal systemic relationships and 
their links with the direction of change in the external world. The 
intention is to present the pattern of the whole rather than all 
elements in it, or the dynamically complex feedback loops that make 
them up since that would make the picture too complex for useful 
viewing. In the figure, as a reflection of its central importance in the 
transition towards eco-sensitivity, 'world view' is positioned at the 
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centre of a triangle made up of the remaining components (or 
groups of elements). Nevertheless all the components can be 
assumed to be related to all others and 'world view' is therefore a 
weighted component within the system. 
As Figure 7 (see page 147) makes clear, a complex of systemic 
interactions make up the overall transition. Only three 'moments' 
in this transition are portrayed and only two of these are presented 
in any detail, but they can be taken as representative of many parts 
in a continuing process. 
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Figure 7: Transitions to Eco-Sensitivity 
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This is an argument for incremental change, and the focus is on key 
points in a number of important transitions that will take place as 
management behaves in an ever more eco-centric fashion. There is 
no intention, however, to define immutable end points for the 
transition, merely to arrive at an understanding of the changes 
associated with movement towards what has been called eco-
sensitive management. 
Before commencing discussion of transitions a further and more 
detailed defence of the notion of incremental change must be offered 
since it is of fundamental importance to the structure of the 
argument. As part of this the ecologically optimistic view of the 
world required to help 'drive' these transitions is also discussed. 
A Defence of Incrementalism 
A major element of 'the defence' has already been presented; 
incrementalism is justified by the fact that it is possible and likely 
within the 'business system', whereas the major changes that are 
required to re-focus the basic characteristics of capitalist production 
are, at best, wildly improbable in this generation. The processes of 
change that have been outlined also make the point that such 
fundamental changes are the end result of many incremental shifts, 
themselves the product of changes at many points in the complex 
systems that constitute the relationship between business 
organisations and the natural world. Incremental approaches are 
also justified because of their compatibility with the changing state 
of knowledge in the late modern world - the problems also change, 
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and ultimately so does the definition of vision that guides change; 
precisely targeted major changes are unjustifiably grand in view of 
such fluidity of insight. 
Incremental change in business is best seen as part of a network of 
changes in other specific areas of activity. Changes to political 
systems, to other bodies of theory (for example economics), changes 
in the ordering of the world system (so that the North/South 
division and the legacy of colonialism wither) and to the extent of 
environmental co-operation between nation states (already 
developing but still lacking in real influence) are all required. Given 
the systemic nature of the world changes in any one area are also 
contributing to changes in other areas. 
The impact of changes to business theory are not only incremental 
in the context of major changes required to re-orient capitalist 
production, they are also specifically targeted at the meso level; as 
organisations adopt different patterns of thought and styles of 
planning they will alter their activities and this will lead to change 
at a variety of local or regional levels. Change to one large TNC, for 
example, could contribute to preservation of the natural world in 
several dozen mining sites. This is far short of the positive impact 
that would be required to solve any of the global problems that Beck 
identifies and that Giddens discusses when he speaks of 'juggernaut 
society'; acid rain, problems with the ozone 'layer, and the 
greenhouse effect are all outside the immediate scope of the 
approach suggested. Such problems may be within the scope of 
change in other areas, for example the area of international treaties 
which earlier discussion suggests will become more significant as 
globalisation proceeds and nation-states multiply and in doing so 
become less important, but in the meanwhile meso level change is 
also useful. It is also immediately achievable. 
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The apocalyptic view of Beck and Giddens and the eco-alarmism of 
writers such as Ehrlich make up an invaluable part of the process of 
alerting the world to risks and in doing so help change community 
values. They also present arguments which assist in the building 
and assessment of knowledge. They do not, however, form a good 
basis for immediate action at either the meso or macro level, since 
their overall impact is one of sensitisation to danger rather than the 
provision of signposts for specific activity. They may actually inhibit 
policy development by implying that it is inadequate to the 
problems that are identified and discussed. Theory based on the 
assumption that humans can make a difference, and in this case that 
the environmentally destructive direction of world capitalism can 
ultimately be turned around, is of more immediate use. 
This distinction between the pessimism of what could be referred to 
as eco-alarmism and the optimism of the current project is made 
clearer by using Elise Boulding's (1979) distinction between 'essence', 
which involves assumptions about whether the world is basically 
good or bad, and 'influence', which describes the level of perceived 
helplessness. Coupling these concepts with optimistic and 
pessimistic positions, the four-sector figure presented in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Essence and Influence Orientation 
INFLUENCE 
OPTIMISM 
1 	 3 
The world is good, 	 The world is bad, 
we can influence it 	 we can influence it 
N GOOD 	 BAD 
The world is good, 	 The world is bad, 
we have no influence 	 we have no influence 
2 	 4 
PESSIMISM 
(Source: Boulding, 1979) 
The current discussion suggests that incremental change that 
impacts generaly because of the systemic nature of the 
environment/society relationship, and specificaly at the regional 
level as business organisations change their mode of operation, fals 
into sector 3. Eco-alarmists fal into sector 4 because of the 
implication that nothing can efectively be done about the risks of 
global change that they so clearly identify. Beck, for example, despite 
the positive program he ofers, is basicaly an eco-alarmist because 
his emphasis is clearly on the inevitable and multiplying risks of 
modernisation, not on the possibility of the solution. This does not 
lead (at least directly) to positive change. More positive analysis of 
macro-issues, for example that of O'Riordan and Rayner (1991) who 
assessed the problems of a management response to global 
environment change, are likely to be far more productive and are 
therefore more immediately related to the current project. 
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Concentration on the meso rather than macro level is also a 
reflection of both the normal scope of national and regional policies, 
and of the capacity of humans to understand and solve problems. 
The first of these points is a product of the distribution of power in 
global society: significant areas of activity in all society are regionally 
controlled, and the irony is that globalisation is actually making 
regional decision-making (at the 'bottom end' of the meso level) 
more important. Meso level policy focussed at regional level is 
therefore also becoming more important, and this is where the 
impact of corporations is immediately felt. The second point is 
developed by O'Riordan and Rayner : 'Most people in the world are 
necessarily preoccupied with the immediate demands of making a 
living from their local environment' (1991:91). The suggestion is 
that macro level problems are beyond the scope of understanding of 
all but a 'tiny elite' (though even this could be disputed given the 
dynamic complexity of the systems involved). A development of 
this argument is that theory focussed on the meso level will be more 
readily understood and more readily implemented. 
A basic theme of the discussion in chapter two was that business is 
more powerful and globally pervasive than ever before and that 
business constitutes a highly significant means of communicating 
changed values as well as practices. Despite a changing world order it 
will remain so, and as corporatism declines, as new trading blocs and 
'trading tigers' are established, changes within major business 
organisations have great potential for wide impact. The significant 
role of TNCs in changes has been made clear, as has their need to fit 
within new systems of values, and they above all have the power to 
become positive agents for change. If the environmentally averse 
character of modernist change is to lessen at all in the next decade, it 
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is most likely to do so as TNC agents from late modern contexts 
wield influence on the value systems and business practice of host 
nations. Again, meso level policies are justified in a wider context. 
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WORLD VIEW: BROAD ELEMENTS 
Three Stages of Anthropocentricism 
An anthropocentric orientation is inevitable in all human approaches 
to nature which are seen as having any value for humans. This 
includes most organisation activities, given that almost all 
organisations, and business organisations in particular, are defined by 
the fact that they co-ordinate action in the world in order to further 
human interests. The question is therefore not whether business 
organisations are anthropocentric but how anthropocentric they are, 
with lesser degrees of anthropocentricism reflecting a movement along 
a continuum. Fox (1990) provides a useful guide to 'signpost' along this 
continuum with his distinction between three kinds of 
anthropocentricism; unrestrained exploitation and expansionism, 
resource conservation and development, and resource preservation. 
Unrestrained exploitation and expansionism is totally anthropocentric; 
'the non-human world is considered to be valuable only insofar as it is 
of economic value to humans' (Fox 1990:3). It also emphasises the 
'physical transformation value of the non-human world' and measures 
this in economic terms while equating it with economic growth. 
Oelschlager (1991: 286-287) describes 'resourcism' in similar terms, 
suggesting that it puts humans outside the 'eco-machine', which is 
exploited with the aid of science and the worth of which is determined 
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via the market. He suggests that the roots of this approach go back to the 
Neolithic revolution and that it reflects 'the intense homo-centrism of 
judeo-Christianity and the alchemy of Modernism' (p.286). For Fox it is 
also characterised by short-term thinking and by a faith in 
'technological fixes' for damage repair when forced to concede long 
term harm has been done to nature (Fox 1990:3). O'Riordan (1991a) calls 
this 'technocentrism' and couples it with an optimism about 
technology that is best exemplified by 1970s writers such as Herman 
Kahn, whose supreme optimism saw no real problems arising from 
war, overpopulation or environmental deterioration. 
This approach remains dominant in the world economy, despite the 
positive signs of more responsible business activity assessed in chapter 
three. It results in unrestrained exploitation which often produces 
excellent short term profits at great but unrecognised (or ignored) cost to 
the natural environment, including major impact on biological 
diversity. The ideology of progress and what Fox (1990:3) calls the 'myth 
of superabundance' legitimate destructive behaviour which is 
conducted and justified in the language of 'frontier economics' (Colby 
1993). Examples of negative results for biodiversity abound. Broken Hill 
Proprietary (BHP), Australia's biggest business organisation, provides 
one with its operations at the Ok Tedi mine in the Fly River district of 
Papua New Guinea (PNG). The mine, jointly owned with the PNG 
Government, Amoco of the USA and German interests, dumps 70 
million tonnes of waste each year into the Fly River because of the lack 
of a tailings dam, and directly affects traditional fishing and gardening 
downstream, with the possible effect extending to the Torres Strait and 
as far south as the Great Barrier Reef (Davis 1992, 1994; Rosenbaum, 
1993). Accurate information on impacts is unavailable however, an 
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inevitable problem made worse in this case by the competing interests 
of the partners, by third world (primary export needy) location and by 
minimal research funding. 
Fox's second approach, resource conservation and development, is also 
'thoroughly anthropocentric' but has a longer-term focus and 
recognises that there are limits to material growth, and as Fox points 
out, in combination these oblige one 'to take the interest of future 
generations of humans (his emphasis) into account in deciding upon 
present courses of action' (1990:4). 
The notion of sustainable development (SD), widely discussed since the 
early 1980s as a compromise position between development and 
conservation, represents a set of ideas that fall within this approach. SD 
is, as Jacobs (1991:59-60) points out, 'a contestable concept: one that 
affords a variety of competing interpretations or conceptions'. There are 
then, numerous definitions of SD. In the 'Bruntland Report', which is 
the most influential work on the subject, it is 'development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs' (World Commission on 
Environment and Development 1990:43). Others emphasise application 
of ecological ideas to economics (Redclift 1987), integrated decision 
making (Harris 1992), or rises in real income, education and health 
standards and general quality of life (Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 
1989). Definitions abound. Tietenberg (1992) quotes Pezzey (1989) as 
finding sixty one, and Pearce, Markandya and Barbier (1989) fill 14 pages 
with definitions. Tietenberg suggests optimistically that it is a 'nascent 
concept... still in the process of being refined and clarified' (1992:600), 
whilst Daly and Cobb applaud the fact that it has been left 'rather vague 
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because this helps ensure unanimity of support' (1989:75), and Cocks 
decides on the same evidence that 'the more you look at sustainable 
development, the sloppier it gets' (1992:251). 
Despite conceptual vagueness a core of meaning can be identified. SD 
involves preservation of the opportunities of future generations, and 
given that this means preservation of a large element of the natural 
world this implies significant use of long term frames of reference and 
holistic perspectives in planning, and provision of greater value for the 
natural environment in planning. 
None of this suggests that SD is non-anthropocentric. As Folke and 
Kaberger point out in discussion of the Bruntland Report and various 
World Resources reports (among the key items of literature in the SD 
debate): 'The perspective is anthropocentric and the concern for the 
life-supporting environment is based on the insight that hurting nature 
is also hurting Man' (1991:282). 
Another point of significance for the current argument which stresses 
the need for 'transitions' is that there are relatively 'weak' and 'strong' 
positions within SD, and therefore a continuum of approaches within 
the broad category of resource conservation and development. A weak 
position could be close to unrestrained exploitation but involve some 
consideration of the welfare of future human generations and therefore 
long term planning and protection of some natural resources. A strong 
position requires that greater value be allocated to nature, that decisions 
be taken holistically in order to incorporate those values, that greater 
sensitivity to risk-for-nature be developed, and that decision making be 
integrated across a range of private and government sectors. Ultimately 
it involves change in attitudes towards nature, leading to a far greater 
degree of eco-sensitivity than that displayed in a 'weak' position. 
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Progressive sections of world business are moving towards adoption of 
(weak) SD positions, as are governments, particularly in core nations. In 
Australia, for example, the process of developing a SD strategy started in 
July 1989 with a statement by the Prime Minister, followed by a special 
meeting of Australian governments in December 1989, a discussion 
paper in 1990, the establishment of nine working groups on SD and a 
final strategy document in 1992. The process has been relatively long 
and thorough, and reflects the willingness of governments in core 
nations to at least be seen to be embracing SD. 
As Daly and Cobb (1989) have suggested, the popularity of the notion of 
SD is related to its vagueness; it is hard to disagree with something that 
promises so much but insists on little. SD does not require, at the weak 
end at least, any fundamental re-orientation of government or business 
activity other than the realisation of some limits to short term 
exploitation of natural resources and has therefore proven acceptable at 
a philosophical level to many conventional thinkers in organisations 
(see Schmidheiny, 1992). With a transition to stronger SD the 
requirements are greater and objections will become more significant as 
difficulties arise in meeting commercial (or conventional government) 
SD objectives. This comment is even more applicable to Fox's next 
stage, which requires even greater change. 
Fox's third approach can fairly be called 'amiable anthropocentricism'. 
He suggests that 'the resource preservation (his emphasis) approach 
tends to stress the instrumental values that can be enjoyed by humans 
if they allow presently existing members or aspects of the non-human 
world to follow their own characteristic patterns of existence' (Fox 
1990:5). These include information, psychological and aesthetic values 
(among others), and contrast with the emphasis on physical 
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transformation value in the other two approaches. For organisations it 
provides a major challenge to development of resources because it 
implies real brakes on transformation activities, and for biological 
diversity it therefore promises the greatest level of protection available 
within an anthropocentric approach. It will also involve a great deal of 
organisation learning and broad social and cultural change before it is a 
realistic position for a significant number of organisations. 
The three 'signposts', then, indicate key points in a transition. The first 
describes that part of the anthropocentricism continuum where most 
business organisations are still operating (particularly resource 
extraction industries). The second indicates important elements of 
change towards eco-sensitivity and describes the pattern of those 
organisations now seeking to operate 'sustainably', whether in weak or 
strong form. The third requires major change and is currently out of 
sight for most organisations. 
As earlier discussion has indicated, any transition along the continuum 
will involve complex change to a variety of interconnected elements in 
the dynamic system that makes up an organisation. An instructive 
view of the results of such a transition is to consider it as a change to 
organisation self. As an organisation becomes less anthropocentric its 
culture and self change. 
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Organisation Culture and Self: the Eco-Self 
Organisations have a self, the manifestation of fundamental aspects of 
organisation culture in the world. According to Schein (1992:12) 
organisation culture is a 'pattern of shared basic assumptions', while 
Limerick and Cunnington define it as 'the set of beliefs, assumptions 
and values shared by a majority of those within an organisation' 
(1993:184). The notion is now well established in organisation theory 
where it has been applied to a range of characteristics shared by groups. 
Schein's (1992:9-10) survey of the literature identifies ten: observed 
behavioural regularities when people interact; group norms; espoused 
values; formal philosophy; rules of the game (the implicit value for 
getting along in an organisation); climate (made up of the physical 
layout and the way people interact); embedded skills; mental models 
(habits of thinking); shared meanings; and integrating symbols (the 
ideas and images groups develop to characterise themselves). He then 
suggests that for a 'culture' to exist these elements must be integrated 
into large patterns that pertain to stable groups, and that this will reflect 
the shared learning of groups. 
This list and the broad definition offered cast a wide net to which 
particular emphasis will be added shortly, but first I will comment on 
the levels at which culture manifests itself. Schein (1992:17) suggests 
three, arranged in a hierarchy: 
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Figure 9: Hierarchy of culture 
Artifacts 
Espoused values 
11 
Basic underlying 
assumptions 
(Source: Schein 1992:17) 
Artifacts are 'visible organisation structures and processes' such as 
architecture, dress, technology and for Schein at least, language. 
Espoused values indude strategies, goals and philosophies. Basic 
underlying assumptions are taken for granted assumptions that guide 
individual behaviour. Each layer is successively less visible than that 
above it, with deeper layers hardest to change. For moves towards eco-
centric management this suggests major difficulties because 
anthropocentricism and growth orientation are at the deepest of the 
three levels. 
Culture is passed on to new members of an organisation over time, not 
only in the learning of values and procedures and in formal induction 
programs but also by more subtle revelations yielded as people become 
recognised members of the organisation. Newly hired workers observe 
artifacts such as architecture, technology and style of clothing. They are 
told about the 'espoused values' of the organisation, they gradually 
become aware of the basic assumptions that guide behaviour, and their 
world view gradually alters to become consistent with them. Such 
notions are both implicit and powerful, the deep layer of culture that 
forms the core of organisation self. This will normally be related to a 
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broader culture (for example American or Japanese) but will have a 
particular 'twist' relevant to the organisation in question. Thus 
organisation members share ideas about such things as rewards and 
punishments, about teamwork, about quality of work and about power 
and influence that are broadly consistent with a wider culture. Despite 
this particular organisation cultures may differ markedly in detail. For 
example, one computer company may be status-conscious and reward 
individuals, another may be basically egalitarian and reward teams, but 
both will be consistent with ideas about financial rewards for effort, 
high quality of work, commitment to organisation growth and broad 
economic development. 
Whilst a somewhat amorphous concept, the notion of group culture is 
useful, indicating a reality of shared learning and assumptions in stable 
groups and organisations. Stable goal directed groups possess cultures 
that are also readily divisible into levels. For this exercise, however, 
some important variations on the mainstream that Schein represents 
can be offered. 
The first is to slightly but significantly re-cast the three level hierarchy. 
The insight that there are varying degrees of visibility to different 
'layers' of culture is correct, but it is a more accurate reflection of the 
situation to depict them in systemic form: 
Figure 10: Culture in systemic form 
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Underlying assumptions remain at a deeper level than espoused values 
or artifacts but it is important to emphasise that they can effect and are 
affected by both. 
The second is to identify 'organisation self' as a related but separate 
concept to culture. This is the social manifestation of culture, made up 
of the views the organisation members have of it (and themselves 
within it). Internally this is affected most by the espoused values level 
as individuals examine strategies and practices, organisation mission 
and 'up-front' assumptions about how the organisation should behave. 
Externally (as will be discussed shortly), this is affected by the view 
taken by 'local' society and presentation by media of the activities of the 
organisation. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the view taken in this 
discussion is that the key to understanding how culture and self 
develop is the 'language' used within the organisation. Assistance in 
understanding how this works comes with an adaptation by Krogh, 
Roos and Slocum (1994) of the autopoietic theory outlined in the 
introduction to part B of this discussion. Their aim is to move strategic 
management - and management writing generally - into the post-
modern world, using perceptions similar to, but a vocabulary varying 
from, writers in the European hermeneutics discourse (see for example 
Habermas [1984, 1985, 1992] and also use of autopoietic theory in 
management by Morgan [1986]). Of particular interest in this tradition is 
the emphasis on 'language' as a way to understand several processes. 
The Krogh, Roos and Slocum autopoiesis lens suggests that the 
components of an autopoietic system are used to produce new 
components; in Hames' (1993) terms, they are 'self-renewing'. The 
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autopoietic perspective also suggests that the world is created by 
individuals; it is not pre-given. This contrasts with the modernist 
cognitivist perspective which, they suggest, is directed at discovering 
representations of a real (given) world via the processing of 
information about this world. 
Autopoietic theory suggests that all knowledge is dependent on the 
Manager and varies with the point of observation. Knowledge allows 
the Manager to make 'distinctions' between things (for example 
between a strategy and a finance book or between different types of 
marshland) and on the basis of 'norms' determine what it is they see 
(for example, is it a good or bad book; is it fragile or resistant 
marshland?). 
The theory also distinguishes between data, information and 
knowledge. Data are elements of potential information, so books, 
lectures and memos are data that become information through a 
process of interpretation. In this state it is a source of organisation 
knowledge. 
Data can be 'latent', in which case it is unclear, requiring extensive 
discussion for a manager to turn it into information, or be 'manifest', 
in which case it is clear and can easily be converted into information 
(Krogh, Roos and Slocum 1994:60). 
Within an organisation 'knowledge' of the organisation is shared 
knowledge among organisational members (1994: 60). It allows for 
members to share 'distinction making' about situations both internal 
and external to the organisation. Knowledge is also 'scalable' in the 
sense that managers can move up or down a 'distinction tree' 
containing knowledge of different levels of generality (1994: 60). 
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Such knowledge is also connected to an organisation's history which 
logically reflects the collective understanding of members over time 
and is fundamental to organisation culture. 
A key to understanding how such knowledge develops is what Krogh, 
Roos and Slocum call ' languaging', the process by which language is 
not only maintained but is constantly being developed on the basis of 
previous knowledge, adding new distinctions and refining them. This 
is a critical point in their autopoietic perspective, one which presents 
the organisation as (following Habermas), a communicative network. 
New knowledge structures evolve with new experiences as members 
develop shared understandings of these experiences. 
For knowledge to develop in organisations 'relationships' between 
individuals must be available so that communication takes place, and 
these can be formal in the sense of structurally conditioned, or 
informal. A 'self-description' (self) of the organisation is also part of the 
system, and for Krogh, Roos and Slocum it is an identity 'which 
provides criteria for selecting what passes for knowledge [and will] 
include business ideas, mission statements, strategy documents, vision 
statements, management principles, guiding values...' (1994:62), a 
definition wider than but consistent with that offered earlier. 
At this point the connection to Schein's 'basic underlying assumption' 
is obvious and my conclusion that re-orientation of organisation world 
views based on modernist notions of unfettered growth and extreme 
anthropocentricism is powerfully supported. 
165 
Chapter Five 
Such change is easiest with some major crisis or series of crises that lead 
to questioning (or in Schein's terms 'unfreezing') of world views. Major 
environmental disasters such as Bhopal and Chernobyl provide 
examples that can be seized upon to effect change in large organisations. 
Changed culture, however, would not be an inevitable outcome of 
disaster since it merely presents an opportunity for a leader or group to 
'move' an organisation. The disaster must be defined as significant by 
members of the organisation before this will occur. Even in cases of 
broad social definition of disasters this may not be the case within an 
organisation. As autopoietic theory suggests, the self renewing self 
referential aspect of organisations makes it difficult for such ideas to 
become established. 
Whilst autopoietic theory suggests why it is difficult to establish 
changes in culture it also explains how they may take place. A new eco-
sensitivity will first be present in the form of latent data and require 
significant languaging before conversion into information, then 
knowledge. Organisations with the most efficient communication 
systems therefore have the greatest capacity to change. In them new sets 
of distinctions may develop that allow for analysis of the natural world, 
as well as new norms about eco-sensitivity, fostering further 
developments in knowledge. Thus an 'eco-self' can develop gradually, 
core values alter gradually, with new organisation practices resulting. A 
disaster may hasten the process but is not essential. 
The emphasis on language in this analysis reflects the 'linguistic turn' 
in recent philosophy, applied to policy and planning by scholars like 
Fischer and Forester who introduce a book of essays in the area by 
saying: 'What if our language does not simply mirror or picture the 
world but instead profoundly shapes our view of it in the first place' 
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(1993:1). They suggest that as policy and planning rhetoric helps shape 
problem selection as well as analysis, and organisation identity as well 
as strategy, language must therefore change before there can be any 
major change in approach. 
Hajer (1993) extends this idea further in analysis of the influence of two 
coalitions which he calls 'ecological modernisation' and 'ad-hoc 
technocratic' in a battle over acid rain policy in Great Britain. In the 
discussion he introduces the idea of a discourse coalition, 'a group of 
actors who share an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories' used to 
present a phenomenon with meaning. When the language of a 
discourse comes to dominate thinking in society and the way dominant 
institutions in that society work he describes it as a position of 
'discourse institutionalisation'. With this he can explain how the 
ecological modernists won the battle against the ad hoc technocrats but 
failed to win the war because the latter continued to dominate the 
discourse prevailing in institutionalised policy processes. 
In autopoietic terms, the ecological modernists had not altered 
organisation knowledge or core values. For a new eco-culture to 
develop - and in the acid rain case that Hajer refers to this would 
require a relatively modest transition towards eco-sensitivity in a 
government organisation - some development of language and 
processes of languaging are essential. Had Hajer's ecological modernists 
understood this their campaign would have had increased likelihood of 
success. 
Change to language, data and knowledge may have many sources; 
government pressure; charged academic debate which feeds into 
organisations as new hires enter; changed opinion from local 
communities (and in the TNC 'local' means globally distributed 
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regions, all with some influence); the media. This final influence 
deserves further analysis. In developing this point, an excursion into 
Meadian social psychology is useful, at the same time serving to further 
explain the nature of organisation self and the way it may change. 
The experience of Australia's biggest organisation, BHP, provides an 
example of how the process of incremental change to self may operate. 
BHP is popularly known as the 'big Australian' and operates a complex 
web of resource extraction manufacturing activities world wide in a 
profit/growth anthropocentric mode characteristic of modernist 
organisations. In 1991 when a new CEO, John Prescott, took over, the 
organisation was at the peak of success. It had registered a profit of $1 
billion, whilst operating commercially successful gas extraction 
processes on the Australian North West shelf, the Ok Tedi gold and 
copper mine in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Escondia mine, 
which is potentially the world's biggest copper mine, in Chile. 
Within five years festering discontent among PNG locals near Ok Tedi 
led to a $4 billion law suit being registered against the company in 
Melbourne; their Moura coal mine collapsed (for the third time) in 
Queensland, killing 11 men; their ship the 'Iron Barron' ran aground 
off the coast of Tasmania spilling fuel that affected fish and bird life and 
led to community concern. The official government commission of 
enquiry into the Moura incident blamed the company, while Ok Tedi 
has become internationally embarrassing. Every major stage of these 
three affairs received extensive media coverage. 
The impact on the 'official line' take by BHP has been profound. They 
have paid for extensive colour supplements to major Australian 
newspapers explaining their position on Ok Tedi, have given 
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numerous interviews; have tried to present a new self to the world. Mr 
Prescott, interviewed in 1996, confessed: 'We have to make sure we're 
world class in everything we do, but its fair to say we have been less 
than world class in our community relations' (cited in Kohler, 1996:80). 
Organisation self has changed incrementally, because of BHP worker 
and broad community views of the organisation, broadly self-reflection 
in Meadian terms. As the Prescott statement indicates this also has an 
impact on officially sanctioned organisation practices and ultimately on 
vision and values. Media coverage of the various disasters facing BHP 
provide latent data which reaches all workers who use or view mass 
media - and in first world countries, such as Australia, this means most 
people. 
In one form or another, radio, free to air television, cable television, 
film, print media, or e-mail, it is likely that some media outlet will take 
up environmental news. This is not to deny 'blocking' of news that is 
not judged as interesting enough (including much biodiversity 
damage), or assessable enough (again as with much complex 
biodiversity news), or too challenging of powerful interests (as for 
example oil companies' actions in Africa). Despite such problems media 
reports will tend to appear, because powerful world media outlets 
require news to fill programs. Changes to organisation self are one 
result of this. This argument does not deny the force of critics of media 
in the modern world (see, for example, Chomsky [1989] and Herman 
and Chomsky [1994]) but suggests that the tendency towards impelling 
the reporting of newsworthy items tends to outweigh the forces of 
repression. 
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The way towards eco-self and eco-culture is also prepared by the 
simultaneous fraying and extension of organisation boundaries in post-
industrial society. In industrial society the organisation could be seen as 
a finite and bounded entity, legally, socially and economically locatable 
in a relatively simple world. The transformation of industrial 
capitalism that came after the crisis of the 1970s rendered this view 
obsolete, and Harvey (1989) and others have pointed out that it has 
become impossible to draw such a boundary around organisations. The 
number of people in the workforce becomes problematical; do you 
include contractors, part-timers, short-term workers, consultants? Links 
with suppliers may become so permanent that they become part of an 
expanded organisation; as Rouleau and Clegg (1992:10) point out, they 
represent 'a set of highly formalised and semi-permanent, virtually 
permanent sub-contractual relations'. There are culturally located 
variations on the pattern. In Taiwan, for example, kinship relationships 
may take the place of contracts, but the results are the same: a basically 
borderless organisation. What happens when organisations are linked 
by a series of contracts to share supplies, markets and products? Is the 
modern tele-communications industry described in chapter two, one 
industry? Ten? It is impossible to say. 
A significant implication of this is that the self of every organisation in 
the 'borderless world' of the global economy has spread. Suppliers, 
customers and competitors are included in the calculation in a far more 
specific way than was normal in the world of 1960s industrial 
capitalism. Planners are therefore familiar with the idea of an extended 
view and an ecologically oriented extension is made more possible 
because of this fundamental process of organisation learning.The idea 
of a spreading of organisation self suggests the essence of the less 
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anthropocentric organisation self. It involves a similar expansion to 
that which is suggested by deep ecologist Arne Naess (1989, 1993) in 
discussing the expansion of individual self beyond the personal or 
biographic to a deep identification with the natural world. As 
organisation values, mission and culture begin to expand to incorporate 
greater sensitivity to the natural world the organisation self expands to 
indude more significant consideration of nature. This means that all 
elements of organisation activity are affected, so the 'eco-self' will have 
a pervasive impact on planning, marketing, production, structure and 
so on (as autopoiesis theory also suggests), and also that the eco-self will 
impact beyond the conventional (modernist) boundaries of the 
organisation. 
Fundamental to the eco-self is widening the point of view of managers, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
Holistic Thinking 
A vital part of moves towards eco-centric management is the presence 
of holistic thinking in organisations. The basic line in holistic thinking 
was well summarised by Marcus Aurelius in the second century AD: 
Always think of the universe as one living organism, with a single 
substance and a single soul; and observe how all things are submitted to 
the single perceptivity of this one whole, all are moved by its single 
impulse, and all play their part in the causation of every event that 
happens. Remark the intricacy of the skein, the complexity of the web 
(1995:24) 
Currently legitimated science ('normal' in Kuhnian terms), however, 
works in the reductionist framework put forward by Francis Bacon in 
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the sixteenth century. Knowledge is accumulated via experimentation 
which selects and analyses one element from a complex picture; 
analysis of the parts in order to build a picture of the whole. This is 
associated with use of linear thinking: a simplification of cause-effect 
relationships that enables reductionism to work by suggesting that 
chains of causation work only in one direction. This is, Senge (1992:74) 
suggests, deeply embedded in the subject-verb-object structure of 
western languages and is consequently difficult to shift. 
Reductionism and linear thinking are also associated with Weberian 
instrumental rationality as used in business planning and with the 
single discipline/professional organisation of knowledge that is 
characteristic of modernism. Such disciplines develop as particular 
subject areas are identified and extracted from the world for further 
study, and techniques for study of phenomena are legitimated within 
disciplinary boundaries. 
Taking 'the wide view' is however necessary if we are to encompass the 
variety of relationships in an ecosystem, more so (if that were possible) 
if considering the eco-system and the impact of organisation activity on 
eco-systems, as well as the impact of that activity on the organisation 
itself and its relationships with other elements of the social world. 
Consider a few of the many disciplinary boundaries that may be 
breached in analysis of a logging operation: economics (attempting to 
value the natural resource), botany (one scientific lens on ecosystem 
and impact), entomology (another lens), zoology (another), forestry (a 
commercial-scientific lens), production engineering (how to process 
logs), marketing (how, where and at what price to market the log based 
products), accounting (what income accrues to the organisation in 
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dollar values and what costs) human resources specialists (who to hire, 
how, what impact on human resources development); and the list 
could go on. 
Use of many disciplines will inevitably fragment a complex reality since 
there is little or no chance of a coherent perspective that allows for 
simple authoritative answers to questions to emerge from a maelstrom 
of approaches. The prime considerations in a process using a variety of 
single disciplines may well become the relative power of the 
disciplinary camps rather than the question at issue. 
To compound• the problem well established disciplines are defined by 
highly developed vocabularies which allow them to describe their slice 
of the world. These are difficult for 'non-professionals' to understand, 
so meaningful communication across disciplines over common issues 
is either difficult or impossible. 
Linear thinking and reductionism are consequently inappropriate for 
understanding complex issues. As discussion in chapter four suggested, 
there is little chance of finding a simple cause and effect relationship 
within an eco-system, and obvious actions will often produce non-
obvious responses. Additionally, long-term consequences of actions in 
eco-systems are rarely simple extensions of the short term as linear 
patterns of thought suggest, so the conventional modernist pattern of 
thought fails in this respect too. 
The reductionist view therefore fails to provide a reasonable 
perspective because it is partial; it also fails because it is associated with 
the idea that these parts of the world can be measured and that 
calculation will reveal this 'micro-complexity'. Modernist disciplines 
endlessly refine measures of ever smaller elements of the world, 
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furthering the view that the world is the sum of these measures. A 
prime example is 'econometrics', the mathematically based discipline 
that assumes that every part of the human and non-human world can 
be turned into numbers that can be fixed into tightly bounded models 
that are then used to explain issues. If such disciplines are to work the 
world must be simple and completely known - biodiversity is neither. 
The disciplines produced through reductionism and use of linear 
thinking are, however, far from simple. Indeed, the sophistication of 
analysis and measurement is profound; they are just too narrowly 
focused to encompass complex issues. This criticism is fundamental but 
difficult to embed in the understanding of policy makers because of the 
very success of the scientific and technological processes that use 
sophisticated forms of reductionism. The development of industrial 
capitalism can be seen as the progress of rationality, reductionism and 
linear thinking. As Fischer points out, a 'systematic and disciplined 
approach to objectives [with] a calculus of precision and measurement 
to order efficiently the means to specific ends' structure not only 
approaches to issues but also organisations (1990:61). He goes on to link 
'technocracy' and the 'technocratic disciplines [of] the managerial and 
policy sciences (1990:7) to the technocratic decision making which he 
suggests endangers the future of democratic institutions. His argument 
shares with the current one a common understanding that this form of 
thinking is deeply entrenched in society and will be difficult to change. 
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A Transition to Holistic Thinking? 
Changes towards more holistic patterns are nevertheless important if 
managers are to deal sensitively with biodiversity. Gradual change is 
coming and elements of it are already present, as the brief tour taken 
through the history of systems theory in chapter two indicated and as 
later coverage in chapter eight will further emphasise. The hard 
systems theory of the 1960's emphasised certainty of knowledge, clear 
problems, linear problem analysis, a mechanical framework; it is 
contingent on the style of rational decision making that is integral to 
conventional modernist organisations. Soft systems theory came later 
and it recognises uncertain knowledge, the role of perception in 
shaping world view, organisation learning, and dialectical change. 
Cybernetic thinking is another development. It seeks to use computers 
to handle the problems of fast changing systems (see Cavaleri and Obloj 
1993). The line of development is from limited reductionist models 
towards more extended models that move beyond simple reductionism 
in an attempt to include both more elements of the world and more of 
the complexity of processes within the world. The systems movement 
crosses disciplinary boundaries - biology, political science, economics 
and communication theory for example - and whilst it has never 
achieved its promise of the early 1970s it has altered organisation 
perceptions of their world. These are now presented in (closed) system 
form in management texts, and systems concepts such as feedback are 
presented (albeit simplistically) as part of the necessary perspective and 
conceptual armory of the manager. 
Senge (1992) takes systems discourse a step further in distinguishing 
between detail and dynamic complexity. 'Detail complexity' is where 
there are many variables, for example those that feature in strategic 
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plans and business forecasts. For this complex systems models are 
required, an extension of the hard systems approach. Dynamic 
complexity, however, includes 'situations where cause and effects are 
subtle, and where the effects over time of interaction are not obvious' 
(1992:71). Conventional linear patterns of thought, Senge suggests, are 
not equipped to deal with such situations and this is a problem for 
organisation survival, because 'the real leverage in most management 
situations lies in understanding dynamic complexity not detail 
complexity.' 
He then argues for a 'shift of mind', a change in the language of 
business away from the linear view towards use of system based 
language such as feedback and towards recognition of frequently 
occurring systemic structures. This represents a major shift away from 
reductionist thinking, and is suggested by Senge as a means towards 
economic rather than eco-survival. It is nevertheless a powerful shift 
because it paves the way for the extended thinking required if 'the wide 
view' is to be adopted by business organisations. 
Within academic circles specifically multi disciplinary thinking has 
become more common in the last generation too, and can be expected to 
gradually feed into the knowledge base of organisations. Developments 
in ecology and the 'environmental sciences' are significant in this 
regard. The trend will continue; as Crook et al. (1992) point out, 
differentiation of knowledge and disciplines moved so far in the 
modernist society that we are headed towards 'de-differentiation', 
arguably a small step beyond issues based multi-disciplinarity. At this 
deep seated level then, the required change towards the style of 
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thinking to service a holistic perspective is coming. Within 
management thinking, strategic management theory, a central area, was 
born out of multi-disciplinary vision (see Chandler 1995). 
Within business writing a further indicator that a transition towards 
holism is taking place comes with the 1980s development and later 
extensions of 'stakeholder theory'. 
In American management writing - and it should be remembered that 
the academic discipline of management is largely an American product 
- the idea that firms have stakeholders other than shareholders only 
gained currency with Freeman's text Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach in 1984. Since then, as Donaldson and Preston 
point out, about a dozen books and more than 100 articles with primary 
emphasis on the stakeholder concept have appeared (1995:65). The 
assumption made in this theory is that 'all legitimate interests 
participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is 
no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another' 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995:68). With appropriate changes made for 
type of organisation (for-profit firm, government body, private not for-
profit) and culture (in Japan for example, suppliers have more power 
than in the USA), the idea is applicable world-wide and it is now a basic 
line of thought in the field within management studies that is usually 
called 'business and society' (for further development of this point see 
Hanson, 1994b). 
The theory has three bases, descriptive, instrumental and normative. In 
the descriptive aspect it presents 'a model of what the corporation is. It 
describes what the corporation is as a constellation of co-operative and 
competitive interests possessing intrinsic value' (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995:66). The instrumental aspect 'establishes a framework for 
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examining the connections, if any, between the practice of stakeholder 
management and the achievement of various corporate performance 
goals' (Donaldson and Preston 1995:67). Jones investigated this and 
suggested that it provides a major basis for further research, concluding 
'that behaviour that is trusting, trustworthy and co-operative, not 
opportunistic, will give the firm a competitive advantage' (Jones 
1995:432). The normative aspect, however, is of most significance for 
this argument. It asserts that managers should acknowledge 
stakeholders and respond to them because it is a moral requirement. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995), prominent scholars in American 
business ethics, conclude that this is the 'ultimate justification' for 
stakeholder theory. 
Connections between this and eco-management have already emerged. 
Stead and Stead (1992, 1995) have asserted that the earth is the 'ultimate 
stakeholder', a line of argument also present in Stank (1995). The 
argument has been well developed and represents a valuable 
contribution to the 'turning around' of management discourse; the 
more the notion of significant (or ultimate) stakeholder status for the 
natural world is discussed the more likely it is that it will be taken into 
account in management decisions. Stakeholder theory itself does not 
specifically prepare business organisations to consider the natural 
world, but it does encourage debate about, and consideration of, a wider 
legitimate constituency. The earth is not yet seen as an ultimate 
stakeholder but, as these ideas gain currency will gradually become the 
stakeholder that exercises persuasive influence over all other 
stakeholders. 
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Despite these promising developments (represented by Stead and Stead) 
this is not yet the case. Recently produced strategic management texts 
designed for the capstone unit in 'Strategic Management' courses in 
Business and Commerce degrees fail to give the natural environment a 
major role. In Byers, Rue and Zahra (1996), Dess and Miller (1993), 
David (1995), Hill and Jones (1995) and Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson 
(1995) for example, the word 'environment' means 'commercial 
environment', and the natural world features only in very brief 
discussions of environmental regulations. Introductory management 
texts, for example Bateman and Zeithaml (1993), accord it greater 
prominence by allocating a chapter to environmental matters, but this 
is still far short of a conferral of legitimate stakeholder status. 
Changes in academic management are then coming, but slowly. An eco-
centric world view, however, requires more than the stakeholder 
perspective can deliver directly. The educative role of stakeholder 
theory is however a useful part of a more pervasive re-orientation 
towards a less anthropocentric approach. The key to re-oriented 
organisation activities is for all stakeholders to keep the natural world 
in mind. Central to this should be their view of risk, an issue discussed 
in the next section. 
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Risk 
Risk is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as: (1) Hazard, danger, 
exposure to peril ... (2) The chance or hazard of commercial loss; spec. in 
the case of insured property of goods.' This neatly captures the essence 
of the concept, both the notion of 'hazard', and the commercially 
oriented flavour it has in industrial society. Missing is mention of the 
anthropocentric flavour of risk in standard discussion and policy 
analysis. Effectively it means 'risk for humans' - and in this discussion 
this is what 'risk' will mean - whilst the idea of 'risk for nature', that 
will be developed later, is either ignored in the literature or seen only 
when it affects humans. 
Risk is a major topic for debate and an important concept for policy 
making in the global economy. Nuclear catastrophes at the Three Mile 
Island and Chernobyl have alerted the world community to the danger 
of nuclear power. Other major matters of world concern are oil spills 
(see Hinrichson, 1990); chemical factory explosions such as that at 
Bhopal have killed thousands (see Shivastrava 1992); rises in cancer 
rates from various causes potentially affect a broad sector of the 
population; problems with drinking water cause concern (see Mol and 
Spaargaren 1993); and the possible implications of the greenhouse effect 
have a broad impact (see Liggett 1990). These and many other concerns 
lead to Beck's idea of risk society (1990a) and to Wildavsky (1988) 
suggesting that the 'search for safety' is central to the modern political 
agenda. 
Risks are, then, obviously 'out there', but the concept is more elusive 
than a listing of risks would suggest, as the number of risk perceptions 
and classification of perspectives indicates. Bradbury (1989) 
distinguishes only two types of risk perspectives, the social construction 
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and the physical. Shivastrava (1994) looks at psychological, economic 
and sociological perspectives. Slovic (1985, 1987) looks at perceptions of 
hazard types. May (1989) looks at systems, cultural and industrial 
perspectives. All these classifications are useful, but in the present 
discussion, where the intentions are to indicate the anthropocentric 
nature of current risk theory and describe useful insights of some of 
those theories for later application in discussion of risk-for-nature, a 
transdiciplinary approach developed from Renn (1992a, 1992b) will be 
used. He distinguishes a range of approaches to risk: actuarial, 
toxicological/epidemiological, engineering, economic, psychological, 
cultural, social. In this discussion the first four approaches will be 
grouped together as 'mechanist' because of their common assumption 
of a basically mechanistic, limited and controllable world. 
The first of the four mechanist risk perspective categories includes 
those risks most obviously related to the modernist perspective. The 
actuarial approach assumes a straight forward problem; calculable 
probabilities of its occurrence and calculable consequences. It assumes 
stable cause-effect relationships and is the basis of the insurance system 
that Beck's (1992a, 1992b) analysis sees behind the approach of industrial 
capitalism to risk. Toxicological studies look at narrow definitions of 
risk for humans from chemicals via animal experiments, while 
epidemiological studies cast a wider net in examining differences 
between populations after exposure to different levels of some risk 
agent. Engineering approaches all assume technology can control risk. 
These approaches have in common simplified models of the world and 
the notion that probability of harm is readily calculable using fairly 
simple statistical procedures. The question of how and what 'risks' will 
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be selected is left unexamined, a point that the psychological/cultural 
theories take up. 
A second set of technical perspectives includes economic (including 
financial approaches). The economic approach is part of utility theory, 
applying probability theory to the standard 'economic man' who is free 
to operate in a (tightly modelled) unconstrained market. As the 
following summary of the economic approach to 'risk' from a best 
selling first year university economics text implies, whilst it may have a 
limited application in some very clearly defined problems, it fails to 
encompass the complexity of either the human or the natural worlds: 
Uncertain outcomes are described using a frequency distribution that lists 
all the possible outcomes and attaches probabilities to them. Attitudes 
toward uncertain outcomes are measured as a degree of risk aversion 
based on the rate at which a person's marginal utility of wealth 
diminishes, more risk-averse people having more rapidly diminishing 
marginal utility. Information is valuable because it decreases risk and it 
pays to use scarce resources to generate and disseminate information. 
Because information is valuable it pays firms to provide information to 
consumers at a cost. They do this by advertising. The type of advertising - 
type of information conveyed - depends on the nature of the good 
(McTaggert, Findlay and Parkin 1992: 435). 
The underlying economic assumptions of rational actors in a certain 
world who seek to maximise utility provide obvious limitations to this 
approach. It fails because this does not reflect human reality, just as it 
fails to encompass the complexity or value of the natural world, with 
an allied assumption that nature is there to be exploited (see Clarke 1989 
for a full criticism of economic approaches to risk). 
Financial approaches are directed at facilitating institutional control 
over the possibility of financial losses. Calculations of different financial 
risks become extremely complex as they attempt to handle the 
complexity of the market (see Felmingham and Coleman, 1995, Chapter 
20). The approach is very narrow in orientation though, measuring few 
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human problems and almost no environmental problems, necessarily 
so because few such problems are clearly defined in the market place, 
much less defined in calculable financial terms. Nevertheless, in a 
capitalist economy a financial risk bias is a ruling feature of business 
organisations, and an element of this will remain in organisations 
directed at (financial) profit. 
The broad category of psychological approaches to risk concentrates on 
the cognitive approaches of individuals in defining risk, often 
investigating the way different individuals in different social positions 
define risk. Fischoff et a/. (1981) and Slovic (1987) follow this line, Slovic 
using psychometric measures of risk perception to discuss risk. The key 
idea in this work is that risk perceptions differ between individuals: 
there are assumed to be risks 'out there' but, for example, lay people 
and experts see them differently. 
Renn (1992a:65), after analysis of the psychological literature, 
summarises the contextual variables that affect perceived seriousness of 
risk. The first is expected number of fatalities, but this shows a weak 
correlation with 'perceived riskiness of technology' (1992a:65). The 
second is the potential for catastrophe, with low probability/high 
consequence risks perceived as more threatening than more 
probable/low-medium consequence risks. The third is a group of 
'qualitative risk characteristics' including the conviction of control over 
consequences, familiarity with the risk and perception of dread with 
respect to consequences (which has a great affect on the perceived risks 
of nuclear power generation). The final set of variables includes those 
associated with beliefs about the cause of the risk, and the suggestion is 
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that risk beliefs are 'often part of an attitude that a person holds about 
the cause of the risk, that is, a technology, human activity, or natural 
event' (1992a:65). 
The psychological approach offers the insight that perception varies, 
and related research into the impact of perception of consequences and 
dread is useful for the environmental debate because it suggests part of 
the reason for limited perception of environmental problems. They are, 
with the exemption of some high profile high consequence risks, such 
as ozone depletion and global warming, low (human consequence) and 
without any (human) dread. Psychological theories, however, suffer 
from their focus on the individual, since ignoring the cultural and 
social levels ignores group processes, group variations and aggregated 
perceptions, and therefore ignores the very stuff of policy making. 
Cultural theory extends risk theory, suggesting that there is little 
connection between risk and an observable 'real' world. Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1982) suggest that risk perception is a social process, 
pointing out that we consent to some risks but not to others and that 
this bias is socially organised. They quote with approval Fischoff et al.: 
Values and uncertainties are an integral part of every acceptable risk 
problem. As a result there are no value-free processes for choosing 
between risky alternatives. The search for an 'objective method' is doomed 
to failure and may blind the searchers to the value laden assumptions they 
are making (cited in Douglas and Wildavsky 1982:4). 
The emphasis here on the role of values and political process in risk 
recognition and aversion strategies is characteristic of cultural theory. 
Schwarz and Thompson (1990) also look at cultural influences on risk 
definitions. The perspective they develop allows Thompson (1995) to 
explain how individuals in different positions develop different sets of 
certainties about an issue. Discussing environmental degradation in the 
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Himalayan region he points out that it has generally been seen as the 
result of ongoing deforestation, which leads to landslides and 
downstream flooding as the land loses the capacity to hold surface 
water, with humans in pursuit of agricultural land and fuel therefore 
seen to be at fault. Thompson (1995:29) argues that this 'certainty' has 
directed decades of policy in the region, but is simply wrong. 
Investigating further, he identifies four different (ideal typical) 
definitions of the problem, each characterised by a particular view of 
nature. 'Hill farmers' see as many problems as there are localities in the 
Himalayas, see nature as capricious, and believe that solutions will only 
work if negotiated with locals. Their 'myth of nature' is fatalistic. The 
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) sees the problem as a 
general one, serious but soluble with the help of established experts. 
Their myth is of nature as perverse/tolerant. The 'individualist' sees 
the problem as not too serious and will quickly be resolved if market 
distortions are removed. Their myth is that of nature as benign. The 
Deep Ecologist position is that the problem is irredeemably serious, and 
that both markets and FAO style hierarchies are part of the problem. 
Their myth is of nature as ephemeral. Thompson's argument with 
respect to policy is an extension of this. He suggests that a plurality of 
approaches is required to solve the problem since each has something 
to offer. We will return to this later in the discussion. 
Overall the contribution of cultural theory is to point out the cultural 
structures of perception of risk. Thompson's view of the FAO is of 
particular interest. Generalising, he suggests that '... those who are in 
the business of control tend whenever possible to see things in a way 
that renders these things as susceptible to control inherently fixable by 
those with the relevant knowledge and organisation' (1995:30). 
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A broader lens than that of cultural theory is provided by Beck (1992a, 
1992b) and Giddens (1990, 1991) who put risk at the core of the analysis 
of 'reflexive modernity'. The basic ideas of this transition have already 
been presented: within risk society risks are an inevitable part of the 
broad pattern of change; they multiply and they cut across sodal 
divisions, affecting all. Beck suggests that modernist society deals with 
risks via insurance which 'goes back to the beginning of inter-
continental navigation, but with the growth of industrial capitalism... 
was continually perfected and expanded into nearly all problem areas of 
social action' (1992b:99). This 'calculus of risks connects the physical, ... 
and the social sciences [and] can be applied to completely disparate 
phenomena not only in health management but also to economic risks, 
risks of old age, risks of unemployment, risks of traffic accidents ....'. In 
sum, modernity, which brings uncertainty to every niche of existence, 
finds its counter-principle in a social compact against industrially 
produced hazards and damages, stitched together out of public and 
private insurance agreements' (1992b:99-100). This whole process rests 
on four pillars, 'each of which is abolished by nuclear, chemical, genetic 
and ecological eco-hazards'. 
First one is concerned here with global, often irreparable damage that can 
no longer be limited, the concept of monetary compensation therefore fails. 
Second precautionary after-care is excluded for the worst imaginable 
accident in the case of fatal hazards; the security concept of anticipatory 
monitoring of results fails. Third, the 'accident' loses its delimitations in 
time and space, and therefore its meaning. It becomes an event with a 
beginning and no end; an 'open-ended festival' of creeping, galloping and 
overlapping waves of destruction. But that implies: standards of 
normality, measuring procedures and therefore the basis for calculating the 
hazards are abolished; incomparable entities are compared and 
calculation turns into obfuscation (Beck 1992a:102). 
Beck's summation of the modernist industrial/commercial approach is 
useful. It is, he suggests, based on insurance, on the notion of limited 
damage, on a limited notion of accident (something outside of systemic 
control), on measuring procedures and calculation of hazards. In social 
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construction terms it is a control system suited for a limited world and a 
pliant population. A financial bias to risk definition is the ruling 
notion. Managers assume that almost all risks are financial, either 
directly (as for example in market behaviour) or indirectly (as for 
example in negligence suits). Shivastrava extends this critique, 
suggesting that: "This mindset ignores the numerous ecological, 
technological and health risks emanating from industrial hazards...' 
(1995:126). 
Whilst the direction of criticism in this position is reasonable, the 
situation is actually more complicated. Within industrial society an 
official response has usually been required to public concern about a 
broad range of risks including such things as the risks to humans from 
nuclear power generation, risks from disposals of hazardous wastes, 
risks from ozone depletion and the carcigenous properties of some (out 
of many possible) industrial processes. The response has been (as Beck 
indeed suggests) to focus on technical factors and an attempt to develop 
standard scientific information that quantifies risks from particular 
activities, setting a level of 'acceptable' risk (see Schwarz and 
Thompson 1990:103-20; Fischer 1993:100-103) This orientation is 
'mechanist' and closest in orientation to the 'can-do' mind-set off 
engineering. Within the USA the Environmental Protection Agency 
manages environmental policy issues in this way, supplying 
technological data that allows a limited framing of problems that 
satisfies the requirements of normal science. Within Australia various 
state environmental agencies follow the same pattern using 
management regulations based on quantitative measurements of risk. 
As the debate about the Wesley Vale pulp mill in Tasmania 
demonstrated in the late 1980s, this is a powerful bias. In the latter case 
protracted public debate and a bitter political struggle was resolved only 
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after recourse to scientifically credible (although still problematic) 
measurements of the likely environmental impact of the proposed mill 
project by the CSIRO. 
What emerges from this analysis of three levels of approach to risk? 
The first thing is the anthropocentric core of the idea. It is 'risk for 
humans', and even in the natural environmental crisis driven analysis 
of Beck and Giddens this orientation remains, as they focus discussion 
on the wider risks to humans of various problems. The common bias 
in all theories then, is towards the world of humans, to the total 
exclusion of concern for risk of damage to nature as nature, rather than 
as human-useful nature. 
The second is that, whatever the 'level' of analysis, risk is socially 
mediated and, consequently, so are decisions. At a general level the 
model that operates looks like this: 
Figure 11: Risk model 
Objective Risk Perception of Risk -4 Decision 
Constructionist Filters (e.g. financial bias) 
There are therefore no objective methods for selecting between risks; 
people pay attention to some and ignore others and, as Thompson 
argues, the social position of the person defining the problem will alter 
problem definition, risk assessment and policy. As Beck and Giddens 
indicate, there is widespread anxiety about the 'high consequence' 
(usually macro-level environmental) risks of modernity, and a 
multiplication of risks that are present but still hidden from all human 
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perception. At the meso level, however, business organisations 
operating from standpoints of unrestrained or only partially altered 
anthropocentricism continue to operate with a financial bias in risk 
analysis (their filter), remaining confident that sophisticated financial 
and legal instruments can contain the hazards that impact on 
organisation performance. Beck may be right in suggesting that the 
'pillars of the calculus of risk' have been abandoned at the macro level, 
but at the meso level the processes of insurance and tort law together 
with vague government regulations allow organisation activity to 
continue despite 'risks' in areas such as consumer safety, worker 
compensation, and product development. 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty, whilst not pursued so far 
in discussion, is worth mentioning at this point. Knight (1921) offered 
the classic distinction. Certainty is when you know for sure what is 
going to happen. Risk is when you don't know for sure but know the 
odds. Uncertainty is when you don't even know the odds. Our 
discussion suggests that certainty rarely exists (Douglas and Wildavsky 
1982:3, suggest on this: 'What would be needed to make us understand 
the risks that we face? Nothing short of total knowledge [a mad answer 
to an impossible question]). Risk and uncertainty, on the other hand, 
are ever-present, but the precise understandings required for a 
distinction between the two are rarely (if ever) present. 
The inherent uncertainty in scientific research, simple lack of this 
research and the hidden and/or delayed nature of human impact on 
the natural world contribute to this problem. As well, information 
overload may inhibit analysis (even though the information is poor 
this is important), people and organisations often out of self interest or 
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protocol necessity rather that as a result of calculation or considered 
judgment, and even when a reasonable level of information exists it 
may not be communicable. 
Decisions are nevertheless taken with, as Thompson's (1995) 
Himalayan analysis suggests, contradictory certainties about problems. 
This does not mean that the 'real' situation is revealed, merely that 
some, for varying reasons, assumptions are made about problem 
definition and information areas required by policy makers (such as, in 
his analysis of the FAO). 
Organisations which seek to operate eco-sensitively will ultimately 
need to operate with a non-anthropocentric stance towards risk, using 
the concept of risk-for-nature. 
Risk for Nature 
Risk-for-nature (RFN) means the risk of harm to nature directly and/or 
indirectly, in the short and/or long term. It encompasses the potential 
harm to nature (and biodiversity) of human action and its 
measurement represents an end towards which eco-sensitive 
organisations should strive. 
At the global level RFNs are clearly multiplying with the advance of 
industrial capitalism and the resultant 'high consequence risks'. At the 
organisational (local) level the degree of deliberate or conscious damage 
to nature will vary according to the extent of development of 
organisation self and movement along the continuum of 
anthropocentricism. At the resource exploitation end there will be no 
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concern over any damage to nature, at the other, the 'amiable 
anthropocentricism' extreme, there will be considerable concern. As 
organisations strive to move through this continuum and become 
more eco-sensitive they will need to deal with limitations on their 
capacity to act appropriately. 
Such limitations occur at all three levels. The first has already been 
suggested - a modernist (basically financial) bias ignores RFN. The 
strength of this limitation is emphasised by use of the insights of 
cultural theory - managers will tend to see nature as there to be used, 
and damage as an inevitable part of the process of producing profit. 
Given the technocratic orientation associated with this stance any 
problems are fixable, but in any case, given a resource exploitation 
stance, these problems will not be problems of nature, but problems that 
affect humans. 
The second limitation applies with organisations further along the 
anthropocentric continuum. There may be an official intention to take 
RFN into account in decision making, but this is likely to be both 
limited in intensity (the extent to which it is regarded as important 
within the organisation) and scope (appreciation of the number and 
type of RFN). Managers will be hampered by a lack of organisation 
knowledge (in the autopoietic sense). Data, or more specifically latent 
data in the form of scientific information, may be sought, but it is 
unlikely to become part of knowledge. The gulf between scientific and 
commercial vocabularies and understandings is such that knowledge 
building will be slow and understandings that become part of the 
organisation core few in number because all but the most eco-sensitive 
organisations simply do not have the capacity to incorporate complex 
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notions of RFN into their core of meaning. This is because they lack 
the communication capacity and the vocabulary (distinctions) as 
well as the willingness and skill required to change. 
The third limitation affects those 'aware' organisations, those which 
have advanced beyond unwillingness to bother with RFN and 
incapacity to understand the idea and appreciate that it entails 
matters of considerable complexity. Reasonable appreciation of RFN 
requires a level of understanding of eco-systems, biodiversity and 
the complexity inherent in assessment of human impact on nature 
that is not yet available. Science is an unreliable ally to the eco-
sensitive organisation. 
In order to further develop this analysis a basic view of the 
relationship between the totality of nature, total RFN, scientific 
knowledge and organisation knowledge is represented in the 
following figure: 
Figure 12: Risk-for-Nature, scientific knowledge and organisation 
activity 
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The figure tpresents the totality of nature in the largest oval (1). The next 
oval (2) represents the sum of all human impact on nature, hence 'real 
RFN', that is the sum of all current impacts by humans on nature. 
Developing McKibben (1990), the suggestion is that, given uncertain 
knowledge, we cannot know that all nature has been altered by 
humans, but that it is likely that either all or almost all has been, hence 
the close proximity of these two circles. The third oval (3) represents the 
totality of human scientific knowledge about RFN, a zone where, with 
varying degrees of confidence, scientists claim to understand aspects of 
human impact. This circle overlaps total human impact and extends 
slightly into 'total nature' as a reflection of the assumption of imperfect 
knowledge - logically there may be some scientific 'knowledge' about 
RFN that is incorrect. Oval four (4 in the diagram) represents the extent 
of impact on nature of any one organisation. It is represented as varying 
from the greater scope covered by scientific knowledge, reflecting the 
fact that organisations often operate without any idea of impact and that 
organisation knowledge (in the autopoietic sense) will always be less 
than scientific knowledge. 
Obviously knowledge that feeds perceived RFN can only grow after 
human interest in an issue has developed. We tend to know far more 
about elements of biodiversity after significant impact than before, both 
for this 'stimulating interest' reason and because of the lag between it 
and the development of scientific knowledge. The relationships in this 
pattern can be presented in the form of a decay curve relating time and 
'environmental integrity', a notion defined by the extent of 'untouched 
nature' evident in any definable segment of the natural world. 
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Figure 13: Knowledge acquisition and decline in environmental 
integrity 
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The contention again is that there is little or no pure nature left and 
that with the passing of time the integrity of any identifiable element 
of (or extent of fit with the notion of untouched wilderness) will 
decline. Scientific knowledge will tend to develop only after a 
significant decline in this integrity, fed by increased appreciation of 
research problems and the capacity to fund the research effort. An 
obvious implication of this is that we know more about that which 
we have almost lost than that which we have not touched. The zone 
of knowledge acquisition tends to focus on a point where integrity is 
denatured to the extent that 'wilderness' has vanished and people 
have become concerned. RFN is 
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integrated after risks for humans (for example risk of loss of amenity) 
are perceived. 
What does this suggest for organisations and biodiversity? Changes to 
organisational approaches to RFN are of obvious importance in the 
development of an eco-self, as some risk approach is fundamental to 
the sensitivity with which developments which involve RFN are 
approached. Holistic thinking is part of this too, since it provides the 
framework within which a new approach to risk is placed. Risk is a 
fundamental part of a total view of the organisation within the social 
and natural worlds. This provides background to analysis of additional 
factors associated with the transition to eco-sensitive assessments of 
RFN. 
The first of these is a move away from the dominance of financial 
approaches to RFN. If the bias is financial then the decisions are too; the 
concentration is on money profits in the short term, and the analysis is 
of ways to control monetary risk. Within this view sophisticated 
accounting systems and calculations of such things as bond rates and 
future market operations predominate. For example, a decision may be 
taken to destroy an area of mangrove swamp in order to erect a marina 
because sale of moorings will provide a boost to annual income, while 
the construction uses up cash resources that are doing badly in the short 
term money market. Damage to the mangrove system and the long and 
short term consequences of this are ignored. An unreservedly eco-
centric approach would eliminate all financial consideration from risk 
calculation, but given the continuance of profit-seeking capitalist 
activity some element of a financial bias will remain: Fox's (1990) stages 
of anthropocentricism are useful in explaining this. With movements 
from unrestrained exploitation and expansionism through resource 
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conservation and development and towards what was earlier called 
amiable anthropocentricism there is a steady increase in the influence 
of an eco-bias (towards protection of biodiversity). This is a balancing 
bias that tempers the financial bias of organisations that leads to actions 
that harm biodiversity. In the mangrove example, an exploitative 
company would proceed irrespective of RFN so long as profits were 
sufficiently likely, whilst a resource conservation company would at 
least hesitate because the impact on nature could mean the loss of long 
term possibilities for other human uses, and the amiably 
anthropocentric company would not proceed because their expanded 
eco-self would suggest that obvious damage in the short term, with 
many possible long term consequences to the eco-system, could not be 
justified for profit. Such a company would seek a project elsewhere. 
This suggests the second factor in a new approach to RFN, a 
redefinition of 'decisive action'. Discussion so far has indicated that 
organisations will be gradually less willing to act in ways that may harm 
biodiversity, effectively moving towards an informed usage of the 
'precautionary principle' advocated by the UK Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (Newsom 1992:28) and advocated in 
Germany as the Vorsorgenprinzip. This means less obviously decisive 
decision makers in that they avoid development decisions or 
prevaricate awaiting further information or new insights. 
A difficulty in achieving this comes with the fact that decision makers 
in the fast changing and complex world economy are rewarded for 
speedy decision making, and as Wally and Baum (1994) and Hitt and 
Tyler (1991) argue, speedy decision makers are highly tolerant of risk 
and have a strong propensity to act. They are also rewarded with 
promotion in business organisations. This will not change while the 
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requirements for flexible responses to a fast changing business 
environment remain, consequently the understanding of what 
constitutes decisive action must change. Avoiding developments must 
be seen as decisive in some circumstances, a low tolerance of RFN as a 
positive feature. Such changes will develop as the eco-self develops for 
organisations and holistic thinking and longer term time frames are 
used in planning. 
A third factor is the usage by decision makers of the insights of the 
social constructionists. Given the understanding that there are 
conflicting certainties when it is assumed that knowledge is present, the 
risk averse decision maker will seek out and make use of these different 
perspectives. Thompson's (1995) analysis of deforestation suggested 
using all four of the perspectives identified. Similarly, evaluation of 
our hypothetic mangrove development could involve organisation 
planners, local residents, ecologists and fisher people. Fischer (1993) 
makes a related point when discussing a 'participatory approach' to risk 
assessment. Having criticised technical knowledge as a poor response to 
the new ways of looking at risk he suggests that 'lay persons' be 
integrated with experts in 'the much needed discourse' on risks 
(1993:106). O'Riordan and Rayner (1991) call this 'vernacular science', in 
which 'moral preferences, public consciousness, and trust in 
participatory decision procedures' have important roles. 
The constructionist perspective yields a wider range of participants - 
including as many different 'expert' views as possible - and, as 
presented in the current discussion, applies it (in contrast to Fischer, 
1993) at the organisation rather than macro level. This is a difference in 
emphasis rather than a clear distinction, given that important decisions 
will involve government and the public as well as the organisation, but 
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is nonetheless significant since it indicates that change within the 
knowledge base of the organisation is required. 
In terms of the autopoietic analysis presented earlier this is a major 
change to core beliefs but, given association with the development of 
eco-self, it is one that is already under way in many organisations. A 
further significant factor in establishing the new approach to RFN is 
suggested by the autopoietic lens. Knowledge growth involves new 
distinctions, additional data and the process of languaging. 
Understanding of RFN will require that many more 'distinctions' be 
established and knowledge added to the organisation core. This will be 
facilitated by the presence of scientific gatekeepers within the 
organisation charged with the task of increasing the amount and 
meaningfulness of scientific data entering and being communicated. 
The key is the communicability of this data and this suggests that such 
gatekeepers should be employed as much for their ability to 
communicate science as for specific scientific abilities. It also suggests 
that they be multi-disciplinary and open to ideas, since RFN issues may 
involve a variety of modernist disciplines. 
The role of scientific gatekeepers is already clear in the literature on 
technology and innovation, where standard advice to organisations 
which want to innovate is to employ technology gatekeepers who 
present communicable data about changes in science and technology to 
organisations (Carlopio 1994). The RFN (or more widely, biodiversity 
issues) gatekeepers would occupy similar positions, with the capacity for 
organisation cultures to adapt to their role increased by the present 
acceptance of technology gatekeepers. 
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Such gatekeepers would ideally be multi-disciplinary with knowledge 
of both ecological economics and the precesses of 'new science', matters 
dealt with in the next chapter. 
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NEW SCIENCE AND ECO-SENSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 
The broad disciplines of science and economics are vital to 
organisation world view, science (in particular natural science) 
because it represents legitimated knowledge about the natural world, 
and economics because it represents the language of power, a 
vocabulary and way of thinking that structures business and 
government dealings with the natural world. For eco-sensitive 
managers both a new science and a new economics are necessary 
tools, and as the discussion will indicate, transitions from old to new 
are already underway. 
New Science 
Discussion of RFN has already indicated that what has been called 
'science' is fundamental to directing the activities of eco-sensitive 
organisations. The fundamental point is a simple one: those who act 
in the world need to understand what they are doing, and 
biodiversity understanding is basically scientific, mostly coming 
from the 'natural sciences' that seek to understand the world of 
living things. 
It has already been suggested that science be communicated (hence 
communicable) within business organisations, and that there be an 
emphasis on multi-disciplinary work in order that the complex 
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interaction between ecology and organisations be understood. In 
earlier discussion too, it was suggested that 'big science' is 
contracting in accordance with the gradual drop in funding from the 
declining corporatist state. Along with this there has arguably been a 
failure of the 'grand design' to control nature which started in the 
seventeenth century with Francis Bacon and reached its peak with 
the lunar landing program of the 1960s and 70s. As Beck (1992a, 
1992b) and Giddens (1990, 1991) point out, control over nature has 
slipped and control over damage to nature has risen as a focus. This 
has been assisted by a loss of public faith in normal science which, 
whilst still greatly respected, has slipped from the height of public 
regard within core nations in generations born since the second 
world war. 
Crook et al. (1992) place these changes in the context of the broad 
process of post modernisation. On the suggestion that funding 
restrictions on research are leading to control of science by 
corporations and governments they comment: 
Far more plausible is the image of decentred and transitional 
science in which the level of the nation-state becomes less and 
less relevant. Hyperdifferentiation corrodes the disciplinary 
structure that underpins modern science. As research fronts 
proliferate disciplines fragment, and for researchers in 
particular fields communication across disciplinary 
boundaries may become more important than 
communication within a discipline (1992:41). 
Their conclusions are persuasively argued and important for this 
argument, given that they suggest transitions in science useful for 
preserving biodiversity that are driven by forces more fundamental 
than organisation intention, government coercion or public 
pressure. 
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This analysis does not suggest that expert knowledge becomes less 
important within post-modern society. It becomes more important 
in providing answers to significant questions thrown up by the 
success of technology and the onrush of the (now flawed) grand 
design. The modernist project of rational control continues to exert 
strong influence both in research and as provider of the basic 
vocabulary and understandings that legitimate business 
organisation and government activity. The trend is, however, away 
from the edifice of big science (and, as we will see in the next section, 
neo-classical economics) and this provides further opportunities for 
favourable developments in the quest for eco-centric management. 
The issue is not whether there will be a 'new science', or whether it 
will be autonomous in the modernist tradition, but 'the manner in 
which science will dissolve into and transform other economies and 
discourses...' (Crook et a/. 1992:218). The way is open for an 
optimistic ethical eco-centric 'science' to develop, and for new ways 
to use this science in policy making. The term 'new science' is used 
to describe the processes required for preservation of biodiversity 
instead of available similar terms in the literature, in particular 
'post-science' (Crook et al. 1992), 'post-normal science' (Funtowicz 
and Ravetz 1993), and 'vernacular science' (O'Riordan and Rayner 
1991, O'Riordan 1991b) because it borrows from all without reflecting 
any one exactly. In particular 'new science', as presented in this 
discussion, is focused on meso level issues rather than reflecting the 
macro level bias of the identified alternatives. 
Such a science is 'optimistic' in the sense of Boulding's influence 
optimism (1979). It comprises a body of knowledge and groups of 
researchers explicitly directed at furthering better outcomes in the 
world. This does not mean that the normal science tradition of 
curiosity-driven research is abandoned - Huizinga's (1968) analysis 
of humanity as 'homo ludens' rather than 'homo faber' suggests 
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this is too deep seated to replace in any case - but rather that it is 
married with policy relevance. As management of organisations 
(and governments) becomes more eco-centric more of this research 
will be directed at issues that have little or nothing to do with direct 
human benefit. In terms of the decay curve described in discussion 
of RFN, research interest extends further up, sensitively 
investigating before human impact has a great impact on the 
integrity of nature. 
It has already been suggested, too, that new science be 
communicable, a point fundamental to the 'scientific gatekeeper' 
role, suggested as part of the handling of RFN. This implies that new 
science needs to be expressed in understandable - albeit necessarily 
sophisticated - language. Since 'experts' and consequently the 
boundaries of disciplinary expertise will continue to be influential 
even as they are broken down in the processes of post-
modernisation, an achievable process is to produce parallel texts for 
policy relevant science rather than strive for an entirely new 
approach to reporting. One text would be conventionally scientific, 
and probably relatively inaccessible to all but fellow researchers, the 
other directed at scientifically literate but non-specialist users. But 
the insistence should be that both texts be produced. 
The parallel text should thus be at a level that a sophisticated reader 
could understand, someone with the vocabulary common to those 
who have achieved a grade twelve education standard in the 
subjects common to core-world oriented education systems. This 
suggests reasonable understanding of mathematics and basic science 
as well as reading and analysis skills. In the Ok Tedi case described 
earlier this means that educated local villagers would be able to gain 
access to relevant scientific understandings and communicate these 
203 
Chapter Six 
to their fellows, and for issues arising in the core world it means that 
either a majority or significant minority of local people affected by a 
development would be able to understand and take part in debate. 
Communication of scientific findings through use of parallel texts 
will also expand organisational knowledge of specific issues because 
it facilitates languaging and the development of new distinctions 
that feed the eco-self. 
The impact of parallel texts will become far greater as the power of 
information technology to store and deliver information to a wider 
community of scientists, organisations and stakeholders increases. 
All policy relevant information - in both 'texts - can potentially be 
stored and accessed world wide through internet technology, thus 
providing a store of data that can serve to inform any development 
proposal. In order to be successful this data would need to be 
organised according to clearly understood international protocols, 
and the development of these through committees of scientists and 
citizens at an initial stage in the process. At the same time there 
must be a willingness on the part of organisations to use such 
information, which would grow as eco-sensitivity increases and the 
boundaries of organisational knowledge expand. 
These are significant changes but will be helped by continuing 
developments in communication technology, and as eco-sensitivity 
further develops, by increasing numbers of scientific gatekeepers. 
These changes will not occur immediately since major alterations to 
the current practice of normal science is involved. As Yearly 
(1992:519) and Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) point out, science is not 
intended for use by consumers but by other workers in the same 
scientific discipline, and more importantly by those working on the 
same or similar problems within the discipline. Crook et al. 
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(1992:215) suggest that : 'Research scientists appear to be deeply 
suspicious of any (their emphasis) non-technical reporting of their 
work. On the one hand they seem to believe that their findings are 
almost wilfully distorted .... On the other hand, working scientists 
are dissmissive of the efforts of colleagues who produce "popular 
science". 
Parallel texts and cross-national and cross-disciplinary 
communication of results will therefore develop slowly, but both 
are pushed on by forces of fundamental change. The disintegrating 
boundaries of normal science and its immersion into the social 
world - scientific problems such as the ozone hole are also social, as 
evidenced by increases in skin cancers - will gradually lead to greater 
willingness to communicate research in understandable form. 
Significant 'cutting edge' research in many areas is now often 
followed by popular writings, for example in chaos theory (see 
Gleick 1988), fuzzy logic (see Kosko 1994), and complexity theory (see 
Waldrop 1992). In these three cases popularisation lagged only a 
short time (in years) behind fundamental research. Cross national 
and cross disciplinary sharing of information is also a current trend, 
already fed by information technology as well as by the normal 
science practice of (frequently international) peer review of scientific 
papers, and pushed on by the deeper processes of post-
modernisation. 
An additional problem for new science comes with the fact that 
science can claim only limited and provisional knowledge on any 
issue. Nothing is fully known, nor is current understanding final. 
This is particularly true of ecological science, as discussion of 
biodiversity in chapter four made clear. Cramer (1987:500) 
summarises the argument here in suggesting that environmental 
scientists are handicapped by 'the low level of theoretical 
development of ecology'. 
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The new science response is to place this understanding at the 
forefront of scientific and public understanding of science. It impacts 
particularly in the approach to environmental issues which are now 
widely considered to be of general significance. For such issues, 
however, there is limited understanding even in the matters 
organisationally considered to be reasonably well understood, and 
no real knowledge of organisation impacts for most organisation 
activity. This requires a new approach to uncertainty in biodiversity 
issues by a scientific community aware that it is of central 
• importance in developing organisational knowledge about issues. 
This onus is given greater weight, too, by legislative requirements 
that such things as environmental impact assessments be conducted 
before organisations proceed; here, too, legitimated normal science is 
of fundamental importance. 
The shape of this science can be further developed with reference to 
the Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991,1993) model for problem solving 
strategies for environmental issues. They use a biaxial model 
representing 'systems uncertainties' and 'decision stakes' on the 
axes, with decision stakes (a value judgment) ranging from low to 
high according to cost, benefits and the commitment of parties 
involved in an issue, and three levels of uncertainty, the technical, 
methodological and epistemological. 'Technical' indicates that 
standard routines are adequate, 'methodological' includes 'more 
complex aspects of the information [such] as values or reliability', 
and 'epistemological' indicates that 'irremediable uncertainty is at 
the core of the problem,' (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991:143). This 
model then represents problem solving strategies (see Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Funtowicz and Ravetz's Model 
High 
MI•••• 
POST-NORMAL 
SCIENCE 
PROFESSIONAL 
CONSULTANCY 
APPLIED 
SCIENCE 
(Core Science) 
SYSTEM UNCERTAINTIES 	 High 
(Source: Adapted from Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993:745) 
In the 1993 version of their model each of the zones includes the 
one before it, (adapted from Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993:745) so 
'applied science' includes the processes of 'core science' and 
'professional consultancy'. 'Core science' emphasises peer review 
and deals with 'certainty'. 'Applied science' uses a wider set of peers 
including 'users of al sorts' and it is 'mission oriented' (Funtowicz 
and Ravetz 1993:740), but its outcomes resemble core science in that 
they have 'the features of reproducibility and prediction' (1993:749). 
'Professional consultancy' deals with higher decision stakes and 
unique situations and involves greater individual judgment. It is 
'client serving' (1993:740). 'Post-normal science' involves situations 
with high level (epistemic) uncertainty and high decision stakes. It 
also involves an 'extended peer community' including, for example, 
the people afected by large scale polution problems, or the victims, 
carers, journalists, activists and self-help groups involved in the 
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AIDS debate. The example of building a dam serves to explain the 
interaction of the four zones: core science informs applied science 
which is used in the basic construction, but to design the optimal 
shape requires professional consultancy and to assess the impact on 
the hydrological cycle in the district requires post-normal science 
(based on Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991:147). 
Insights from the model are useful. It is clear that the level of 
uncertainty affect capacity to solve problems and that 'decision 
stakes' and level of complexity also affect problem solving. A 
number of developments for a new science relevant to macro level 
biodiversity problems can, however, be suggested. 
With use of parallel texts and sharing of what therefore becomes 
communicable information, the role of curiosity driven 'core 
science' expands from the very limited one allocated by Funtowicz 
and Ravetz (1993). 'Experts', as Crook et al. (1992) point out, will 
remain important in any case because of the continuing power of 
established science, but with increased communication of their ideas 
they can also make a much greater contribution to policy and debate 
over biodiversity issues because their specialised insights are 
fundamental to an increased general understanding of these issues. 
Beck (1992a) points out that they have never been more necessary 
than now; having been pivotal in humankind's conquest of nature 
they remain pivotal in the quest to control its consequences because 
they are repositories and producers of the knowledge required to 
handle the complexities inherent in this project. 
The mission oriented zone of 'applied science' and the value-
judgmental 'client serving' zone of the professional consultancy 
which includes it should also be altered, though in this case by 
contraction rather than expansion. Both include 'core science', but 
in neither case is the suggested expansion of peer community and 
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debate enough to guard against the influence of values and 
development of judgments that are antithetical to the preservation 
of biodiversity. Until most organisations operate in an eco-centric 
fashion, exploitative anthropocentric values will tend to produce 
applied science and consultancies that validate development that 
contributes to loss of biodiversity. There is also a real danger in poor 
environmental research or research which is tailored to the group 
paying for it rather than the problem under investigation. With 
transitions towards eco-centric management this tendency wanes, 
but in the meantime the influence of an expanded new science that 
values knowledge before results provides a better barrier than a 
mission or client orientation. 
The shape of what Funtowicz and Ravetz call 'post-normal science' 
can also be altered after further consideration of the idea of an 
extended peer community that is fundamental to it. 
This is effectively an expanded group of stakeholders who take part 
in debate, an idea echoed by O'Riordan's 'vernacular science', 'a 
special mixture of scientific analysis, communication and 
participation' (O'Riordan 1991b:150). In the AIDs example they 
include everyone with an interest in the area, failing to distinguish 
between those who can contribute to debate as primary users of 
knowledge and those who contribute primarily as developers of 
knowledge. The former may be called 'user-peers', and the latter 
'knowledge peers', and as the following argument suggests the 
distinction between them is significant. 
Three sets of knowledge peers can be identified to extend scientific 
knowledge of biodiversity. The first is natural scientists generally; as 
communicable information spreads and disciplinary (and sub-
disciplinary) boundaries break down the number of scientists who 
can readily contribute to policy relevant research grows. They may 
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not be 'direct responsibility' researchers but can nevertheless 
contribute insights from their own research. The second includes 
social scientists who contribute insights from their own conceptual 
viewpoints; for example, a social scientist can help identify issues for 
research into ozone impacts and help in designing the research 
process by splitting cancer victims into useful demographic groups. 
The third group is made up of people with indigenous knowledge of 
the eco-system or the particular species under scrutiny. This is 
perhaps more important for biodiversity than other areas of 
scientific or policy interest, given that such people have, as McNeely 
(1988) and Norse (1993:160) indicate, a depth of knowledge built up 
over millennia, one that is both suitable and sophisticated and 
complements rather than challenges the insights of normal 
scientists. 
The pattern in this extension of knowledge is an onwards expansion 
of the areas of legitimated knowledge towards a linking of 
disciplinary fields, and towards an incorporation of many types of 
knowledge in the quest for an understanding of biodiversity. As 
with the other transitions that have been discussed this will not 
happen immediately but will rather take the form of a gradual 
expansion that is already underway. Normal science is developing 
science-based multi-disciplinary areas (such as environmental 
studies) already, and as discussion of ecological economics will 
shortly indicate, there are efforts to incorporate social science into 
natural scientific inquiries as well as natural science into the social 
science of economics. Legitimation of indigenous knowledge is 
likely to be a subsequent step because it involves a greater leap by 
established science, but in the area of biodiversity it is already 
occurring, pushed on by the desire for business organisations to be 
seen to have taken account of the needs of the indigenous people in 
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organisation developments. Again, BHP at Ok Tedi provide an 
example, belatedly recognising the value of local knowledge about 
the impact of their operations. 
Expansion of the ranks of knowledge peers also expands the 
effectiveness of user peers because it provides for more broadly based 
understanding of issues. In new science the roles of these two peer 
groups develop synergstically, both fed by an emphasis on the 
communicability of information. 
Discussion so far has concentrated on changes to the Funtowicz and 
Ravetz problem solving approach. Before drawing it together it is 
necessary to explain an adaptation of their biaxial model. 
It is useful to bear in mind that the Funtowicz and Ravetz axes are 
both knowledge-dependent. Decision stakes are determined by 
knowledge of costs and benefits while system uncertainties are 
related to the extent of knowledge of the system under scrutiny. 
Decision stakes for biodiversity issues at a meso level are, using the 
insights of social constructionists, the product of a social process 
rather than a given. An organisation's acceptance of the seriousness 
of the issue (hence decision stakes) will be the product of processes at 
either or both of the meso or macro levels. 
At the meso level the extent of organisation knowledge and the 
progress within the organisation towards eco-sensitivity can set 
stakes for eco-sensitive organisations that are high to very high 
depending on the perceived level of scientific understanding, whilst 
for less sensitive organisations such stakes are low irrespective of 
knowledge. In RFN terms, appreciation depends on both knowledge 
and eco-sensitivity. 
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At the macro level, governmental pressure, media coverage, the 
level of socially communicated scientific understanding of issues, 
and public activism will all place pressure on organisations to act or 
refrain from acting. Hence two levels interact as the meso level is 
influenced by the macro, for example, as an organisation's identity is 
changed by media exposure of environmentally insensitive 
operations. It is also common for action to be entirely the result of 
meso level pressures, for example, an organisation failing to 
develop an area of rain forest even though unhampered by external 
pressures, just as it is possible for an organisation to be prevented 
from developing a 'resource' because of government (macro) 
pressure. 
At both levels, and at any number of socially located positions 
within them, there will be (despite reservations about the idea of 
'given' decision stakes articulated in discussion of constructionist 
ideas in chapter five) notions of the 'real situation' with respect to 
an ecosystem or species, especially in cases where there is widespread 
acceptance of a serious decline in environmental integrity. This will 
result in a broadly accepted notion of the 'real situation', one that 
impacts at both the macro and meso level. There is, for example, an 
appreciation of the threats to the endangered species of wedge-tailed 
eagle in the Australian state of Tasmania. Despite widespread 
decline in environmental integrity this 'real' appreciation varies 
according to factors such as the attraction of the species or eco-
system, the degree of media exposure and the efficiency of 
environmental pressure groups in putting the issue forward (see 
Hanson 1994). 
One result of this multi-layered analysis is an expanded role for 
normal science which, it is suggested, can handle more low stakes 
situations than Funtowicz and Ravetz suggest. Another, equally 
significant, is a much expanded high stakes zone reflecting an 
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organisation's impact on the natural world, with a new science 
'fueled' (or informed) by normal science required to handle these 
issues. 
The Funtowicz and Ravetz system uncertainty axis also requires 
change. Given that recognition of the provisional and uncertain 
nature of scientific knowledge is a feature of new science this axis 
can be labeled 'uncertain' at the epistemological level. At the level 
of legitimated knowledge however, there is a possible distinction 
between scientificaly accepted adequate knowledge and recognised 
inadequate knowledge, hence classifiable as 'acceptably certain' to 
uncertain. For biodiversity issues the situation is one where there is 
adequate knowledge about relatively few species or eco-systems. 
The new science biaxial can now be presented: 
Figure 15: New Science 
Low 	  * High 
Scientific Uncertainty 
High * 	 ,„ High 
Epistemological Uncertainty 
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This reflects the arguments already offered. Decision stakes are rarely 
low. When high, normal science may be the answer but for most 
situations it is new science based on and penetrated by normal 
science that provides answers. The Funtowicz and Ravetz zone of 
applied science is swallowed by new science which is, with 
recognition of different peer communities, an emphasis on 
communication, and with expanded fields of legitimated 
knowledge, capable of handling many issues. With any issue 
though, part of the new science stance is to recognise high levels of 
epistemological uncertainty. Indeed, the assumption of limited 
provisional knowledge is basic to the process of new science. The 
horizontal 'uncertainty' axis reflects this fact with dual labelling. 
Epistemological uncertainty is always high, but an additional 
'scientific uncertainty' label reflects the state of legitimated 
knowledge. This ranges from low levels to high, with the lower 
levels covered by existing normal scientific knowledge, and some 
higher levels covered by the processes of new science. 
Where decision stakes and/or scientific uncertainty are very high a 
zone of political and community debate is indicated in the new 
science model. Significantly this is a well-informed debate, fuelled by 
the communicability of new science. In the Funtowicz and Ravetz 
system this is the realm of 'post-normal science', but in fact, outside 
the scope of any science, debate needs to be based on recognition of 
uncertainty rather than on implications of a 'scientific' handling of 
an issue. The boundaries of new science expand gradually to fill this 
zone. With high levels of eco-sensitivity in political and/or 
organisation systems this will be a zone of inaction, and with lower 
levels a zone of action taken in almost total ignorance of impacts. In 
RFN terms, eco-sensitive organisations will not proceed with high 
RFN (high uncertainty, high stakes) but may proceed as the 
boundaries of knowledge expand. 
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New science offers much to organisations and communities. It 
expands the role of science, rendering it more central to decision 
making. An issues focus, new communication systems, expanded 
user and peer communities and a growing multi-disciplinarity in 
approach to issues also expand its potential to produce the 
knowledge that organisations require for sensitive handling of 
biodiversity issues. Simultaneously, the processes of new science 
expand the role of the community, both in the processes of 
developing knowledge and debates about levels of knowledge. 'New 
science' is a combination of tools (for example parallel texts) and 
attitudes (for example, an issues focus) that can lead to fundamental 
changes in the way organisations approach risk, and, as they become 
more eco-sensitive, RFN. 
The transition from acceptance of the limited field of discipline 
bound 'normal science' to 'new science' is obviously complex and 
will take time. As the discussion has indicated though, the 
directions of change in science (a breakdown of big science), in 
organisations (acceptance of the need for quick change and use of 
gatekeepers), and information technology (facilitating 
communication), make it possible. 
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A New Economics 
The discipline of economics remains the language of power, a 
narrow but powerful set of concepts and understandings that 
legitimates and purports to explain the economic behaviour of 
humans. Policy goals (see Daly and Cobb 1989:63) and organisation 
behaviour are deeply affected by the techniques and theories of 
economics which are the most overtly scientific of the social 
sciences, its high standing in the world reflected in the fact that it is 
the only 'soft' science honoured by the awarding of a Nobel prize. 
The approach to nature of conventional economics, however, is 
intimately related to unrestrained anthropocentricism and 
economic growth unfettered by ecological concern. A new 
economics is therefore required to support eco-centric approaches to 
management, and as the following discussion of the 'evolution' 
from classical, through neo-classical, to 'new environmental 
economics' and then ecological economics suggests, there are already 
significant moves in this direction. This brief history of economic 
approaches to the natural world is necessary both in order to make 
sense of the new approaches and also because elements of earlier 
approaches are still significant influences on organisation decision 
making. Ultimately an eco-centric economics is required, one that is 
incorporated by and also incorporates ecological understandings, but 
in the meantime the surprisingly broad church of conventional 
economics remains dominant. 
Folke and Kaberger (1991) use Colby's (1990) work to group 
conventional approaches to economics in the 'frontier economics' 
paradigm, and suggest that it predominated in both capitalist and 
Marxist economics from about 1870 to 1970. Their term echoes 
Boulding's 1960s notion of a 'cowboy economy' (reprinted 1992), a 
world of 'reckless, exploitative, romantic and violent behaviour,' 
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(Boulding 1992:31). In order to further understand the link between 
the various schools of economics that can be classified as members 
of this 'frontier' paradigm and economic growth, a brief history of 
the major elements of conventional economics is useful. 
The first major economic writing was undertaken by classical 
economists, in particular Adam Smith (1723-90), Thomas Malthus 
(1766-1834) and David Ricardo (1772-1823). They provided an 
interestingly pessimistic assessment of the prospect of long term 
growth. According to Pearce and Turner (1990:6) they '... stressed the 
power of the market to stimulate both growth and innovation, but 
remained essentially pessimistic about long term growth prospects'. 
Such pessimism vanished with the advent of now dominant neo-
classical theory, which has nevertheless retained Smith's doctrine of 
'the invisible hand', where the self-oriented actions of individuals 
are seen to lead to overall benefits to society so long as the market is 
allowed to operate free from government constraint. This notion 
remains significant, having increased its dominance over the last 
decade with the wave of privatisations world-wide and the 
'renaissance' of capitalism with which they have been associated. 
The modern 'Chicago school', represented most publicly by 
Friedman (1980), presents the modern face of the doctrine. 
The Marxist model followed classical economics, placing capitalism 
in a historical context and presenting a labor theory of value where 
workers provided value, while exploited by owners of capital. The 
natural world was separate from humankind, and there to be 
exploited. In Eckersley's summation of Marx this non-human world 
'...was first and foremost "the primary source of all instruments and 
objects of labor" and was variously referred to by Marx as a 
"laboratory", "the original tool house", or "the original larder" 
(1992:77). Eckersley goes on to point out that both generic streams of 
modern 'eco-Marxism', the 'orthodox' and 'humanist', accept 
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Marx's view of history and 'thereby an instrumentalist and 
anthropocentric orientation towards the non-human world,' 
(Eckersley 1992:82). On that basis it holds little promise for an 
economics that is 'eco-centric' (in terms of the meaning given to eco-
centrism in the current argument). 
The next school chronologically is neo-classical economics which 
developed just after 1870 but remains fundamental to mainstream 
thinking. Jevons (1970, first published 1871) followed by Meinger in 
the same year and later Walras, all, according to Blaug (1978:309), 
working independently, described a model of economics similar to 
the Newtonian physics that was then dominant and much admired 
for its clarity and explanatory power. Their approach was deliberately 
value free (scientific) and based on a theory of perfect competition in 
a closed system where time was irrelevant. Rational individuals in 
this system seek to maximise utility by satisfying numerous 
substitutable wants. The natural world is unpriced and the interest 
of future generations irrelevant. Basic to the system is marginal 
analysis, featuring calculations based on increases or decreases in the 
marginal utility of actions, which enables employment of the 
differential calculus that Newton developed. Calculation is also 
aided by the quest for quantification; to fit the model things must be 
measured and specific (nearly always monetary) values provided. 
The sub-discipline of welfare economics provides the vehicle for the 
handling of some environmental issues within the neo-classical 
model. 
These ideas have not persisted without challenge. The institutional 
economics of Veblen (1970, first published 1934) and Commons 
extends the neo-classical view of human nature, arguing instead for 
culturally located individuals whose preferences change over time. 
Institutionalists also take a more complex view of the economy, 
locating it in a web of institutional arrangements that includes 
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important scientific and technological elements, and they also 
'demand an integration with other social sciences', (Blaug 1978:711). 
The natural world is also given a major role in institutional 
economics, with environmental problems seen to be an inevitable 
part of economic progress and pollution seen to be a significant 
social cost. Despite having lost a 'battle' for the control of 
mainstream economics to the neo-classical school, the institutional 
perspective remains significant, represented, for example, by the 
Journal of Economic Issues, which continues to represent the wide 
interests of institutionalism under the banner of 'evolutionary 
economics'. Its emphasis on disciplinary integration and sensitivity 
to the unwelcome effects of economic growth provides therefore, 
both an historical example and modern indication of the shape of 
eco-centric economics. 
Other broad-scale attacks on the neo-classical perspective have been 
common. For example Joan Robinson (1971) has pointed out its 
deficiencies from a neo-Marxist standpoint, and Ballogh (1982) 
argued strongly that it is irrelevant (paying little emphasis to the fact 
that 'relevance' need not be supported by demonstrated 'worth'), 
while Etzioni (1988) has put forward a new economics with a moral 
dimension, featuring non-selfish 'properly socialised' human beings 
and 'social collectives' as the major decision-making unit . 
Despite these attacks and attempts at reformulation the central ideas 
of the neo-classical school, including its mechanistic model, quest 
for measurement and calculation, and the building of complex but 
incomplete conceptual models of the world, structure the world 
view of professional economists throughout the developed world. 
Mainstream environmental economics has developed from 
conventional economics as ecological awareness has risen, applying 
basically neo classical assumptions to environmental issues. It has 
had two peaks of popularity, one in the 1970's in the first of the 
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modern waves of environmentalism reflected by the Club of 
Rome's studies, and a second in the late 1980's mirroring a more 
recent peak in ecological awareness. The aims of this emerging sub-
discipline were, and remain, modest, and are well summarised by 
Pearce and Turner, prominent scholars in this sub-discipline: 
After 1970 a majority of economists continued to argue that economic 
growth remained both feasible (a growing economy need not run out of 
natural resources) and desirable (economic growth need not reduce the 
overall quality of life). What was required was an efficiently functioning 
price system (1990:13). 
These views govern approaches taken to pollution control and to 
resource development, and whilst not the eco-centric economics 
required for new approaches to policy at government and 
organisation levels they demonstrate a transition from the position 
of neo-classically legitimated economic growth and anthropocentric 
resource exploitation that had been basically accepted in core nations 
from 1870 to 1970. 
The Folke and Kaberger analysis puts the environmental economics 
approach in the category of environmental protection, 'concerned 
mainly with ameliorating the effects of human activities .... on 
damage control' (1991:282). It involves use of environmental impact 
assessments and the weighing up of costs and benefits of 
development possibilities. In order to do this economists are 
required to value the environment using techniques legitimated 
within economic and policy making circles, then compare quantified 
costs and benefits in a cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 
This process has been used in core nations since the early 1970s. 
Barde and Pearce (1991), for example, include discussions of case 
studies from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States in a survey of the valuation of natural 
resources. Their claim is that this research demonstrates that the 
techniques used to quantify values of nature are 'reliable' but 'rarely 
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used in decision making' (Barde and Pearce 1991 :Preface). Their 
explanation for this suggests three 'categories of obstacles' to use, the 
ethical, political and methodological. These are worthy of brief 
description, since they indicate the wide breadth of attacks on 
environmental economics, some from exploiters of the natural 
world, some from protectors. 
Ethical obstacles include objections to the quantification of nature 
from institutionalist and deep ecologists, who suggest that it is 
impossible to place proper value on the natural world. Barde and 
Pearce rather oddly dismiss these because they' do not seem to 
prevail in decision making circles' (1991:7). Political obstacles are 
said to be more significant, particularly the fact that benefit estimates 
are designed to make policy objectives and decision criteria explicit 
and therefore scrutinisable. This is unwelcome to policy makers 
because it lessens their freedom to act. Methodological obstacles are, 
they suggest, 'significant but over-estimated' and can be overcome 
with training, organisation of data bases and preparation of 
guidelines. 
The attacks on a new but conventionally located environmental 
economics then, come from all sides but most fundamentally from 
entrenched and unrestrained exploiters of the natural world. Barde 
and Pearce are representative of a real concern for the natural world 
within sections of the establishment of economics, one that 
threatens organisation's rights to untrammelled exploitation. The 
advance from conventional neo-classical economics they represent 
is modest from the point of view of many who deny the 
assumptions and techniques of the economists concerned (far more 
than the instrumentalists and deep ecologists that Barde and Pearce 
[1991] refer to), but is nonetheless highly significant because it is 
gaining in influence despite the opposition that has been discussed. 
The late 1980's and early 1990's indicate something of a high tide for 
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the new environmental economics. Pearce, Markandya and 
Barbier's Blueprint for a Green Economy (1989), for example, sold 
world-wide as paperback, but originated as a report for the UK 
Department of the Environment. In Australia, again representative 
of core nations, Sinden (1991) has listed over 100 different 
environmental valuation studies, and the Federal Government 
supported for a number of years a Resource Assessment 
Commission that produced reports on valuation techniques (see for 
example Streeting, 1993) as well as large scale - albeit controversial - 
valuation studies (for example that on Kakadu National Park, see 
Resource Assesment Commission 1991). 
These examples do not so much indicate specific instances of the 
natural world being borne in mind in decision making (even 
though this is significant, irrespective of ethical or academic 
objections) but they do indicate growth, however uneven, in 
institutional acceptance of the worth of the natural world. At the 
organisation level tools are provided to value the natural world, 
and related to this (and more importantly) organisation learning 
takes place. Individuals become aware of the techniques and develop 
skills in using valuation techniques, aided in this by the 'how to' 
books that follow significant acceptance of the need for such things 
as environmental evaluation. 
As economic learning and further methodological refinement 
proceed the way is prepared for 'resource management' (Folke and 
Kaberger 1991:282). This is, they suggest, the 'basic theme' of the 
Bruntland and annual World Resources Institute reports and 
therefore mainstream 'resource conservation'. In the Folke and 
Kaberger version, however, this represents a considerable advance 
on the Pearce style environmental economics response to 
sustainable development since, they suggest, it involves a focus on 
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'eco-systems processes, rather than just stocks of physical resources', 
as well as attention to 'stabilisation of population levels in 
developing countries' (1991:282). 
The methodological and value analysis subtleties involved in 
giving full effect to this are extended yet further in their final 
paradigm, 'eco-development', which more specifically sets out to 
'restructure the relationships between society and nature, by re-
organising human activities so as to be synergistic with ecosystem 
processes and functions' (Folke and Kaberger 1991:282). They suggest 
that this involves 'the management of adaptability, resilience and 
uncertainty' as well as a move away from anthropocentricism. 
Both paradigms require extensions to conventional systems, a 
challenge that 'ecological economics' seeks to answer: 
Ecological economics is a new transdisciplinary field of study that 
addresses the relationships between ecosystems and economic 
systems in the broadest sense ... By transdisciplinary we mean that 
ecological economics goes beyond our normal conceptions of scientific 
disciplines and tries to integrate and synthesise many disciplinary 
perspectives. One way it does this is by focusing more directly on the 
problems, rather than the particular intellectual tools and models used 
to solve them, and by ignoring artificial turf boundaries (Costanza and 
Daly 1991:3). 
This is a very broad statement of intent and the field is still 
developing, analysing new areas and attempting to develop new 
methodologies. Herendeen (1994) provides an indication of the areas 
of research that have resulted in his survey of the activities of 
ecological economists in striving for a measure of total 
environmental cost of human activities. He lists developments in 
theory in environmental impact statements; in the linking of 
ecological and economic systems; new forms of valuation using 
energy analysis; new resource accounting; ways of adjusting GNP to 
include resource depletion; considerations of the externality costs of 
electricity production; development of a theory of 'ecological distress 
syndrome'; some theory in 'no-regrets strategies', (1994:100-3) 
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This is part of the growing list of research in ecological economics, 
which is continuing to develop just as further refinement in the 
methodology of neo-classical environmental economics takes place. 
At the same time that economics remains the language of power, 
increasingly (albeit unevenly) acceptance of the need to use some of 
the ideas of environmental economics in decision making provides 
an indication of positive change. 
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THE SHAPE OF ECO-CENTRIC STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT 
Strategic management can be defined broadly as the field of study and 
practice that deals with top level organisation strategy. Top level 
managers and their support teams deal with such strategy in a quest to 
provide direction for organisations. It is therefore of critical importance 
in eco-centric organisations because it is a significant determinant, at 
least, of the direction of organisation operations in the short to medium 
term and, at the most, of the direction of the organisation (including its 
approach to the natural world) in the longer term as well. 
This broad definition will be extended shortly in a discussion which 
develops the broad shape for a model of eco-centric strategic 
management and at the same time draws together insights from the 
literature on a range of related issues. As earlier discussions have 
indicated, the challenges to such a model are profound. Discussion of 
biodiversity indicated the paucity of available knowledge of this central 
environmental issue, the lack of research workers in the area, and the 
complexity of the issues involved. Despite this, knowledge of this and 
other environmental issues changes quickly, although most of this is 
inaccessible to organisations because it is available only in obscure 
academic journals where it is expressed in 'difficult' language. Early 
discussion in chapter five emphasised too the pervasiveness and 
embedded nature of anthropocentric world views and culture that 
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inhibit adoption of eco-centric practices. In partial balance, the 
remainder of chapter five and chapter six indicated promising new 
ideas in the areas of risk management, science, and economics that 
could be incorporated into a new strategic management process. A 
central question is how can this best be done? One answer is, by 
developing an eco-centric style of strategic management. 
Strategic Management: The Schools 
What has strategic management offered so far to counter such 
challenges? The field is broad, as Chandler's definition of strategy 
implies: 'the determination of the basic long term goals and objectives 
of an enterprise and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying 
out goals' (1962:7). Central to this classic 'plan based' notion is the idea 
of rational planning and action backed up by the collection and analysis 
of information. This has been a preoccupation for managers of 
organisations (including armies) for millennia, with a relevant written 
heritage going back almost two and a half thousand years to Sun Tzu 
(1986). 
The notion of strategy as a plan is an idea entrenched in organisation 
life and the huge field of scholarship that has developed to assist 
managers fully reflects this fact. There are, however, other established 
points of view as well, and to review this literature in order to develop 
insights for an eco-centric strategic management model might seem an 
insuperable task. It is possible, though, with the assistance of 
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Mintzberg's (1990a) analysis of 'ten distinct points of view' on strategy 
formulation. These 'schools' provide a good basis for later discussion 
even when presented in summary form. They fall into three groups. 
The prescriptive group includes the 'design', 'planning' and 
'positioning' schools, all of which suggest how strategies should be 
formulated. They also provide the basis for conventional 
undergraduate courses in strategic management and for most 
organisation plans, and reflect the planning bias that has dominated the 
strategy literature. 
The next six schools, the 'entrepreneurial', 'cognitive', 'political', 
'cultural', 'environmental' and 'learning' schools, focus on how 
strategies are actually made rather than how they should be made. 
The last school, the 'configurational', is Mintzberg's preferred option 
and clusters elements of the others into a single perspective, making 
use of insights from all. As the ensuing discussion will indicate, this is 
broadly the case here with insights drawn from several schools in 
support of a learning school based model for eco-centric management. 
Before this though, other schools need introduction. 
The 'design school' is, in Mintzberg's opinion, the most 'deeply rooted' 
in current practice and is based on the SWOT model which suggests 
analysis of internal strengths and weaknesses and external 
opportunities and threats in order to arrive at a strategy. It has been 
associated with the Harvard Business School (see Andrews 1971,1980) 
and makes up the core of most undergraduate textbooks on strategy (see 
for example, Hill and Jones 1995, Thompson 1990, Dess and Miller 
1993). Mintzberg (1990b:172), in fact, suggests that a critique of this 
school can in some ways be taken as a commentary on the currently 
popular beliefs in the field of strategic management in general. 
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According to Mintzberg's characterisation, the design school writers 
suggest that strategy should be a controlled process of thought, that the 
chief executive officer (CEO) should be the chief strategist, and strategies 
should be made explicit but kept simple and informal (Mintzberg 
1990a:113-114). 
The 'planning school' developed at around the same time as the design 
school, with Ansoff (1965, 1979, 1984) its most prominent exponent. In 
the Mintzberg description of it the Ansoff model is broadly similar to 
the planning model but is more formal and far more complex. 
Diagrammatic presentation of the planning system in Ansoff's work 
includes more than fifty elements, seventy points of 'management 
decision', and a profusion of flows connecting them (1965:202-203). The 
planning school literature in general is full of advice on how to budget, 
schedule and program. The CEO remains architect of strategy, but 
planning staff are really responsible for operating these systems. 
Ansoff's recent (1991) defence against Mintzberg's (1990) attack calls it 
the ' school of holistic strategic management' and makes the point that 
there have been many advances within it between 1965 and 1990. These 
include such things as' diagnostic procedures .... for sequencing 
strategy/structure development ...', use of the notion of organisational 
capability (to replace strengths and weaknesses), and development of 
'interactive computer software for strategy formulation in turbulent 
environments' (Ansoff 1991:452-453). The emphasis on complexity, on 
planners, on formal skills and authority, and on the power of rational 
thought remain. 
The 'prescriptive school' focuses on the idea of strategy as a position in 
the market place and much of the modern work classifiable within its 
scope stems from Porter's analysis of competitive strategy (1980,1990). In 
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this conception strategy is about analysis of the market then selecting a 
position and generic strategy. The process is analytical, based on 
economic criteria, conscious, explicit, future directed and requires the 
skills of an analyst (planner). The basic Porter 'five forces model' used 
for industry appears simple enough for a well educated person to use 
with confidence ( however misplaced this may be) and it has been very 
widely accepted in conventional business practice. 
These three schools in the prescriptive group share the same bias 
towards rational planning and an assumption that a knowable world is 
'out there' which can be controlled, so that organisations are prepared 
for and control the future. Taken together they can form the basis of 
what Prahlahad and Hamel (1994) call 'traditional strategic 
management'. This conception reflects aspects of all three schools, but 
widens them to include directions of current conventional research and 
has the following key elements: 
• Strategy is about positioning a business in an industry 
• The focus is on existing and stable industries rather than 
industries in transitions (declining or emerging) 
• Specific business units remain the focus rather than 
corporations 
• Economic analysis is the basis for conclusions (rather then any 
interplay between economy and politics, or economy and 
society) 
• 'Strategy is the result of an analytical process [and] execution of 
strategy is an organisational process' (Prahlahad and Hamel 
1994:11) 
This is obviously a stylised view of a complex and, as Ansoff (1991) 
points out, a still evolving body of literature, but it is nevertheless clear 
that the basis of these schools is analysis which relies on the availability 
of information. There is an overall assumption that management 
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guidance can control the future, and an emphasis on established 
expertise and use of hard data. The notion of formal planning is 
basically unchallenged from within these schools, untouched even by 
critics on the outside such as political scientist Wildavsky (1973) who 
provided fairly early and savage comments that contain a truth that is 
perhaps ironically a major defence for planning: 
Planning is not really defended for what it does but for what it symbolizes. 
Planning, identified with reason, is conceived to be the way in which 
intelligence is applied to social problems. The efforts of planners are 
presumably better than other people's because they result in policy 
proposals that are systematic, efficient, coordinated, consistent, and 
rational. It is words like these that convey the superiority of planning. The 
virtue of planning is that it embodies universal norms of rational choice 
(1973:141) 
Whilst Wildavsky's intent is critical his statement on the symbolic 
value of planning is notable. Formally rational plans symbolise order 
and efficiency; they persuade management and workers that things are 
under control. In an uncertain world this is, contra Wildavsky, a 
generally useful role and it constitutes an important defence for 
rational planning. On its own it may indicate that rational planning is 
necessary to control anxiety in an uncertain world. 
In other important ways however, formal planning of the sort under 
discussion is incapable of dealing with a world that cannot be rendered 
orderly enough to be encompassed by linear thinking processes. Even in 
sophisticated form, planning fails in the face of change. A 
demonstration of complexity of conventional planning systems 
striving to encompass the intricacies of a large organisation, and also of 
their weaknesses, comes with International Business Machines, IBM. 
As outlined by their Director of planning in the late 1970s (Katz 1978), 
IBM included a range of 'divisional' plans, plans for operating units 
within divisions, business policies planned at the corporate level, and 
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reviews of operating units. It also induded the distinction between 
'program planning' for specific products or to improve productivity 
and 'period planning' which balanced the wide range of program plans. 
They were 'operating plans' which used time horizons of two years and 
overall 'strategic plans' with five year horizons. Managers of operating 
units were advised to maintain 'an awareness of emerging problems or 
opportunities' and top management to 'maintain a continuing focus 
both on the strategic direction of the business and the commitment to, 
and control against, the plan of record' (Katz 1978:2).Their planning and 
management staff were selected from amongs the best and the brightest 
available. Despite this they failed to respond to the relatively obvious 
challenge of the personal computer, failed to restructure as the business 
became unwieldy, and have since the 1980's gradually weakened their 
once apparently unchallengeable position in the market. The 
conventional planning maps, even in a refined form and operated by 
dever people, failed. 
This is not to suggest that formal conventional planning is without any 
direct (as distinct from symbolic) value. Managers must plan in order to 
handle Senge's (1992:71) 'detail complexity', the many variables that 
must be controlled if an organisation is to produce goods and/or 
services. For much of the time and in many organisations that is all 
that is required, and assumptions about identifiable problems in a stable 
world are both convenient and realistic. However, all organisations are 
occasionally, and some organisations are continually, faced with the 
challenges of survival in a complex world economy. The challenge 
then is that of handling 'dynamic complexity, ... [where] an action has 
one set of consequences locally and a very different set of consequences 
in other parts of the system, ... [and when] obvious interventions 
produce non obvious consequences' (Senge 1992:71). This, of course, 
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neatly summarises the problem of dealing sensitively with the natural 
world, and as discussion in chapter five indicated, suggests that a 
holistic view of organisations and events be adapted. 
In the face of already existing dynamic complexity as well as a changing 
future conventional planning tends to fail because existing maps 
designed to handle detail complexity are inadequate. Another well 
known illustration of this is the Peters and Waterman (1982) set of 
excellent companies, used by them to back up the conclusions of one of 
the most popular successful business books of the 1980's. Within five 
years two thirds of them were in trouble. There is nothing unusual in 
this. In the USA, one third of the Fortune 500 industrials listed in 1970 
had gone by 1983 (deGues 1988:70). 
Incapacity to handle a changing future or dynamic complexity provide 
obvious handicaps for handling the world of biodiversity issues and 
conventional prescriptive schools can be dismissed on these grounds 
alone. The Mintzberg critique goes further though. In what was a 
coherent and powerful argument against planning his 1994 work The 
Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning virtually argued for a dismissal of 
planning in all complex situations. 
With these criticisms in mind we can turn to other schools. 
The first of Mintzberg's descriptive group is the 'entrepreneurial school' 
which suggests strategy is a visionary process which comes from a 
leader who uses creativity and intuition. The stress therefore is on an 
individual's qualities rather than on any process of formal planning or 
on capacities of the organisation. This style best suits a simple 
organisation structure that is responsive to the leader's direction 
(Mintzberg 1990a:139). 
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The 'cognitive school' emphasises the importance of cognitive 
processes in the mind of the strategist. Whilst Mintzberg presents this 
as 'work that could eventually grow into ... a school' rather than an 
established body of work (1990a:142), it is nevertheless worthy of 
comment because of the insights offered. These writings focus on issues 
such as distortions of reality when framing strategy, cognitive styles and 
concept formation. They are significant matters and elements of related 
work have already been used in discussion of risk and RFN in the 
previous chapter. 
The 'political school' focuses on the influence of politics in promoting 
and retarding strategic change. The notion of politics is defined broadly 
by Mintzberg to include both the internal exploitation of power which 
binds strategy (micro-politics) and the external political sphere which 
affects organisation direction (macro-politics). Such matters have 
largely been ignored in the planning oriented (conventional) literature 
and the lesson that they need to be taken into account when discussing 
strategy implementation is the most obvious one that can be drawn. It 
has been teased out by MacMillan and Jones (1986), Mintzberg (1983) 
and Pettigrew (1977) and is applied in many studies, for example in 
Pettigrew's (1985) study of Imperial Chemical Industries. 
This political lens is most obviously useful in explaining change 
processes in large organisations where blocking by sections or divisions 
slows or prevents change. Consequently, as change management 
writers emphasise, the micro-political dimension needs to be taken into 
account in change management, just as analysis of the macro-political 
level is necessary to explain the influence of government on 
organisations. 
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The central insight of use to us from this school is well stated by 
Mintzberg when he suggests that' the very fact the process [of strategy 
formation] is political means that the organisation is likely driven more 
by parochial interest than common interest, which makes it difficult to 
arrive at strategies (1990a:162). The difficulties of establishing eco-centric 
strategies, particularly 'turn around strategies' that seek to alter existing 
perceptions (and culture), illustrate an extension of this idea suggested 
by autopoietic theory: the greater the variation from core identity the 
greater the micro-political dimensions of change formulation and 
implementation. At the same time the obvious point that the macro-
political sphere is a major source of influence on the degree of eco-
centrism within an organisation remains, making the macro and micro 
spheres together a complex mix of forces influencing strategy (these 
insights are again employed in chapter nine). 
The 'cultural school' looks at the influence of the established patterns of 
belief shared by the members of a collectivity, in our case, a formal 
organisation. Discussion of autopoietic theory in chapter five made 
reference to insights from this school and the theoretical lens 
developed there; one such insight, emphasising the importance of 
culture and identity but recognising the inevitability and necessity of 
cultural change, will continue to be used in the remainder of the thesis. 
In the 'environmental school' factors such as leadership and culture are 
passive, because the common line in these studies is that organisations 
are forced into positions by exterior forces. In the most extreme form it 
is known as 'population ecology' and uses a model of natural selection 
to explain 'birth', 'life' in an ecological niche, then 'death' of an 
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organisation, (see Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984). In less extreme 
form ('contingency theory') it argues that organisations must adapt to 
the exterior forces presented to them or perish. 
This school presents obviously useful ideas, but in basically ignoring 
the importance of leadership, culture, political forces and the 
complexity of change processes, and hence the difficulties involved in 
altering organisation identity, it renders a complex world too simple to 
be of real use in explaining how organisations may best become more 
eco-centric. 
At this point it is useful to summarise the argument so far. It has been 
suggested that the three prescriptive schools offer little to management 
of and planning for complex dynamic challenges such as management 
of biodiversity issues. They do however offer useful prescriptions for 
relatively static situations and simple problems and they do have 
important symbolic value for management. The political school 
provides useful insights into macro-political influences on 
organisations and micro-political impacts on change processes within, 
and some of those insights have already been incorporated into the 
argument in chapter five, just as have social constructionist insights 
broadly situated within the 'cultural school'. The cognitive and 
ecological school offer little direct assistance, although the insight 
developed in chapter five that organisational cores develop slowly in 
complex interaction with organisations' environments is related to the 
contingency theory variation of the ecological school. 
What has been developed so far then, is a theoretically varied (issue 
driven) background for development of an eco-centric strategic 
management. Learning school theorists provide the injection of ideas 
required to complete the picture. 
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A Basic Learning School Model for Eco-Centric Management 
The essence of models classifiable within the learning school is that 
strategists learn as they go, so that as issues arise and new information 
is obtained they continually change the direction of suggested action. 
These core understandings have been usefully developed by a range of 
theorists. 
Lindblom's The Science of 'Muddling Through' (1959) set out a process 
of problem solving by making 'successive limited comparisons', an 
'incremental pattern of policy making' which avoids mistakes because 
it relies on knowledge of 'past sequences of policy steps' (p.86) and do 
not involve big policy jumps. Lindblom points out that this is a system 
rather than a failure of method and suggests that it is how policies are 
really made.Weick (1979) provided theoretical background to this 
position in arguing that all planning is related to past learning: 
Our view of planning is that it can best be understood as thinking in the 
future perfect tense. It is not the plan that gives coherence to actions. 
Coherence comes from the fact that when the act to be accomplished is 
projected in the future perfect tense the means for accomplishing the act 
become explicit, and the actions run off with greater coherence ... A plan 
works because it can be referred back to analogous actions in the past, not 
because it actually anticipates future contingencies .... Any plan is either 
phrased in terms of something one has done before or else it is meaningless 
(1979:102). 
The message here is that organisations take actions that have worked 
somewhere before; they can only plan having already learned. This is, 
as Mintzberg (1990a:152) points out, a reversal of the logic of the still 
widely accepted prescriptive school. In doing so it provides a powerful 
lesson, an insight that is important for learning school models, but one 
that goes too far in denying the power of envisaging futures and some 
forms of planning. It is possible to use past guides as guides to future 
plans, future visions. 
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Quinn (1980) developed Lindblom's incrementalism, adding an 
element of intention to arrive at 'logical incrementalism'. In his system 
formal planning is a building block of limited power that is 'excellent 
for some purposes', but strategies actually 'emerge in ways that differ 
quite markedly from the usually presented textbook methodologies. 
The full strategy is rarely written down in any one place. The processes 
used to arrive at the total strategy are typically fragmented, evolutionary 
and largely intuitive' (Quinn 1980:15). 
Quinn (1980) also provides advice on how this happens within 
organisations. Total strategy is the result of the development and 
interaction of major sub-system strategies (for example the internal 
learning, and innovation and the government-external relations sub-
systems). The particular mix of planning processes within an 
organisation is also dependent upon 'culture or ethos, management 
style, organisation form, external opposition, time horizons and degree 
of control over events' (Quinn 1980:43). This, of course, reflects the 
insights of the political school. 
In Quinn's model top management have a dominant role but tolerate 
ambiguity, and avoid overspecification in order to leave the scope to 
cope with new information. They probe the future while integrating 
sub-systems using techniques such as scenario planning, formal 
planning and 'devils advocate' (1980:57). They have a good grasp of 
political matters and also 'build the seeds of understanding, identity 
and commitment into the very processes that create their strategies' 
(1980:145). 
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Quinn's logical incrementalism offers much for the management of 
complex issues. It is open to new information, aware of the need to 
build understanding, takes into account systemic insights, and is flexible 
whilst capable of direction. The view he presents of top management's 
role is also useful, as is reflected in discussion of eco-centric leadership 
in chapter nine. 
Further insights classifiable within the learning school and useful for a 
new model to handle biodiversity issues come with the work of 
Mintzberg and others on types of strategy (Mintzberg 1978, 1987, 1994; 
Mintzberg and McHugh 1985; Mintzberg and Waters 1982, 1984). The 
conventional notion of strategy as a plan (that is, deliberate strategy) is 
distinguished from strategy as a pattern of actions, 'that is, consistency 
in behaviour over time' (Mintzberg 1994:23). The former is intended 
strategy and this is sometimes (though rarely, he suggests) 'realised', but 
usually fails to achieve results and hence is 'unrealised'. The latter is a 
pattern of strategy that is not directly intended, and is 'emergent'. Links 
to the learning school come because deliberate strategy precludes 
learning, while the more common emergent strategy relies on it, but: 
In practice of course, all strategy making walks on two feet, one deliberate, 
the other emergent. For just as purely deliberate strategy making precludes 
learning, so purely emergent strategy making precludes control. Pushed to 
the limit, neither approach makes much sense (Mintzberg 1987:69). 
An example serves to further explain how emergent strategy may 
develop. When Honda first entered the USA motor-bike market they 
aimed for success with big bikes. This deliberate strategy was unrealised, 
as American bike-riders did not want big Hondas. People did, however, 
notice and approve of the small Honda bikes used by Honda staff to run 
errands, and following up this lead a successful emergent strategy to sell 
small bikes to an entirely new market of people who had never owned 
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a bike before developed (Pascale 1984). In this case deliberate strategy 
was unrealised and emergent strategy resulted from an 'accident' from 
which the organisation learned. 
Deliberate strategy can result from the efforts of a CEO, or planning 
group, but so can emergent strategy as they pick up signals from the 
organisation environment and act on them (as Honda did) and in 
Weickian terms as they reflect on previous actions: 'Strategies grow like 
weeds in the garden. They take root in all kinds of places, whenever 
people have the capacity to learn'(Mintzberg 1987:70). 
In the work of Mintzberg and McHugh (1985), several structures for 
strategy formation are identified. Umbrella strategies take place after 
senior management has set out broad goals but the specifics are left for 
those lower down in the organisation; the conception is deliberate but 
the details are emergent. Process strategies are when the central 
leadership controls the process of strategy making and the structure and 
specification of who makes strategy, but the actual strategies are left to 
others.De Geus (1988) in an influential article (see for example, use by 
Senge 1992, and Redding and Catalanello 1994), provided further 
insights within the learning school. Reflecting on the history of 
planning at Royal Dutch/Shell, where he was head of planning, he 
argued that organisational survival depends: 
...on the ability of the company's senior managers to absorb what is going 
on in the business environment and to act on that information with 
appropriate business moves. In other words they depend on learning. Or, 
more precisely, on institutional learning, which is the process whereby 
management teams change their shared mental models of their company, 
their markets, and their competitors. For this reason we think of planning as 
learning and of corporate planning as institutional learning (De Geus 
1988:70). 
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The notion of planning as learning applied to leaders and to 
institutions (Institutional learning') is the key to Shell's approach. 
From this perspective the strategic management process is one of 
continual organisation change at the same time as it charts a course for 
the organisation in the future. Royal Dutch/Shell is trying to become a 
'learning organisation'. 
For Senge this is 'an organisation that is continually expanding its 
capacity to create its future' (1992:14). For Garvin it is '... an organisation 
skilled at creating, acquiring and transferring knowledge, and at 
modifying its behaviour to reflect new knowledge and insights' 
(1993:80). For Pedler, Burgoyne and Boydell, who prefer the more 
'convivial' term 'learning company', it is an organisation that 
facilitates the learning of all its members and transforms itself' (1991:ix). 
The common thread in these (and other) definitions is continual 
learning leading to organisational change. 
In the mid 1990's the idea is somewhat faddish and given to vagueness, 
as pointed out by Tom Peters (himself a surfer of fads as a popular 
business writer!): 'Most talk about "learning organisations" is 
maddeningly abstract or vague - and perpetually falls short on the 
specifics' (1992:385). Garvin, in a similar vein, suggests most discussions 
of learning organisations focus on 'high philosophy and grand themes, 
sweeping metaphors rather than the gritty details of practice' (1993:79). 
Such criticisms ring true, much as they would for any general term 
directed at describing a grand idea, and as earlier discussion indicated, 
the term 'sustainable development' receives similar criticisms. The 
usual solution in the case of a learning organisation is to pin it down 
through a specification of its constituent processes. As might be 
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expected the results vary, but the common theme is an intention to 
create a system that learns. Senge's prominent version includes five 
'disciplines': 
• Personal mastery, which is concerned with personal growth and 
individual learning. 
• Mental models, where the internal images we use to view the 
world are brought to the surface and alternative ways of seeing 
this world are envisioned. 
• Shared vision, the building of a vision that emerges and 
enthuses people. 
• Team learning, building learning in groups. 
• Systems thinking, which ties the other disciplines together, and 
the practice of which is integral to the creation of successful 
learning organisations. 
An emphasis on continual learning in order to survive in a 
competitive and dynamic world economy represents a management 
theory orthodoxy for the mid 1990s reflected in a specialist journal such 
as Management Learning and in texts prepared for the wider market. 
One example is Rylatt (1994), who reflects Senges's views whilst adding 
little, while Redding and Catalanello (1994) add only emphases in 
experimentation and improvisation as responses to challenge. 
What can be taken out of this for an eco-centric model of strategic 
management? Strategic planning process should, in order that they 
sanction no action that could lead to long term harm to nature, 
concentrate on the short term, building policies incrementally. 
Strategies will then be flexible and capable of incorporating new 
information. It must, however, be held together with a longer term 
'umbrella' strategy that is a product of an eco-sensitive strategic 
intention and culture oriented towards protection of the natural world. 
Such an 'umbrella' is necessary in order that the realised strategy be 
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broadly eco-sensitive, bearing in mind the realisation that much of it 
will, despite the incrementalism that lies at the core of this process, 
inevitably be emergent. Further, as short term strategies change, the 
long term eco-sensitive umbrella will continually change as the 
'vision' gets altered by events - a learning process consistent with 
Weick's insights. 
In the short term then, incremental strategies that are eco-sensitive, 
held together in the long term with an eco-sensitive intention based on 
an evolving eco-sensitive culture are advocated. Both of these are based 
on learning and continual incorporation of new information into the 
planning process. 
This represents a particular form or type of learning organisation, the 
eco-learning organisation. This is one held together by a shared culture, 
and best analysed (as in the broad argument in this work) through a 
cultural lens. It is one that deliberately pursues two major categories of 
knowledge simultaneously. Knowledge of 'conventional' matters such 
as commercial opportunities and commercially advantageous ways of 
behaving is one focus. The other is less commercial, pursuant of 
knowledge from fringe areas of science, economics, management theory 
and any number of multi and trans disciplinary areas. 
This is another serendipitious conjunction of aims. The same basic 
process facilitates both conventionally commercial and eco-sensitive 
activities. The eco-centric organisation therefore requires transitions in 
thinking (towards active pursuit of learning) and process (in order to 
facilitate this) that are simultaneously consistent with organisation 
survival and capacity to behave in an eco-sensitive fashion. 
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With this as background the next chapter can turn to basic processes 
that facilitate organisation learning, processes consistent with the view 
of learning-informed logical incrementalism that has been here 
developed. 
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THE PRACTICE OF ECO-CENTRIC STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT: SCENARIOS AND SYSTEMS 
THINKING 
Two related processes are basic to planning practice and information 
handling in the eco-learning organisation. Scenario based planning 
has a direct use in that it provides a practical system for planning 
and an indirect use in that it alters world views and assists in 
establishing a learning culture within organisations. Use of 
established techniques in systems theory (an applied form of the 
holistic thinking discussed in chapter five) offers the same mix of 
direct and indirect uses, and can be integrated into the scenario based 
system. They will be discussed in turn, before brief consideration of 
how the mental models of individuals may be changed towards 
more eco-sensitive patterns. 
A Scenario based eco-centric planning system 
This planning system is 'prescriptive' in the sense that it is a 
suggested way of planning that formulates transitions towards eco-
centric management. It is also 'descriptive' in the sense that it 
describes existing systems developed to handle commercial 
problems that nevertheless fit eco-centric management practices. 
The basis is a scenario technique but it also incorporates the systems 
thinking perspective and a version of Quinn's (1980) logical 
incrementalism, whilst also taking a process view of strategy.The 
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Mintzbergian view of strategy as a process is useful because it 
suggests there is always 'strategy' even if it is not articulated. All 
organisations have, in this view, a biodiversity strategy and overall 
environmental strategy made up of the pattern of their actions with 
respect to the natural world . This need not, and usually is not, an 
element in their formal planning system. Part of the eco-centric 
system is the 'mapping' of such strategies using techniques such as 
those that will be explained in later discussion of mental models. 
Quinn's (1980) insights, adjusted for a world in which organisations 
have access to new science and economics and vastly expanded 
sources of general information, provide a key to the system. 
Planning proceeds through the scenario system that will shortly be 
described, but actions which affect the natural world will be 
'incremental' rather than 'significant' in impact because 
organisations strive to minimise damage while remaining open to 
new sources of information which direct both these and later 
actions. An assumption of incrementalism, with the size of each 
'step' governed by the extent of available knowledge, is important to 
protecting the natural world. This does not mean that a 'long view' 
cannot be taken, indeed that is one key to the usefulness of scenario 
systems and to developing a point of view that facilitates protection 
of the natural world. The view is long, but successive actions are 
incremental. What then is scenario based planning and how does it 
fit into the system? 
Schwartz (1991:3-4) provides a recent definition: 'Scenarios are a tool 
for helping us take a long view in a world of great uncertainty ... a 
method for articulating the different pathways that might exist for 
you tomorrow, and finding your appropriate movements down 
each of these possible paths.' They are a way of organising ideas 
about possible future worlds while at the same time changing 
perceptions of the current world, and therefore deal with both 
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information and perception. They are based on information about 
the forces that drive organisations, but explore and expand this 
information by including uncertainties about its accuracy and utility. 
Consideration of these uncertainties is fundamental to altering 
perceptions of those involved in the scenario development (Wack 
1985b). 
Earlier discussion has suggested that decisions in organisations are 
taken after testing against mental models of how the world and the 
organisation operate. In a world in which survival for most 
organisations depends upon learning about future possibilities, 
scenarios structure ideas about possible futures. 
In this important sense scenarios are different to 'forecasts' which 
are based on the past with simple extrapolations to the future. The 
forecasting model suits conventional planning because it is based on 
available (usually quantifiable) information; it is definite in form, 
and suits planning modes that require precision. This tends to work 
in stable situations, and as Wack points out' more often than not 
they can be reasonably accurate. And this is what makes them 
dangerous. They often work because the world does not always 
change. But sooner or latter forecasts will fail when they are needed 
most' (1985a:73). This does not mean that there are not many 
'givens' that prevail for almost all possible futures. For example it is 
relatively easy to use demographic data to assess the age-structure of 
a population any number of years ahead with reasonable confidence. 
These do not constitute the whole picture, but to the extent that they 
are useful they can be incorporated into scenarios as 'certainties'. 
The basic scenario process is to prepare and then examine multiple 
possible futures and base strategies on the outcomes of the process. 
Scenarios are a technique which accepts uncertainty and attempts to 
understand it (Wack 1985a:79), while at the same time altering the 
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perceptions and mental maps of participants in the process. Changes 
to understandings and strategies may not occur immediately but as 
Mercer (1995:46) suggests,' ... failure to have an immediate impact 
on published strategy should not, however, discourage those 
considering use of the technique. Our own experience, and that of 
Shell, was that the first scenarios produced are relatively neglected 
in the subsequent planning. It may take literally years for the process 
to deliver all its benefits'. Mental maps, perceptions and skills all 
take time to develop, just as organisation culture and identity takes 
time to change, but all can and do change, and scenarios are an 
important tool in facilitating the process. 
The history of scenarios goes back to the USA Air Force in World 
War II which used them in order to plan against what opposing 
forces might do. Herman Kahn, according to Zenter (1982:14), 
introduced the idea into the planning world in the 1950s and by the 
late 1960s was talking of 'surprise free futures .... a means to improve 
understanding rather than forecasts' (Kahn and Wiener 1967). In the 
early 1970s the 'hard systems' based computer models of Meadows, 
Meadows and Forester (1972) and the Pestel and Mesarovic (1974) 
studies of growth and environmental impact were examples of the 
computer based scenario techniques used at that time. 'Soft models' 
followed. The Delphi technique (now used for some decision 
making in business) was used to develop scenarios (see Linstone and 
Turoff 1975), and complex cross-impact analysis techniques were also 
developed (see Fontela 1976). 
Organisational use of scenarios in the 1970s and for much of the 
1980s, however, was dominated by the Royal Dutch/Shell group of 
companies (Shell). They began trialing scenario planning in 1971 
after deciding that the 'unified planning machinery' which 
provided them with detailed plans for all areas of operation as well 
as forecasts for six years ahead was unable to cope with the degree of 
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uncertainty in their industry (Wack 1985a). Shell began using the 
technique throughout the group in 1973, establishing a reputation 
for prescience by successfully employing it in preparation for the 
1973 world oil crisis. In 1981 they again used scenarios to good effect 
and sold off excess oil when other companies stock piled after the 
start of the Iran/Iraq war, subsequently profiting when prices 
dropped as a glut of oil developed. Further public demonstration of 
success for scenarios came in the 1991 Gulf war when Shell's 
chairman suggested they were so well prepared that business 
proceeded without a pause or perception of a major problem. 
The Shell group's use of the technique has been used to explain its 
rise from the bottom in the early 1970s to near the top of a financial 
ranking of big oil companies. The business success story of Shell and 
prominent articles by Shell planners have given scenario planning a 
solid reputation in world business. This, together with the inclusion 
of comment on scenario based planning in learning organisation 
literature, has provided the technique with a 'respectable' 
commercial reputation. 
How does the scenario system work? A technique recommended for 
wide adoption needs to be ready and easy to use. In the early years of 
scenarios this was not the case, since the early hard system approach 
and the complex soft systems approaches of the 1970s were difficult 
to use, and as Linneman and Klein (1979) suggest after analysis of a 
sample of USA companies using 'multiple scenario analysis', these 
'established procedures' were ignored and ad hoc 'do it yourself 
practices' that led to poor decisions were used instead. 
A number of prominent recent proposals stressing simplicity as well 
as rigour have been presented to answer the resultant call for 
useable systems, overcoming the looseness inherent in the 'do it 
yourself' approach taken in the 1970s. Three of these can be 
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considered in order to draw out elements to serve as a basis for an 
eco-centric system; the Schwartz (1991) model, Mercer's (1995) 
version, and the 'future mapping' process described by Mason (1994). 
Schwartz (1991) was head of Shell's planning division before starting 
the Global Business Network, an information gathering and 
processing organisation which was set up to assist organisations to 
think about futures. He suggests an eight stage process for 
developing scenarios: 
1. Identify the focal issue for decisions. This should be 
specific, since without an issue there can be no useful 
scenario (because all require a focus). 
2. List the 'key factors' influencing the success or failure of 
the issue. Examples include facts about competitors and 
suppliers. These are 'micro-environment' considerations. 
In conventional strategic planning these make up the 'task 
environment'. 
3. List the 'driving forces' in the macro-environment. 
Schwartz suggests consideration of social, economic, 
political, technological and natural environment forces, 
and points out that some are predetermined (for example, 
demographics) while others are 'highly uncertain' ( for 
example, public opinion). In strategic planning literature 
these make up the 'general' environment. This is a 
research intensive step, requiring information and 
sensitivity to trends and trend-breaks. 
4. Rank key factors and driving forces on degree of 
importance for the issue and degree of uncertainty. The 
idea is to identify factors or forces that are most important 
and most uncertain. 
5. This is based on the key factors and forces. The idea is to 
compose 'scenario plots' using them and ending up with 
'a few' scenarios. 
He explains how this works (1991:140). A team is gathered, 
they know the issue and have done their research, then: 
'We sit around talking for a day, developing ideas in 
response to these questions: 
• What are the driving forces? 
• What do you feel is uncertain? 
• What is inevitable? 
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• How about this or that scenario?'A direct 
comparison can be made to making up a movie 
script. You start with an idea (he suggests car 
racing); develop characters (these are like 
building blocks for scenarios); and consider 
possible plots (rivalry between drivers/ 
developments of courage?). The plot can go 
many ways from here, but will be carried by the 
logic of character and situation. 
Schwartz also suggests three main plots, what Kleiner 
(1994) calls 'classic stories'. 'Winners and losers ... starts 
with the perception that the world is essentially limited, 
that resources are scarce, and that one side must get 
poorer' (Schwartz 1991:147). This is the plot for most 
elections, for wars, for most debates about logging of old-
growth forests. 'Challenge and response' is where a 
problem leads to adaptation and productive change. A 
character builds as challenges come forward, for example, 
or in the sustainable development debate a core 
assumption is that both environmental protection and 
economic growth are possible if appropriate changes are 
made. 'Evolution' is where slow changes take place. 
Schwartz suggests these are hard to detect but easy to 
manage once detected. The prime example offered is 
technological changes which provide 'new tools' for an 
existing system. 
6. Choosing two or three scenarios and fleshing them out. 
This requires a return to key factors and forces, with each 
given attention in each scenario. 
7. Implications for the focal issue of step one are identified. 
What vulnerabilities have been revealed? 'Is the decision 
or strategy robust across all scenarios...?' (Schwartz 
1991:231). 
8. Select key indicators that can be used to predict which of 
the scenarios is likely to develop. 
The Schwartz system is relatively simple to understand but requires 
skill and wide multi-disciplinary knowledge to operate. The same is 
true of Mercer's system which is, however, even simpler in 
structure. 
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Mercer deliberately set out to describe an easy scenario process in 
order to make it 'more accessible to a wider range of organisations' 
(1995:81). His system, developed at London's Open University but 
with reference to Shell's experience, is directed at wide-ranging 
business environmental scenarios that examine the 'total external 
environment of the whole industry within which the organisation 
operates' (1995:82). It has three 'stages' (or groups) of activities: 
environmental analysis; scenario planning; corporate planning. 
Environmental analysis is an information collection stage, using as 
wide a range of sources as possible and best conducted as a team. 
Here, as with Schwartz, the importance of widely read, multi-
disciplinary and extensively linked people is obvious. Scenario 
planning follows, with six stages: 
1. Identify the drivers for change, 'the most important factors 
that will decide the nature of the future environment 
within which the organisation operates' (1995:83). Mercer 
suggests that people should look ten or more years ahead 
in order to counter the tendency to merely extrapolate 
from the current situation. Such a time horizon also tends, 
he suggests, to make people look 'farther out' into the 
external environment. 
The list of drivers should then be extended in a brain-
storming session before being sorted out to arrive at a list 
that includes those that are both important and uncertain. 
2. Put group drivers into combinations that are meaningful 
to participants. Mercer suggests this is the most difficult 
step, requiring intuition. It 'usually produces' seven to 
nine groupings. 
3. Work out what each of the groupings represents. These are 
'mini-scenarios'. 
4. Reduce the seven to nine mini-scenarios to just two or 
three. Mercer suggests just two because managers find it 
difficult to deal with more. These should be 
'complementary' rather than 'good versus bad' to prevent 
managers slipping into single track ('good') forecasting. 
These should then be 'tested' to see if they make sense to 
participants in the process. 
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5. Write scenarios in the form most suitable to managers 
who are going to use them as a basis for strategy. Usually 
this is in written form, often reports, sometimes an 
expanded list, and could include numerical material 
and/or use of a fictional character as a device. 
6. Examine these scenarios to determine the most critical 
outcomes. 
Corporate strategy is the stage at which the firm's resources are 
matched to the challenges identified in the scenario. This ensures 
strategies are prepared for alternative futures. 
Mercer's process is relatively simple, team based and strategy 
oriented. It is iterative; people go back and forth between stages and 
steps and continually polish scenarios. All this helps ensure that it is 
a process of learning. 
The final scenario building model, 'future mapping', will not be 
considered in detail; however two key ideas are worthy of 
discussion. Mason's (1994), description, suggests it is based on two 
sets of tools, 'end states' and 'events'. A scenario is a series of events 
that lead to an end-state. The notion of events is the first of the 'key 
ideas' referenced. 
Events are definite and recognisable. For example the trend to 
smaller and faster computers is deconstructable into events. It may 
be claimed that, for example, a 140 mhz carriable machine will be 
available for $1000 by 1997. We can then readily see if this happens. 
The appeal of this concept lies in its 'grounded' nature, in that it 
provides a series of useful focal points for inclusion in scenario 
descriptions. 
The first stage of future mapping is the second idea. In this managers 
meet in order to develop a 'conventional wisdom scenario', a 
picture of the group's current mental model. This is done by 
managers identifying and then listing events that are considered 
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highly likely and highly unlikely before posting them 
chronologically on a wall and putting them into thematic clusters. 
Mason (1994) suggests this is typically the first time that managers 
have visualised their underlying thinking, which is revealed 
through the events and themes selected as highly likely.The shape 
of the eco-centric system can now be outlined using elements of the 
three models presented. For simplicity it is presented as four stages, 
issue identification, identification of driving forces, scenario 
building and strategy. 
Issue identification provides the focus for scenario building. Issues 
need to be specific but important given that the technique can be 
time consuming. This does not mean that issues need to be 
immediately and absolutely sharp in focus and expression. An 
initially fuzzy issue can be rendered gradually sharper in what is an 
iterative process of scenario shaping and strategy development. A 
soft systems based willingness to continually examine assumptions 
and to assess how reality is being constructed is therefore part of the 
process. 
In order to spread learning and maximise the opportunity for 
insights this should involve relevant line managers and a selection 
of line workers, making up as wide a group as is possible. 
The next stage is identification of 'drivers'. Mercer's single category 
classification is preferred because the Schwartz distinction between 
'factors' and 'driving forces' may be obscure, just as there are 
problems in strategic management distinguishing between the task 
and general environments. This does not mean the distinction 
cannot be used, it does in fact constitute a useful framework for 
initial thinking, merely that it is too loose to form the basis of a 
classification system. 
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Mercer's suggestion that a ten year time frame be used is useful too, 
a simple idea that forces people to think outside the immediate 
world of the organisation and to go beyond mere forecasting of the 
probable. It suits an eco-centric process because it forces people to 
consider the possibilities of long term and widespread change even 
when there are no short term indications. (This is a pattern 
common in environmental issues as exemplified by the history of 
commercial fishing world-wide.) 
This is the research-intensive part of the scenario process because 
good analysis requires information and sensitivity to nuances 
within data. The future mapping idea of 'events' can be included in 
this step. In order to focus thinking on drivers, specific (indicative) 
events should be identified to use in tracking them. 
New science, which is particularly useful in informing views on 
ecologically related issues, will become gradually more available to 
participants in scenario building as it becomes communicable 
through the parallel text system outlined in chapter five, and as it 
becomes part of the electronic web of information that is 
increasingly being used by researchers in all disciplines. This, 
together with other changes in information and understanding, 
makes up an important category of intellectual drivers. 
A final step in this stage is a classification of 'drivers' according to 
degrees of importance and uncertainty. Scenarios will be driven by 
the most important/most uncertain drivers. Again, the natural 
environment will be important (so long as it is included in the 
system in the earlier steps) because ecological impacts are always 
uncertain. 
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The next stage is writing the plots. Mercer's idea of grouping drivers 
is a key, bearing the issue in mind together with a concentration on 
the most important and the most uncertain drivers. 
This preparation of scenarios in some communicable form finishes 
the preparation stage. The aim is communication, a combination of 
communicability and use of communication pathways. This 
suggests that it does not matter what form scenarios are given so 
long as they are readily understandable and so long as they fit the 
communication infrastructure and culture they are aimed at. They 
are most commonly written and presented on paper and, if this is 
the case, should be in plain language. They may include graphs, 
figures and tables, but only if required in order to tell the story and 
presented in such a way that the audience can understand them. 
They may also be presented in video form. Computer technology 
facilitates their communication throughout an organisation 
however large and geographically dispersed it may be. 
The final and most obvious stage of the scenario building process is 
strategy formation. The key question is what strategies fit the 
scenarios? Answers allow exploration of possible organisation 
responses to the alternative futures that have been developed, just 
as Shell was able to explore responses to a very low oil price in the 
early 1970's. 
In the eco-centric system three scenarios should be prepared. The 
first is effectively the conventional wisdom scenario, made up of the 
routine expectations of the organisation. As Mason's future 
mapping process suggests, these reflect current mental models. The 
second will be made up of the other most plausible of the 
combinations of certain and uncertain drivers, emphasising 
possibilities that may require organisation response. Following 
Mercer's line, it must be complementary rather than contradictory so 
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that it is directly useful to the organisation. The third scenario is also 
complementary (hence comprehensible) but also specifically 
emphasises ecological matters in order to focus attention on the 
natural world and improve organisation learning. Knowledge of the 
natural world will therefore improve irrespective of the interests of 
participants. They may not be personally interested but will 
nevertheless learn about such things as river eco-systems because 
they are required to consider them as part of an organisationally 
useful process focused on possible futures. 
Because this process results in strategies that are useable in a 
conventional organisation world, ecological learning is not 
threatening to participants. Such learning can be spread widely 
within the organisation if scenario preparation groups include 
people from as many sections and levels of the organisation as 
possible, and with up to ten in each scenario team (Mercer's 
guideline) there is scope to include line workers as well as stake-
holders from outside the usual organisation boundary, for example 
local residents near a mining operation. 
The process will be iterative which also increases the potential for 
learning. Whilst it has been presented in segmented stages the 
reality is that teams will move up and down the stages, for example 
by refining issues after considering focus or refining conventional 
wisdom after looking at future scenario outcomes. 
Specific scenario development processes take time. Kleiner (1994) 
runs an annual scenario program for an organisation, meeting twice 
a week for six weeks and communicating via computers in the 
meantime. The Shell process extends over months (see Wack 1985a, 
1985b, for example). It will take at least the 'Kleiner time' to generate 
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the material required as background and develop the insights 
necessary to write scenarios. This length of time spent specifically 
considering issues also helps ensure learning. 
The scope of organisation activity is constrained not only by 
organisation learning and resources but also by the social and 
political forces operating in the macro environment. Scenarios 
indicate possible futures, but the macro world constrains possible 
actions and at the same time constrains the scope of the possible 
futures that are developed. As the developed world becomes more 
eco-sensitive the scope of possible action and the shape of possible 
futures become more limited. As with all such change, however, it 
is unevenly distributed, both in the political world, because some 
nation-states have populations and political systems more eco-
sensitive than others, and in the world of organisation as some 
learn more quickly than others. 
The relationship between incrementalist scenario building and the 
zone of possible natural world related action and its impact on 
possible futures is best presented diagrammatically: 
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Figure 16: Eco-centric Scenario Planning 
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As this diagram indicates, the zone of possible action that afects 
nature decreases with time and developing (broad culture) eco-
centricity. Simultaneously, organisation world view wil tend to 
undergo a greater transition towards eco-sensitivity, one that reflects 
organisation sensitivity, thereby further constraining the scope of 
action. The extent to which this wil be the case wil vary according 
to the particular mix in any one organisation of leadership opinion, 
organisation cultural change, internal and external politics, 
planning expertise and accessible and useful information  (see Quinn 
1980:187). 
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This analysis does not eliminate the likelihood of emergent 
strategies playing a significant role in action. Indeed, as new 
information is included into consideration it is likely that much 
realised strategy will be emergent as new events take place and the 
organisation responds. Such strategies will, however, be developed 
with skills enhanced and attitudes changed by the scenario process. 
They will also be constrained within the same 'zone of action'. 
The key to the usefulness of this style of scenario planning for eco-
sensitive organisations is the simultaneous presence of ecological 
learning and commercial utility. In an uncertain business world 
planning which uses a scenario system is becoming more common. 
The process outlined uses this as a tool for increasing the eco-
sensitivity of organisations. 
Systems Thinking: The Basic Appeal 
Systems thinking, defined as a complex body of generic theory, 
insights and techniques rather than as any single theory or systems 
approach is part of the eco-sensitive management for both direct and 
indirect reasons. 
A major direct use is relatively clear and has been exemplified by the 
model used to explain the position of an organisation in its broad 
environment in the introduction to part B. Systems thinking 
facilitates understanding of complex situations, allowing 
understanding of the whole as well as the parts. In relatively simple 
form it allows for description of detail complexity (useful for 
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structure) and dynamic complexity (for such tasks as building 
models of organisation activity and its inter-relationship with the 
natural world). 
Related to this is a facilitation of the growth in understanding by 
management of eco-systems. When considered systemically business 
organisations and eco-systems are structurally similar. Both include 
inter-related units (or agents) operating in complex patterns, and 
both require consideration of the 'whole' before 'parts'. It is unlikely 
that many current business managers will have formal training or a 
deep interest in ecology, but given the growing popularity of systems 
theory it is likely that a growing proportion will be able to gain this 
knowledge and understanding more quickly than previously 
because their mental models already include compatible systems 
language and understanding. In autopoietic terms, compatible 
distinctions are already established in organisation discourse. 
The impact of such activity, whilst indirect, may be profound. Once 
managers start to think in terms of systems, and systems concepts 
such as feedback, cause and effect loops, and time delays between 
cause and effect, they change their world. As language changes so 
does the world. As new terms ( distinctions in autopoietic terms) are 
established new insights are possible. As knowledge develops 
organisation identity changes. Once systems language has been 
established a basis for discourse institutionalisation of insights 
useful for eco-sensitive management has occurred. 
The best example of the potential of this process comes with 
'feedback', a central notion of systems thinking. It is defined by 
Senge (1992:75) as any 'reciprocal flow of influence' (see introduction 
to part B for earlier discussion). 
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This concept is of specific significance for eco-sensitive management 
because it encompasses an overthrowing of extreme 
anthropocentricism. The idea of using nature in simple exploitative 
fashion without considering consequences is impossible in a world 
structured by feedback language since this carries with it the 
assumption that we are part of the natural system, just as it is part of 
us. In Senge's words '...the human actor is part of the feedback 
process, not standing apart from it' (1992:78). Allied to this is the 
important realisation that in a system no one is fully responsible for 
poor performance nor is anyone free from blame or praise. In an 
eco-centric company everyone and every process is responsible for 
an insensitive operation, all are worthy of praise for a sensitive one. 
One outcome of this (mentioned again in the next chapter) is that 
the eco-centric organisation is more collaborative than combative. 
Such advantages for eco-sensitive management stemming from 
system thinking are powerful even though they will be most often a 
serendipitous result of the adoption of system language by 
organisations seeking to cope with complexities defined as of a 
business rather than an ecological type. The facilitation of eco-
sensitivity is nevertheless there, carried by an altered discourse and 
furthered by skills developed through use of the tools offered by 
systems thinking. 
Before going on to consider further tools of particular use for eco-
sensitive management brief comments on their source are necessary 
in order to provide intellectual context. 
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Theoretical Background 
Hard systems approaches rely heavily on deterministic assumptions 
and emphasise an engineering approach to rational decision 
making. They assume problems are well structured, that all 
necessary information can be obtained and that the world is orderly 
and capable of being modelled without real difficulty. Mathematical 
expression of this world is possible, and operations research, an 
application of hard systems theory, relies on mathematical models 
to make business decisions (see for example Kwak and DeLurgio 
1980). This is still the basis for many conventional academic courses 
in Management in core nations such as the USA and Australia. 
In the environmental debate the hard approach has been well 
represented in various computer based 'world models', firstly by 
Forester (1971) followed by the Club of Rome model (Meadows, 
Meadows and Forester 1972), and by a number of other smaller 
models in the decade following (see Meadows 1982 and for a recent 
discussion of world models, Meadows, Meadows and Randers 1992). 
Forester's preface to World Dynamics is interesting, both for what it 
says about the advantages of systems thinking, and because it 
presents a cogent criticism of much 1990s thinking. Referring to 
stresses in the world system he comments: 
Over the last several decades interest in economic development, 
population growth and the world environment has expanded rapidly 
... . But it seems fair to observe that most of the activity has been 
addressed to separate facets of the world system. Little has yet been 
done to show how the many actions and forces are affecting one 
another to produce the total consequences we observe (1971:vii). 
Despite the hopes for insights implied in these words and echoed in 
other hard systems world models, the 'hard approach' is 
handicapped by the problems of any rational, tightly bounded 
modeling process. The need to cram a complex world into a model, 
however many elements are included and however powerful the 
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computer that runs it, is fraught with difficulties. Environmental 
issues are often ill-defined and little understood, and their 
relationships both internally (within eco-systems) and externally 
(with the rest of the world system) too dynamically complex for a 
model to encompass. This does not mean that 'hard' models lack 
utility. They can yield insights and lead to a higher level of 
awareness in system-makers, but they cannot reflect the world, 
paradoxically because they claim to reflect it too precisely, thereby 
limiting it so greatly that an accurate representation is impossible. 
The soft system approach is designed to overcome many of these 
problems. Checkland suggests soft systems are the 'learning 
paradigm', in contrast to hard systems thinking which is 'the 
optimisation paradigm' (1993:258). Cavaleri and Obloj's summary of 
soft systems approaches includes five principles: perceptions are 
subjective and problems are therefore the result of perceptions, they 
are not 'out there'; problems are complex, so it is better 'to identify 
general issues than to define specific problems'; improvements 
rather than solutions are the goal; identified systems are not real, but 
'projections of mind'; improvements to systems rely on learning 
and are not optimised outcomes (1993:133). 
The soft systems approach, recognising limitations of the human 
mind and emphasising insights similar to those of the social 
constructionists discussed in chapter five, is suited to the handling 
of ecological problems. Whilst cautious about assuming that 'reality' 
can be reflected in models it is nevertheless optimistic that useful 
approximation can be developed and gradually improved. 
Cybernetic systems originated in the 1940's (Weiner 1948) as a way of 
regulating or 'steering' systems. The emphasis is on control of 
systems via feedback loops which make up their underlying 
'structures' (which in systems theory refers to the pattern of 
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relationships among systems components). Cybernetic theory is 
closely related to engineering ideas of regulation by measurement in 
a process including performance —) measurement of feedback —) 
alteration of performance --) measurement. This is structurally the 
same as the system operating while a thermostat regulates room 
temperature. 
Elements of all three approaches are evident in systems dynamics, 
an integrative approach which owes much to Forester, a computer 
pioneer, who became professor of systems dynamics at M.I.T. as well 
as being an influential member of the Club of Rome and a major 
influence on Senge (1992), currently pre-eminent amongst 
popularisers of systems thinking for business. From the hard 
systems approach comes an emphasis on model building, on use of 
computers, and the assumption that the system is knowable. From 
soft systems theory comes continual challenge to assumptions and 
changes to the model. A specifically reiterative process of model 
design and emphasis on feedback within system structure comes 
from cybernetic theory. System dynamics is also consistent with 
aspects of autopoietic theory with its emphasis on the closed nature 
of the system and the importance of the system structure (the 
pattern of the feedback loops in systems dynamics). 
Forester was concerned that managers could not understand 
dynamic complexity without the aid of computers, responding to 
earlier work by Simon (1957) on human limitation which was 
influential at the time. Simon suggested that individuals cannot 
operate with complete information but rather must operate with 
'bounded rationality', doing the best with available information and 
mental capacity: 'The number of alternatives he must explore is too 
great, the information he would need to evaluate them so vast that 
even an approximation to objective rationality is hard to conceive' 
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(1957:79). The Forester answer to information overload was systems 
thinking and computers. (The first two years of the 1970s were, after 
all, a period of technological optimism, as Stafford Beers' now 
somewhat ironic introductory comment to his 1972 work on 
cybernetics suggests.) 
The basic Simon/Forester theme of human limitation continues to 
exert influence. Senge, for example, updates it for the 1990s in his 
argument for systems theory: 'Today, systems thinking is needed 
more than ever because we are becoming overwhelmed by 
complexity. Perhaps for the first time in history, humankind has the 
capacity to create far more information than anyone can absorb, to 
foster far greater interdependency than anyone can manage, and to 
accelerate change far faster than anyone's ability to keep pace' 
(1992:69). 
Whilst Senge's answers do not depend on computers to the same 
extent as those of Forester, they do go back to early writing in 
systems dynamics. In the current discussion they are used 
extensively but with a more specific background of assumptions 
from soft systems theory. In what follows therefore, the stress on the 
influence of language in defining reality, on the need for continual 
examination of assumptions, and on an iterative process of 
modeling, should be taken for granted. 
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Useful Tools and Techniques within Systems: Theory Directly 
useful for Eco-Sensitive Management 
The aim in this section is to provide a general illustration of the 
usefulness for eco-centric management of selected systems thinking 
techniques rather than to set out a text-book recipe for their use 
which would be a task requiring a book in itself. 
The concept of feedback has already been referred to. Feedback 
language represents a fundamental re-orientation of perception, but 
is also a useful tool for action. In systems thinking any identifiable 
element can be linked to others via use of 'causal loops'. There are 
two basic types of loops worthy of mention in this discussion: 
'reinforcing' and 'balancing'. (For a full coverage of feedback's use see 
Richardson, 1990.) 
Reinforcing loops represent feedback that builds in a reinforcing 
process so that small changes can lead to greater ones. This can be 
good or bad. For example, in diagrammatic form, a good loop is 
presented in Figure 17, and a poor one in Figure 18: 
Figure 17: Recycled paper loop 
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Figure 18: Pollution loop 
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Balancing loops represent stability, as for example in stability within 
an ecosystem or in the balancing feedback process that maintains the 
human body. In organisations balancing loops are easily found, for 
example production adjusts to orders and prices in the free market 
adjust to demand. In a balancing situation there is a target (either 
explicit or implicit) and a gap. These can be represented 
diagrammatically, for example with a wood-yard supplying fire-
wood: 
Figure 19: Wood-Yard loop 
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Senge suggests that balancing loops are more difficult to see than 
reinforcing loops because nothing may seem to be happening. The 
system may be pursuing an implicit target, so in his example, a 
leader may encounter resistance to change that 'seems to come from 
no-where' (1992:88). 
In systems, delays between action and consequence are also 
significant, as well as being difficult for individuals to appreciate. In 
the recycling loop presented earlier there are significant delays at 
several points. The length of such delays may be difficult to calculate 
but realisation that they exist is significant in understanding how 
the system works. This is of central importance for an organisation's 
understanding of eco-systems because of the delayed nature of much 
important change after human impact on nature. 
The two forms of feedback and the notion of delays are the building 
blocks for systems diagrams which may be very complex but may be 
revealing even when simple. An example of a simple but useful 
systems analysis is provided by the Australian State Government of 
Victoria which in January 1996 decided that government run 
research programs would be corporatised, opening them up to 
commercial competition. Possible impacts can be presented 
diagrammatically in a reinforcing loop with delays. 
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Figure 20: Corporatised environment research loop 
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The message is simple, a reinforcing cycle that wil gradualy lead to 
less and less research and an increasingly endangered environment. 
At each stage delays wil apply and the patern may be lost if this is 
not borne in mind. 
This simple ilustration supports a general argument ofered earlier: 
systems modeling of organisations can be very complex, including 
multiple interlocking loops, but even when complex wil rarely be 
any more so than the relationships between the parts of an 
ecosystem and in both cases the system is built up using the same 
basic idea. Learning how to model organisation systems therefore 
provides the skils and many of the understandings necessary to 
model and/or understand ecosystems. The discipline of seeing 
wholes before parts is fundamental in both cases as is the role of 
inter-relationships, delays, flows, paterns. 
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Organisations staffed by people who use systems thinking have one 
of the basic understandings necessary for eco-sensitive operations 
because they possess an important set of skills that facilitate such 
activity. 
Modeling systems nevertheless remains an extremely complex 
activity and assistance for those unable or unwilling to develop their 
own models comes with the notion of systems archetypes or 
patterns that re-occur. Senge suggests that they are 'simple stories 
that related again and again [and] reveal an elegant simplicity 
underlying the complexity of management issues' (1992:94). The 
idea has obvious similarities to the scenario archetypes discussed in 
the previous section, with the system version distinguished by use 
of systems concepts. Senge offers nine such archetypes, reflecting 
current orthodoxy in systems dynamics, and provides reasonable 
examples of their application to organisation activities. Of the nine 
at least four also have direct application to biodiversity issues and 
these provide examples of the usefulness of the idea for eco-centric 
management. 
The first can be called 'limits to growth 'where: A process feeds on 
itself to produce a period of accelerating growth or expansion. Then 
the growth begins to slow and eventually comes to a halt, and may 
even reverse itself and begin an accelerating collapse' (Senge 
1992:379). This is a direct borrowing from Meadows et al. (1972) and 
has obvious application to any identifiable ecosystem or natural 
resource. Use of ecosystems without regard to consequences is 
definitional of exploitative anthropocentricism. 
Shifting the burden is where: 'A short-term "solution" is used to 
correct a problem, with seemingly positive immediate results. As 
this correction is used more and more, fundamental long-term 
corrective measures are used less and less. Over time, the capabilities 
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for the fundamental solution may atrophy or become disabled, 
leading to even greater reliance on the symptomatic solution'(Senge 
1992:381) Environmental application of this comes frequently with 
mining operations that use tailings dams to handle waste disposal, 
an apparently reasonable short term solution that hides rather than 
solves a problem. This is related to the idea of 'eroding goals': 'A 
/ 
shifting-the-burden type of structure in which the short-term 
solution involves letting a long-term fundamental goal decline' 
(Senge 1992:383). Application comes with any dumping operation, 
for example, sea dumping of jarosite. 
The tragedy of the commons archetype is familiar to 
environmentalists: 'Individuals use a commonly available but 
limited resource solely on the basis of individuals needs. At first 
they are rewarded for using it. Eventually, they get diminishing 
returns which causes them to intensify their efforts. Eventually, the 
resource is either significantly depleted, or entirely used up' (Senge 
1992:385). This is a specific (and acknowledged) adoption by systems 
dynamicists of Garrett Hardin's ideas with classic application to the 
fisheries industry world wide. 
The final archetype can be called 'fixes that fail': 'A fix, effective in 
the short-term, has unforeseen long-term consequences, which may 
require even more use of the same fix' (Senge 1992:388). This 
archetype is seen in much agricultural activity. Land is cleared; used 
and becomes infertile. Fertilisers are added, the land is re-used but 
then more fertiliser is required, and more, and more. Similar 
patterns are evident in the use of insecticides. 
These archetypes are likely to be given increasing use as eco-
centricity develops because of their application to environmental 
matters, and especially biodiversity issues. As with the scenario 
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archetypes (or stories), they are notions now used by organisations 
seeking survival but can be readily adopted to serve environmental 
ends. 
Further assistance in coming to terms with systemic patterns and 
interdependencies comes from the growing supply of what are 
called, by some, 'micro-worlds' and also, in reflection of modern 
technology, 'management flight simulators'. These are computer 
generated worlds that allow users to explore options without real-
world consequences for mistakes. With good micro-worlds people 
learn about patterns that may occur in the real world and develop 
skills that allow them to cope with this world. There are obvious 
similarities with the learning that result in process of scenario 
building, with micro-worlds representing ready made generic 
scenarios. 
A powerful way to extend understanding of environmental issues 
is, then, to make ecologically focused micro-worlds available, such as 
the 'World-391 Explorer' which allows exploration of the limits to 
growth archetype and the thirteen different scenarios described in 
Beyond the Limits (Meadows, Meadows and Randers 1992). More 
'micro-worlds' of interest are likely to be offered as organisations 
become more eco-sensitive, resulting in further increases in the 
capacity to give effect to eco-sensitivity. 
Interested people can already build their own micro-worlds, 
effectively computer models of known or invented systems. 
Available software for both Macintosh (Micro-world creator, i-
Think) and MS-DOS (i-Think, Stella, Power-Sim, Sim-tek) are 
already available worldwide to facilitate this process. 
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Scenarios, System Thinking and Mental Models 
Both scenario planning and systems thinking have immediate and 
practical applications for organisations. Scenario planning works as a 
planning process and systems thinking provides a tool that allows 
description of both detail and dynamic complexity. Both also have a 
positive influence on the learning climate within an organisation 
since both involve incorporation of new data and information into 
organisation knowledge. Both lead to development and use of 
multi-disciplinary thinking and provide a means for incorporation 
into formal processes of new and perhaps unorthodox information 
from, for example, science and economics. 
These processes help alter, slowly, organisation culture by changing 
language and understandings, and therefore by altering institutional 
discourse. For individuals within organisations they provide an 
opportunity to assess and perhaps alter their existing mental models. 
'Mental model' in this discussion means the semi-permanent view 
individuals hold about their world, one that renders it meaningful 
and structures everyday activities and reasoning processes. The 
notion is common to a variety of disciplines. Churchman uses the 
Hegelian 'Weltanschauung' to refer to images of the world and ways 
of viewing (1971:169-170). Senge prefers the term 'mental model' for 
'internal pictures of how the world works' (1992:174). Checkland 
follows Churchman using 'Weltanschauung' to indicate the 
(unquestioned) image or model of the world which makes a 
particular human activity system a meaningful one to consider (see 
Checkland 1993:214-225). Argyris, who helped pioneer 'action 
science' which aims to achieve more effective learning in 
organisations, refers to 'master programs' (1991:103). In this 
discussion the term 'mental model' is preferred because it is the 
simplest available and best reflects the practice of planning. 
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Eco-sensitive organisations require eco-sensitive individuals, 
implying transitions from the exploitative view of the natural world 
that is dominant in human culture. It has already been suggested 
that while broadly based ecological consciousness is rising, a basically 
exploitative anthropocentric notion remains dominant in all or 
almost all world cultures and certainly in the mental models of 
individuals active in the growth oriented global economy. In simple 
terms the transition towards eco-sensitivity in individuals mirrors 
central elements of the organisational transition: towards holistic 
thinking; new understandings of risk for nature in human activity; 
new knowledge in areas such as science and economics; pursuit of 
problem centred multi-disciplinarity. Ultimately, as Naess (1989) 
suggests, the 'expanded self' encompasses more of the natural world 
than before and the individual cares more about actions that affect it. 
Such changes in world view are difficult, however, because 
individuals 'defend' their mental models which consequently have 
a resilience similar to that of organisation culture and self. Argyris's 
analysis of this is noteworthy. He refers to the defensive reasoning 
that individuals use to defend their world view and emphasises it's 
tacit nature: 'one of the paradoxes of human behaviour, however, is 
that the master program people actually use is rarely the one they 
think they use' so that their 'espoused theory of action' is different 
to actual behaviour (1991:103). 
This idea applies particularly to deep seated elements of world view 
that make up the network of assumptions about the natural world. 
People who consider themselves kindly disposed towards animals 
eat meat from animals raised in cages and barbarically killed; 
workers who love the sea work in factories that pollute it; fishermen 
over-exploit fish stocks but consider they respect the resource. 
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Individual eco-sensitivity and the Naessian 'extended self' may 
therefore be slow to develop, inhibiting transitions in eco-sensitive 
organisations. Argyris suggests that most (impliedly western) 
'theories in use' rest on the same set of governing values, providing 
a further cautionary note in this argument: 
There seems to be a universal human tendency to design one's actions 
consistently according to four basic values: 
1. To remain in unilateral control; 
2. To maximise 'winning' and minimise losing'; 
3. To suppress negative feelings; and 
4. To be as 'rational' as possible (1991:103). 
Taken together this is a summation of central values of the growth 
oriented global economy. As individuals become more eco-sensitive 
they will abandon win-lose values and change towards win-win and 
compromise/collaborate ideas, just as they will start to consider 
alternatives to the emphasis on control and conventional linear 
styles of rationality. How can this take place? 
Scenario planning and systems thinking provide powerful tools 
while new writing and ideas in areas such as science, economics and 
strategic management as well as in growing multi-disciplinary 
understandings provide useful background. In more eco-centric 
organisations too, organisation culture will encourage more eco-
sensitive behaviour and eco-centric thinking. 
In addition to these activities and influences, all already discussed, a 
range of specific tools suggested by 'action-science' thinkers can be 
used to uncover mental models. Two will be discussed in order to 
provide an indication of the uses of this branch of management 
thinking. (For a full range see Argyris and Schon 1978, Argyris, 
Putnam and Smith 1985, Argyris 1985, Argyris 1982, Argyris 1990, 
Argyris 1991.) 
275 
Chapter Eight 
Examining what Argyris cals our 'ladders of inference', pathways of 
increasing abstraction from observable data to generalisations about 
the world constitute one such technique (see Argyris 1990:87). 
Normaly individuals go from observable data to generalisation and 
then action so quickly that steps in the process remain unexamined 
and with them the mental models that alow conclusions to be 
drawn. This (adapted) ladder provides an example: 
Figure 21: Mining tailings ladder of inference 
STRUCTURE 
Action 
Beliefs 
Conclusions 
beliefs 
alter 
data 
selection 
Selection of 
some data 
EXAMPLE  
commend supervisors, cancel 
order for new polution 
control equipment 
natural world is 
basicali resilient 
continue with current 
process 
tailings disposal 
is satisfactory 
observation of 
flow paterns, 
obvious damage to 
water flow limited 
Provision of 
meanings 
Observable data 	 tailings polute a 
(in the world as it 	 river system causing 
could be recorded, 	 damage to entire 
more or less objectively) 	 ecosystem 
Once such a 'ladder' is recognised and individuals become used to 
the idea it becomes much easier for them to analyse their reasoning 
processes. In the example ofered a manager might therefore re- 
276 
Chapter Eight 
examine the original observable data, checking for damage to nature 
in a more rigorous way. Such a process, of course, will be enhanced 
as managers obtain a more complete level of understanding and the 
sophisticated vocabulary necessary for describing eco-systems. 
Another action-science idea is balancing inquiry and advocacy. The 
insight here is that managers in the global economy have life time 
training in argument but little in learning (and still less in 
collaborative wide-scope learning). To help managers obtain inquiry 
skills, tools such as conversational protocols have been developed; 
for example, advice on how to draw out the reasoning of people 
('How does this relate to your other concerns?') and use of 
unconventionally un-aggressive language (instead of 'What do you 
mean?' use 'Can you help me understand your reasoning?'). 
These protocols - and a range of other techniques for improving 
inquiry skills - are admittedly likely to be of more use for managers 
already anxious to change rather than those who are content with 
the mental model that has made them successful. They are 
nonetheless powerful because they present a way of changing 
thinking towards the flexible patterns suitable for eco-centric 
management. 
Many such techniques may be used by eco-sensitive leaders who 
attempt to hasten the transition towards an eco-friendly world. The 
next chapter's discussion explores the style and some possible 
strategies useful for this sort of leader in more detail, before 
discussing the related idea of the organisation structure that is best 
suited to eco-sensitivity. At the same time, chapter nine serves to 
bring together some major lines of argument from preceding 
chapters, given that the leco-leader' will use the understandings 
already presented in earlier discussion. 
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LEADERSHIP AND STRUCTURE 
Leadership 
Leadership, defined simply, is 'the ability to influence people 
towards the attainment of goals' (Daft, 1994:478). It is a reciprocal 
process involving changes to both leaders and those influenced and 
involves the use of legitimate leader-power. 
Beyond these relatively straight-forward points the huge literature 
on leadership provides little clear guidance, with enormous 
variation on issues like whether leaders are born or trained, the 
traits of leadership, the type of leader required for different 
situations, and the differences between leaders and managers. 
The choice available within the literature is therefore broad and in 
this discussion the basic approach is a cultural one, focusing on 
leaders as initiators and embedders of organisation culture which is 
in a continual, but slow, state of change. This is consistent with the 
approach taken earlier and focuses attention on key 'world view' 
elements in the transition to eco-sensitive management. 
Discussion will concentrate first on the leadership 'understandings' 
consistent with eco-sensitivity before moving on to consider the 
'styles' that help ensure creation and maintenance of eco-centric 
organisations and then assessing the difference in leadership 
challenges between start-up and mid-life/mature organisations. 
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In all this discussion it needs to be borne in mind that the eco-
sensitive leader is one who seeks to direct an organisation beyond 
the merely pragmatic processes of either staying in fit with current 
regulations and stakeholder expectations or getting in just ahead of 
expectable changes to them. Certainly, pressure from a variety of 
forces in broad culture are forcing most organisations (in the core 
world at least) to behave more eco-sensitively, but the truly eco-
sensitive leader will strive to move organisations beyond the 
expectable, effectively operating in advance of any changes in broad 
culture. 
The level of current 'best practice' for environmental leadership is 
therefore some way before the activities of the eco-sensitive leader 
who seeks change in the organisation as a whole and in style of 
operation and thinking of people within it. 'Best practice' is an 
ongoing (and always changing) part of this but it tends to be 
reflective of current orthodoxies rather than truly visionary change. 
This is not to say that it is unimportant, merely that it is less 
important than changes to the total approach of the organisation. 
Leadership Understandings: The Mind of the Eco-Learning 
Leader 
Many key understandings about the mind of the eco-leader reflect 
earlier discussion: The world is constantly changing; continual 
learning is required for organisation survival; new information will 
become available on issues; this will nevertheless never be 
complete. What can be called an eco-learning leadership style is 
comfortable with such ideas. 
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The classic Zelaznik distinction between managers and leaders 
captures the essence of the leader's attitudes to problems: 
Leaders tolerate chaos and lack of structure and are thus 
prepared to keep answers in suspense, avoiding premature 
closure on important issues. Managers seek order and control 
and are almost compulsively addicted to disposing of 
problems even before they understand their potential 
significance (Zelaznik 1992:131, referring to his 1971 article). 
The ability to tolerate ambiguity allows room for changing decisions 
and is consistent with pursuit and use of new information and 
theory, scenario planning styles and continual revision of world 
view. 
The eco-leader will also be conversant with, and a behavioural 
model for, scenario planning and systems thinking and practice and 
thereby capable of spreading those ideas through the organisation. 
Leaders who think in and use 'feedback' rather than linear language 
are a powerful force for changing organisation discourse because 
they possess the power to exert control over elements of that 
discourse. A leader, for example, may insist on feedback language in 
board meetings and in planning group meetings and in doing so 
will gradually establish that language within the organisation. 
Such a leader will also be one of Elise Boulding's (1979) 'influence 
optimists', believing that those elements of the natural world 
affected by organisation activities can be protected and/or improved. 
Again, as a behavioural model this results in influence on others, 
thereby improving organisation performance. 
These leaders will operate with . a long-term (at least generational) 
time-frame, whilst at the same time remaining alert for the 
immediate impact of activities as well as for opportunities. This is 
already characteristic of leaders in large Japanese companies such as 
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Hitachi who think a generation ahead in their research program (see 
Gross 1992) and the notion is gaining currency in the rest of the 
world economy. 
A tolerance for diversity in individual staff, groups of staff and ideas 
is required if the necessary room for new ideas is to become part of 
the new eco-learning culture. The style of this (if not the substance) 
is well summarised by Arne Naess, referring to his personal 
philosophy: 
I have a somewhat extreme appreciation of diversity: a 
positive appreciation of the existence of styles and behaviour 
which I personally detest or find non-sensical (but which are 
not clearly incompatible with symbiosis); an enthusiasm for 
the 'mere' diversity of species, or varieties within a genus of 
plants or animals (Naess 1993:216). 
Because changing an embedded growth oriented culture is a difficult 
and long term process the eco-learning leader will also require 
persistence. New organisations provide an exciting and immediately 
rewarding opportunity to set up and embed an eco-culture, but in a 
world economy with almost all organisations anthropocentric and 
growth oriented a gradual re-orientation over perhaps a generation 
is required to turn an organisation around. Eco-leaders must be 
skilled as well as patient, a matter to be further discussed shortly. 
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Leadership Style 
Burns' (1978) distinction between transactional and transformational 
leaders provides a useful start to discussion. Transactional leaders 
clarify goals, provide work assignments, allocate rewards and 
generally maintain an effective status quo. Transformational leaders 
energise and change followers, appeal to their imaginations, excite 
them. They are belief, value and goal focused, changers of world 
views. 
Because truly eco-sensitive organisations operate in advance of and 
in partial contradiction to the dominant view of the world economy 
leaders need to be transformational, in order to create and 
communicate the 'different' vision of eco-sensitivity for people. 
This point applies notwithstanding the already argued point that 
there is a trend in many organisations for gradual transition towards 
eco-centric practices; eco-sensitive managers push this process along, 
thereby taking advantage of the social and cultural space and 
commercial opportunities presented by this evolution. 
The guiding vision must be one which describes an eco-sensitive 
future state related to organisation capacity, performance and shape. 
Ideally it will be one recognising the components of eco-sensitive 
organisations discussed in preceding chapters. An effective eco-
sensitive vision also sets out the future state as unambiguously as 
possible (given the realisation that it will constantly be changing) 
and covers the organisation as a whole. 
A transformational leader is one committed to this vision and 
capable of communicating it enthusiastically and effectively; pulling 
rather than pushing people along (see Bennis 1984). This will 
happen partly because of the public actions of leaders, and 
transformational leaders of the future are therefore likely to be ever 
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more effective users of the mass media as the power of the letter to 
communicate in a seemingly personal fashion grows. It is most 
effective though, when interpersonal, as leaders such as Anita 
Roddick of Bodyshop demonstrate. She visits retail outlets 
frequently, speaking to staff about the vision and the business, and 
successfully seeks to inspire workers. 
This focus on individuals is characteristic of transformational 
leaders. They tend to hold a positive view of human nature as well 
as a faith in their own ability to influence it. Subordinates of such 
leaders have enhanced self esteem and confidence (Dunphy and 
Stace 1992:172) since the communicated vision provides a 
framework of meaning in their lives. Interestingly a domino effect 
may operate as transformational leadership at one level in the 
hierarchy is repeated in the next (Bass, Walman, Avolio and Bebb 
1987) 
Whilst being an ecologically oriented transformational leader may 
already be difficult enough, the discussion so far fails to fully 
encompass the complexities of leading eco-sensitive organisations. 
A key variable altering leadership tasks is organisation life-cycle, 
with a simpler task facing founder leaders of new organisations to 
that of leaders of those in mid-life/maturity. The following 
discussion allows development of these points, taking a cultural 
lens to the matter. 
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Organisation Life-Cycle and Eco- Sensitivity 
Founder-leaders have the opportunity to establish the 'climate' of 
an organisation, which will, by virtue of 'culture-embedding' 
mechanisms, become manifest in organisation culture and identity. 
In Schein's (1992) analysis these mechanisms include a range of 
formal and informal processes that allow overtly eco-centric 
organisations such as the UK based Body-Shop and the USA's Ben 
and Jerry's Ice Cream to develop an appropriate culture (see Hawken 
[1994] and Saunders and McGovern [1993] for analysis of these and a 
range of other eco-sensitive organisations, and Roddick [1993] for a 
description of the Bodyshop specifically). 
Powerful culture embedding processes are evident when leaders pay 
attention to particular things on a regular basis, include them in 
plans and decisions, measure them, count them, and discuss them. 
Leaders systematically paying attention to biodiversity matters, for 
example, ensure organisation attention to such matters. When staff 
disagree and are brought into line messages are reinforced and 
become part of the culture. In these processes the language used by 
leaders is particularly important because of its contribution to 
organisation knowledge and discourse. In the early years of an 
organisation an eco-sensitive leader can effectively create an 
'ecologically literate' work force by ensuring inclusion of a useable 
ecological vocabulary into the everyday conversation of staff. 
These lessons are reinforced and made more obvious in the way 
leaders handle crises. As Schein (1992:237) points out, these are 
'especially significant in culture creation and transmission because 
the heightened emotional involvement during such periods 
increases the intensity of learning.' A major accident in a new 
production facility, for example, is an opportunity to demonstrate 
the founder's commitment to worker safety, just as the discovery 
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that a threatened species is endangered by company activities 
provides an opportunity to demonstrate commitment to 
biodiversity. (The role of crisis in culture change is again considered 
in later discussions of change in mature organisations.) 
The observed criteria used in creating budgets also operate as a 
powerful signal of intention in a commercial organisation. For staff 
who share the for-profit assumptions of the world economy a leader 
who is willing to budget for an expensive voluntary survey of the 
biodiversity of a possible new factory site sends out a clear message 
of organisation intention. 
Organisation founders can also exercise considerable influence 
through deliberate teaching and role modelling, not only inter-
personally but also via videotapes, computer messages and in-print 
media. 
The criteria used to recruit, select, reward, promote, retire and, using 
Schien's word, 'excommunicate' (fire or give meaningless work to) 
staff are fairly obvious means of embedding culture. Founders have 
the ability to surround themselves with people who already think 
the same way as them about issues, to promote those who think 
most like them, and marginalise or dispose of those who don't. 
In addition to the 'primary' embedding mechanisms already 
discussed, 'secondary' mechanisms also exist. These indicate formal 
statements of values and mission; legends about people and events; 
rites and rituals; systems and procedures; and design of physical 
space. In the early stage of organisation life each presents choices that 
can be directed or heavily influenced by a leader or leaders. They are 
'secondary' in the Schein (1992) system because they work as 
embedders only when consistent with primary mechanisms and 
whilst in the early period of an organisation they are highly visible, 
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they may be difficult to interpret without insider knowledge 
obtained from observing a leader's actual behaviour (Schein 
1992:245). 
The message that founder leaders can provide powerful direction 
towards eco-sensitivity is clear in this analysis. They have the 
greatest possible chance of being transformational because the task of 
founding an eco-centric organisation necessarily involves the taking 
of a transformational stance. The power of culture-embedding 
mechanisms is such that a new organisation with an enthusiastic 
eco-centric leader can be established as eco-sensitive even if placed 
within a generally unsymphatetic social and economic 
environment. This is nevertheless a difficult process because the 
culture exerts continual and often contradictory influence on staff 
and business activity generally, thereby creating an ongoing 
challenge to a different (eco-centric) organisation culture. 
Ben and Jerry's and Body-Shop, both of which are relatively new 
organisations, demonstrate two aspects of this. In the former, 
leadership succession created a major problem. When the founders 
and leaders decided to retire, they advertised for a new leader, but 
because they had established a limited pay differential policy within 
the company culture and had therefore restricted their own CEO 
salary the advertised position was advertised at a similarly low pay 
level. It attracted little interest from outside the company, revealing 
a lack of qualified people in the employing pool sharing their 
assumptions. 
The Bodyshop situation is one in which attacks have come from two 
'sides' of the environment debate. The organisation uses 
environmental awareness as the basis of its advertising and in 1994- 
1995 attracted significant criticism from environmentally minded 
critics who challenged the validity of such claims, creating such 
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interest it was the subject of a formally highlighted debate at the 
annual conference of the Academy of Management in 1995. At about 
the same time the organisation was under a financial challenge in 
London as financiers continued criticisms of its financial stability. 
These examples point out problems as eco-centric organisations 
head towards mid-life, become larger, and lose some of the initial 
excitement and drive of first years. Activities necessarily become 
routinised as commercial operations that are culturally distinct 
continue. Organisations are also linked to an established labour 
market and, however unwillingly, to the conventional requirement 
to grow, make profits and market products. The conventional 
processes of transactional leadership are required to keep an 
increasingly complicated organisation operating effectively and the 
transformational aspects become less important. The role of an eco-
sensitive leader becomes one of defending an established culture 
rather than building a new one, a leader who is battling against a 
gradual (and in its detail unpredictable) drift towards the broad 
culture's values. 
This situation is more obvious in established mid-life organisations. 
Schein suggests these have 'had at least two generations of general 
managers and [are] publicly owned.' Structures, norms and processes 
are by then well established and culture is embedded. In this 
situation culture defines leadership more than leadership defines 
culture. 
An eco-sensitive leader in this situation will therefore tend to come 
from outside and must be capable of leading change. Instituting 
scenario style planning, using systems thinking, introducing new 
ideas from science and economics and appreciating the 'shape' of an 
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eco-centric pattern of management are part of this. Transforming 
mid-life and mature organisations also requires an appreciation of 
basic change strategies and a particular view of the organisation. 
Dunphy and Stace (1992:82) suggest that change can be managed in 
organisations with one of four strategies: 
• 'participative evolution', that is incremental change 
through collaboration with high employee involvement 
• 'charismatic transformation', large scale change led by 
transformational leaders 
• 'forced evolution', incremental change by coercion, which 
is manager driven 
• 'dictatorial transformation', large scale transformation by 
direction 
This integrative model incorporates both the human 
resources/organisation development theorists who favour planned 
consultation! collaboration, and the power! political theorists who 
argue for direction and coercion. It is situational, suggesting that 
different strategies are required depending on prevailing 
circumstances. 
In their analysis participative evolution is suitable for situations in 
which the organisation is basically in fit with its environment and 
needs only minor adjustments in a situation in which key interest 
groups are in favour of change. 
This may be the case when leaders seek to 'nudge' an organisation 
further towards eco-centricity, particularly when broad social and 
cultural changes indicate more eco-sensitive operations are required, 
for example when recycling programs or new pollution control 
processes are set up. The organisation development literature is 
replete with advice on how this can be handled, emphasising 
activities such as team building, workshops, consultations, and 
survey feedback, a process in which questionaries are used to elicit 
responses on matters such as values and group cohesion before 
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consultants ('experts') meet with them to develop strategies to 
handle problems identified in the data (see Nadler 1977, French and 
Bell, 1990 for coverage of these and other techniques). 
These ideas are consistent with a Quinn-style incrementalism, 
pacing changes so that new information can be gathered and 
assimilated by staff. They are gradualist in nature, 'fine-tuning' 
rather than being oriented towards significant change, and therefore 
will not push organisations much ahead of the requirements of 
current orthodoxy. That said, another value for them comes in 
defending an established eco-sensitive culture. 
Much of the current best practice in environmental management 
can be classified into this category. The activities may be complex 
and their impact far-reaching as companies strive to keep pace with, 
or (as with sections of the European car industry discussed in Fischer 
and Schott 1993) stay ahead of changes in stakeholder expectations 
and government regulations. Dechant and Altman (1994), for 
example, list five elements of such best practice; 'a vision statement 
and corporate values that promote environmental advocacy'; 'a 
[structural] framework for managing environmental initiative'; 
'green' product/process design; 'environmentally-focused 
stakeholder partnerships'; and 'internal and external education 
initiatives' (pp. 9-15). 
This is a formidable list of structural and cultural initiatives which 
includes an indication of more profound changes that may accrue in 
the future, but falls short of major organisation change. It is 
classifiable as a 'can-do' program without backing from a holistic and 
fundamental view of organisation change and environmental 
leadership which incorporates conscious changes to deep aspects of 
organisation culture. 
289 
Chapter Nine 
'Charismatic transformation' is of use when major change is 
required and transformational leaders energise and sweep people 
along, breaking old world views and creating new ones. Eco-centric 
leaders of new organisations certainly fit this mode, and its core 
ideas of envisioning, exciting people and carrying them along are 
arguably those required for any leader seeking to keep staff on side as 
they change organisations to fit major new challenges. A purely 
transformational style is, however, unlikely to be available to 
leaders seeking to turn established cultures radically towards eco-
sensitivity because this involves a shift away from fundamental 
aspects of both organisation and broad culture, aspects deeply 
embedded and rarely examined. Charismatic change in commercial 
organisations, as Dunphy and Stace point out (1992:89), 'becomes a 
more viable approach when there is an acceptance on the part of key 
organisational stake-holders of the need for large scale 
transformation'. This sort of acceptance is unlikely in a mid-life 
commercial (or government) organisation because of the 
contradictory nature of a basically eco-centric approach. Incremental 
change in line with a changing orthodoxy is necessary and change 
slightly ahead of this is possible, but transformational change is 
unlikely. 
This does not mean that the eco-leader can afford to neglect the key 
interpersonal messages of the charismatic style, as 'selling' an 
unorthodox message requires energy, imagination and excitement. 
Coercive change through 'forced evolution' is applicable when 
minor adjustment is required but key internal groups are opposed. 
For example, new information and communication technology and 
new organisation structures may be part of moves to make the 
organisation more co-operative. Change to more effective (but 
difficult to operate) pollution control equipment and compulsory 
use of new and unfamiliar sources of information are examples of 
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eco-leaders operating this way. When a culture of an organisation 
and the broad culture within which it is located are opposed to new 
eco-sensitive ideas, as they will often be when a TNC wishes to 
operate in advance of local ideas, coercive change is part of the eco-
leader's role. 
Dictatorial transformation is appropriate when the organisation 
requires major change but there is no support for it within the 
organisation. It is a style required when established practice and 
culture come into conflict with the need to move organisations 
forward in a changing world economy. Dunphy and Stace (1992) 
provide the actions of Australian Lend-Lease corporation after take-
over of MLC life as an example. They reduced the workface by up to 
40 per cent in some areas, culled middle management, changed the 
organisation structure, eliminated some departments and changed 
technology. The result was a more competitive organisation. 
This mode of change relies on a clear mandate from significant 
stake-holders, typically majority owners. When established 
organisations are purchased by individuals or groups with clear eco-
centric expectations this may be the mode chosen by the new leader 
(de-facto an eco-leader). Such a person will require a clear idea of 
what processes, world view and practices constitute the mandate 
version of eco-sensitivity and can then implement them. This will 
however, rarely be the case in a profit and growth oriented world 
economy. 
Analysis so far has followed the Dunphy and Stace (1992) change 
strategy model, whilst retaining the cultural lens used in earlier 
discussion of transformational leaders and the opportunities 
afforded founder-leaders. What is missing though, is a strategy 
category which includes the type of long term cultural and world 
view changes that result from instituting scenario-planning, systems 
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thinking, use of new risk ideas, new science and new economics. 
These will be in part collaborative because some aspects will be 
agreed to by staff, and because their use is justifiable in terms of 
orthodox pursuit of profit and survival terms. They may be 
coercively introduced, far more often because of commercial rather 
than eco-sensitive reasons, but nevertheless with a longer term 
benefit for the natural world. They may be part of a directive 
program, aimed at some wider agenda of corporate re-direction. In 
any case if they are to be successfully adopted they must be instituted 
with the energy and vision characteristic of transformational 
leadership. 
Ensuring significant transition towards eco-sensitivity therefore may 
require elements of four models simultaneously. It also requires 
persistence and because the necessary focus is on cultural change, 
including change to fundamental aspects of world view and patterns 
of language, it requires a longer term point of view than 
conventional change strategies. As well as this it requires 
considerable understanding of culture by the leader and the ability to 
manipulate an organisation to those long term ends. 
A further essential understanding is that change within 
organisations is inevitable and continuous. Incremental changes to 
vision and culture take place irrespective of leadership or stake-
holder intention and the role of the eco-sensitive leader is to 
channel, foster and re-direct this change; in Morgan's phrase 
learning how to 'change with change' (1986:254). Such realisation of 
perpetual flux was articulated in early Greek philosophy by 
Heraclitus: 'you cannot step twice into the same river for fresh 
waters are ever flowing in upon you' (quoted by Bertrand Russell, 
1961:63), and has entered current change theory via English writers 
such as Morgan (1986) and Pettigrew (1991). 
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Since permanence lives in process rather than substance the eco-
sensitive leader must seek to control processes of change. What can 
be called a processoral model of leadership is required, in this case 
one that is exercised by multi-disciplinary thinkers sensitive to the 
needs of the natural world. Multi-disciplinarity is required because 
of the range of understandings and knowledge needed to operate as 
eco-oriented channellers of process, a current understanding again 
reflected by Heraclitus who suggested that 'Men who love wisdom 
should acquaint themselves with many particulars' and emphasised 
the difficulties of the eco-sensitive leader further in his remark (here 
echoed in chapter four) that 'nature loves to hide' (both quotes in 
Bly, Hillman and Mead 1992:379). Again, this stance is compatible 
with a branch of European change theory, as Dawson's description of 
the essence of 'contextual theory' suggests: 'The approach is often 
multi-disciplinary...drawing on a range of perspectives and methods 
such as the business historian, the corporate strategists and 
organisation theorists ... and is concerned with a detailed 
examination of organizational transition' (1994:23). 
Figure 22: Processoral leadership 
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Transformative 
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PROCESSORAL LEADERSHIP 
Forced 
Evolution 
Dictatorial 
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(Source: adapted from Dunphy and Stace 1992:90) 
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The four Dunphy and Stace strategies become contextual in this 
model, used as required in the process of continual eco-vision 
directed change. Other tactics will also be used as the range of 
understandings that can be mobilised by the eco-sensitive leader 
become relevant to current challenges. Such tactics will vary, as the 
following brief discussion of some additional generic change 
strategies indicates. Following this discussion it will be possible to 
draw the argument together, with a further model of processoral 
eco-leadership emphasising the holistic nature of change and the 
role of deep values in defining possibilities. 
Further Strategies for Change 
In all the situations to be discussed the strategies are designed to 
increase tension within the organisation, battling autopoietic inertia 
by creating doubt and injecting new ideas for change. The process 
can best be conceptualised as dialectical, the thesis and antithesis 
made up of the autopoietic organisation 'net' and elements of 
tension respectively, with change the synthesis. 
Strategies specifically designed to create organisation tension must 
deal with organisations who battle to stay the same so that they can 
continue to use their old answers to the challenges posed by the 
world economy. Miller points out the results of such inertia: 
The fabled Icarus of Greek mythology is said to have flown so 
high, so close to the sun, that his artificial wax wings melted 
and he plunged into the Aegean sea. The power of Icarus's 
wings gave rise to the abandon that doomed him. The paradox, 
of course, is that his greatest asset led to his demise. And that 
same paradox applies to many outstanding companies today: 
their victories and their strengths often seduce them into 
excesses that cause their downfall. Success leads to 
specialization and exaggeration, to confidence and 
complacency, to dogma and ritual (1990:3). 
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The Miller image is Icarus, whilst an appropriate eco-sensitive 
image is that of Pheonix, reborn out of the fire of the world economy 
in a new shape led by someone (or perhaps some group) who reflects 
not only the understandings described earlier but also wide 
knowledge and alertness to the nuances of organisation activity. 
Such alertness is required in order to maximise the chance of taking 
advantage of changes of an eco-centric type within the unpredictable, 
non-linear feedback systems that make up organisations. Non 
linearity means that minor changes may have major consequences 
and nuance alertness is therefore an important part of the eco-
leader's operating style. 
Cultural understandings remain integral to success in processoral 
mode, and extend to use of the sub-groups within all medium to 
large organisations. These may be differentiated by factors such as 
function (for example engineering or accounting); location (for 
example Asian or Australian branches); products (for example 
washing machines or tractors); merger or acquisition status; and 
joint ventureship status. Each presents the likelihood of a sub-
cultural variation from the majority organisation culture, one 
related to significant differences in task, location or history and 
'defined' in the same ways as all organisation cultures/identities, 
and each provides an opportunity to create a more eco-centric 
culture than that which characterises the organisation as a whole. 
A diversity of sub-cultures creates obvious challenges in defining an 
overall eco-centric culture but also opportunities for a leader intent 
on change who can selectively promote people from a favourable 
sub-culture into other sub-cultures in order to spread ideas. This 
process presents great possibilities for change in trans-national 
corporations which of necessity already possess the linkages that 
make cross-group promotion possible. In this way, for example, 
influence from one of the nine Tioxide paint pigment factories can 
295 
Chapter Nine 
spread to all as promotions proceed, thereby transferring new ideas 
into four continents. From there it may spread to other companies 
that are, like Tasmania's Tioxide plant, part of ICI's global holdings. 
Sub-groups that are allowed to operate eco-centrically in contrast to a 
broad organisation pattern can also contribute to wider change by 
first establishing then modelling the benefits of such practices. 
Schein (1992:317) calls these 'parallel learning systems' and points 
out that they allow organisations to test new assumptions without 
anxiety, thereby providing 'psychological safety' to the organisation 
as a whole. The process of change will take, he suggests, anywhere 
from five to fifteen years (1992:317-8), and requires planning and 
conscious management by leaders. These structures apply to eco-
leaders who are, after all, testing and trying to change deeply held 
values. 
Leaders intent on the difficult process of deliberate change to 
embedded cultures may also take advantage of a crisis that is 
significant enough to challenge established world-views. Processes 
of gradual evolution of organisation culture in line with changes to 
prevailing social culture have already been described in chapter five 
of this discussion: in the case of a disaster such as Bhopal, Chernobyl 
or Exxon Valdez the potential for sudden and more dramatic change 
is presented. In such cases established assumptions and practices are 
made clear and people examine their own behaviour. A leader may 
step forward with new ideas and deliberately manage change, taking 
the opportunity to act that is presented by a crisis that can be defined 
so as to unlock existing value systems. 
This is related to the media-focused change to organisation culture 
and identity following a crisis discussed in chapter five. In that case 
the process was non-directive, but is nevertheless the result of an 
organisation's links to broad culture and society. 
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At the same time as they operate as identifiable leaders of change the 
process of leadership-facilitated learning within the organisation 
continues. A leader may operate as a behavioural model for the 
optimism, tolerance for ambiguity, and enthusiasm outlined as 
central to eco-learning in earlier discussions, and will also control 
participative planning systems, as well as set up flexible organisation 
structures that encourage discussion and allow time for workers to 
learn. 
An irony is contained within this position: the eco-leader is a 
learning leader who must also have the capacity to use 
directive/coercive tactics. Perhaps unfortunately, organisation 
cultural change containing ideas in advance of the dictates of broad 
cultural orthodoxy will often require such strategies. The pure 
learning leader 'pulls' but an eco-learning leader of large and mid-
life organisations also has to 'push'. 
Stacey (1992,1996), who seeks to use chaos theory to yield insights 
about organisation change offers a useful development of this line 
of argument about power and control. He suggests that in order to 
maximise organisation learning the leader should cease the 
checking process that ensures adherance to a tightly determined path 
and allow room for emergent strategies to develop (1992:192-4). An 
eco-leader, backed by scenario planning processes, systems thinking 
and language building processes and using a multi-disciplinary 
background and 'nuance alertness' is well positioned to use this 
view of control to move further towards eco-sensitivity by 
facilitating appropriately eco-sensitive emergent strategies. 
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Stacey's view on power is also compatible with that already offered. 
He suggests (1992: 1994-6) that complex learning is maximised when 
power is sometimes used, sometimes withdrawn, thereby creating 
the tension required for change. This is consistent with a leader who 
is open to challenge and also presents ambiguous and difficult 
challenges to staff (see Stacey, 1992:201-5). This mode of operation is 
useful for the eco-leader who can present eco-centric ideas for debate 
and also set up difficult and ambiguous challenges of an eco-centric 
type for people (perhaps those in a targeted sub-culture). The 
resultant processes of languaging in themselves - irrespective of any 
tangible result of either type of challenge - will hasten moves 
towards eco-sensitivity. 
The range of 'further strategies' offered suggests the need for a 
different view of the eco-leader model. The Dunphy and Stace 
'generic strategies', together with further strategies and various 
elements of eco-learning style, become strategic alternatives 
exercisible within a space constrained by the processes described in 
Figure 23. 
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Figure 23: The context of leader-driven strategy 
The outer boundary of the model represents organisation 
boundaries, solid as reflecting of their autopoietic nature. Within 
that, autopoietic flux, the continual change that operates and is 
reflective of the non-linear feedback characteristics of the system, is 
represented by a further circle . The final circle represents the 
leader's holistic perception of the organisation, required if the 
totality of possibilities for change is to be understood. The size of this 
circle is limited by the leader's world view, knowledge and skill. 
'Eco-vision' is represented by an arrow, a forward developing vision 
that changes as strategies are implemented and it is altered as a 
result. 
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All this is the crucible within which strategies are developed. The 
mix of strategies must take account of autopoietic flux (using nuance 
alertness); the need to increase tension within the organisation; the 
need to incorporate appropriate influences from the broad 
environment; and the use of coercive/co-operative strategies. 
The basic influence of the broad environment is on the organisation 
as a whole, pushing it slowly along, but leader-perception (the inner 
circle) and eco-vision may also be affected directly, with altered 
strategy a result. 
Over time the organisation will 'shift' as new deep seated values, 
new organisation self and culture develop. The process is reflected 
in Figure 24 which shows a 'spiral' of new 'organisation contexts'. 
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Figure 24: Changing organisation contexts for leader directed 
strategy 
Eco-sensitivity 
TIME 
Two axes are presented. Time is indicated by the length of the spiral 
measured along the bottom axis. Eco-sensitivity is indicated by a 
continuum on the top axis, and, in the example provided, the 
possibility of a shift 'backwards' along the eco-sensitivity continuum 
is presented - eco-centric strategies may not always work,  or 
autopoietic flux may lead to moves backwards. 
Operating in such a context and controlling such a process of change 
may seem beyond the scope of any leader. Certainly it is difficult, but 
not impossible. Pascale, discussing major changes in large 
organisations, demonstrates that comparable patterns of thought are 
already required in conventional for-profit organisations: 
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Change did not find its way into Honda, Ford, and General 
Electric through quick fixes. It happened when each company's 
leadership adopted new ways of thinking. Fujisawa's, 
Peterson's, and Welch's contributions were in direct proportion 
to their personal development. The concept is straightforward 
on an intellectual level, but is hard to live with (1990:252). 
Organisations are already experiencing directive change as a result of 
new ideas from leaders. Eco-centric ideas may be focussed at the 
level of deep values but it is not impossible to effect change at this 
level, and leaders with the appropriate skills (if not values) are 
increasingly common. Any leader-directed or manipulated change 
towards eco-sensitivity will, however, involve consideration of 
organisation structure, a matter discussed in the next major section 
of this chapter. 
Structure 
Organisation structure is the final element of the system making up 
the transition towards an eco-sensitive organisation style to be 
discussed. To this point it has been argued that many transitions 
along elements of the total system are necessary for an eco-centric 
'style': change towards amiable anthropocentricism within 
organisation culture; new organisation self; new concept of risk; use 
of holistic world views and application of systems thinking; scenario 
based incrementalist planning; learning organisation assumptions; 
an eco-leadership style; and attitudes of influence optimism. 
Such transition suggests requirements for an organisation structure. 
It must facilitate communication and the languaging' that leads to 
significant cultural change and changes to discourse. It must 
facilitate organisation learning and the entry of new forms of 
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knowledge, hence information flow must be flexible in order that 
changes in planning and policy can be quickly implemented as new 
information about specific environmental problems becomes 
available. 
With this as background discussion can turn specifically to structure, 
defined broadly as 'the key co-ordinating mechanisms within 
organisations' (Mintzberg 1983). This provides an obvious focus in 
management writing because it is 'perhaps the most malleable and 
visible of management tools' (Nohria and Berkely 1994:75). In such 
writing structure is commonly coupled with strategy, so change in 
one requires change in the other. In Mintzberg's words: 
.... structure follows strategy as the left foot follows the right in 
the walking. In effect, strategy and structure both support the 
organisation. None takes precedence; each always precedes the 
other, and follows it, except when they move together, as the 
organisation jumps to a new position (1990b:183). 
More recent research, whilst retaining the idea of mutual influence 
that Mintzberg argues for, suggests a weighted relationship, with 
strategy a 'much more important determinant of structure than 
structure is of strategy (Amburgay and Dacin, 1994:1446). 
Structure also reflects broad national culture. Ouchi (1980) and Clegg 
(1992), for example, identify a 'clan' system associated with Far-
Eastern traditions of family based organisations featuring high levels 
of trust, loyalty and co-operation. Another structure related to a 
specific broad culture is evident in Italy where a successful model of 
'diffuse industrialisation' has proved successful. It is based on 
networks of small specialised firms, each specialising in one phase of 
the total production process, and routinely co-operating to produce 
goods for international markets (see Inzerilli 1990, Ritaine 1990). 
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Both the Japanese and Italian systems provide contrast with 
conventional corporate models which are mostly based on the 
western cultures of USA and Europe. 
At the same time structure tends to reflect stage of economic 
development. As discussion in chapter one indicated, the industrial 
revolution and modern world were coupled with the growth of 
bureaucracies, hierarchies and formal control systems. Post 
industrial society however creates new possibilities. Facilitated by 
the new information technology that allows instant communication 
across great distances and the ready storage of and capacity to 
manipulate and recall huge quantities of information, it features a 
much wider range of structures that were extensively debated in the 
late 1980's and early 1990's (see, for example, Rouleau and Clegg 
1992, Jackson and Carter 1992, Burrell 1994, Kreiner 1992, Cooper and 
Burrell 1988, Clegg 1992). Heyderbrand offers a general but 
representative opinion of post-industrial (alternatively post 
modern) organisations, in doing so bringing together some ideas 
that are of use in a quest for an eco-centric structure: 
.... it would tend to be small or be located in small sub-units of 
larger organisations; its object is typically service or 
information, if not automated production; its technology is 
,computerised; its discussion of labour is informal and flexible; 
and its managerial structure is functionally decentralised, 
eclectic and participative, overlapping in many ways with 
non-managerial functions (1989:327). 
At the time it was written this was a more predictive than 
descriptive view, but one with, as we shall see, a strong element of 
accuracy as it applies to business organisations of the mid 1990s. 
Before discussing this though, the uneven nature of change in broad 
patterns of organisation structure must be stressed. New types of 
organisation structure may emerge as organisations attempt to 
change in accordance with their commercial environments, but 
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these will tend to co-exist with older forms. Rigid bureaucracies will 
therefore persist in the post-industrial societies of the western world. 
In Eastern cultures the clan-like structures discussed by Ouchi (1980) 
and Clegg (1990) will also persist, perhaps amended as information 
technology facilitates ever wider and more immediately linked 
family based networks. 
Mintzberg's (1983) typology of organisation configurations, 
developed from 24 structural variables, demonstrates the variety of 
forms existing in the 1970's that will continue to proliferate in the 
industrial and post industrial worlds, because each is adequate to its 
task. The first are the 'simple structures' featuring 'direct 
supervision' which will continue to suit small organisations, for 
example the family shop. The second is the 'machine bureaucracy' 
featuring standardised routines, roles, work and procedures. It will 
continue because it suits many government organisations and also 
situations such as small to medium industrial centres producing 
simple goods for stable markets. It also suits situations in which 
workers are considered to be relatively unskilled and it is interesting 
to note that many TNCs use 'machine bureaucratic' structures in 
their third world factories. The third is the multi-divisional form, a 
more complicated bureaucratic system than the machine 
bureaucratic that allows co-ordination of large multiple unit 
organisations. In its various manifestations (Hitt, Ireland and 
Hoskisson, 1995, for example, discuss co-operative and competitive 
forms) it will continue because it allows co-ordination of large TNCs 
with a wide range of products produced in many different 
geographic areas. 
Mintzberg's fourth and fifth configurations centre on knowledge. 
The 'professional bureaucracy' is made up of specialists who control 
their own activities, co-operating with colleagues and providing 
services to clients. These will persist in legal and health areas, with 
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the movement towards service based economies adding to their 
number. The final group, 'ad-hocracies' are flexible, changing as 
work requirements change (see Mintzberg 1983:255). Mintzberg's 
examples come from the American Space Program, but more recent 
examples can be found in the fluid arrangements in the world soft-
ware industry where teams form and dissolve as projects are 
initiated and completed. 
It should be stressed that the structural adaptation stance taken in 
this section of the argument falls short of the population ecology 
view, which suggests that new organisation forms emerge to fill 
environmental niches via processes of 'blending, random drift' and 
'selection' (see Hannan and Freeman 1986, also Young 1988). The 
autopoietic view, presented in earlier arguments, suggests a 
significant degree of organisation inertia, with a capacity for 
organisations to defend established patterns. Organisation forms 
therefore persist because organisation culture and identity defend 
them, as well as because they are appropriate for particular 
commercial challenges. The autopoietic view not only means that 
environmentally related change is slow, it also suggests that 
deliberate change to structure must take into account the cultural 
dimension, and that it too will tend to be a slow process. 
With these insights as background, the structural configuration best 
suiting an eco-centric management style can be outlined. 
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Eco-Centric structures; a process approach leading to a 
network orientation 
In any discussion of organisation structure the temptation is to focus 
on the design of the system rather than on the processes that must 
be facilitated. Nohria and Berkely (1994:70) refer to ' the misguided 
search for concrete representations of [a] new management 
philosophy' which leads to complicated pictorial representations, for 
example Handy's 'shamrock' and the Eastman-Kodak 'pizza' 
organisations. The orientation in this discussion is, in contrast, 
towards action; facilitated communication; free information flow; 
and flexible response capacity. 
As Heyderband's (1989) predictive comments on the nascent 'post-
industrial form' indicated, there have been authoritative accounts of 
new information based, technology facilitated, informal, 
participative organisations emerging in the world economy. Change 
in the 1990s bears out this trend. Flexible manufacturing systems, 
cheap personal computers, and new and ever cheaper information 
technology have allowed small to medium firms to achieve 
economies of scale that facilitate successful entry to the world 
economy. 
Because they are small they can respond quickly to changes in the 
market place, exploiting opportunities as they arise. It is also easy for 
them to develop effective internal communication channels which 
spread new ideas quickly, and allow discussion of innovations with 
ultimate developments in organisation culture. 
At the same time large firms started to imitate the small pattern. 
The increasingly sophisticated bureaucratic forms they had 
developed in the post world war II years allowed for growth with 
control. But circumstances changed. Welch, CEO of industrial giant 
General Electric, provides a first person account: 
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We had constructed over the years a management approach 
that was right for its time, the toast of the business schools. 
Divisions, strategic business units, groups, sectors - all were 
assigned to make meticulous, calculated decisions, and move 
them smoothly forward and upward. The system produced 
highly polished work. It was right for the 1970s, a growing 
handicap in the 1980s, and it would have been a ticket for the 
boneyard in the 1990s (in Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1995:88). 
The problems with these systems are manifold: divisions tend to 
fragment the organisations as they become powers in themselves; 
their top management tend to keep new ideas and entrepreneurial 
responsibilities for themselves, defending their positions; co-
ordination is difficult as divisions compete; layers of management 
within the total company and within divisions make it difficult to 
implement ideas quickly. 
In many organisations the initial response to these problems 
amounted to a 'sidestep' that solved part of the problem while 
retaining the same basic structure. To encourage entrepreneurialism 
companies set up 'skunkworks', small ideas groups empowered to 
work outside the bureaucratic system, a technique pioneered in 
California's 'Silicon Valley'. Many organisations also entered into 
strategic alliances with smaller and innovative firms, or 
systematically acquired new ideas as soon as they hinted at 
commercial advantage. (This process shifts ideas from all parts of the 
periphery towards the large corporations at the core, explaining, for 
example, the shift of promising new technologies from the 
peripheral economy of Australia towards the core of economy of the 
USA.)More public responses included 'downsizing' in which large 
numbers of workers were dismissed, and idelayering', in which the 
number of levels in the hierarchy are reduced. For example, Toyota 
went from a nine level system to three. Both measures are designed 
(amongst other things, such as straight-up savings) to increase 
flexibility and speed of decision making and implementation. 
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This points the way to the small pattern which nevertheless 
involves more fundamental changes to structure. Asea Brown 
Boveri (ABB) provide the best example. This trans-national (Swiss 
based) electrical contractor and manufacturer of electrical equipment 
has reorganised into 1300 commonly owned little companies which 
operate world wide. The ABB system includes three different types 
of 'profit centres' with individual financial responsibility, all 
interacting with competitors and buying and selling with and from 
one another. In each country in which ABB operates they also have 
a locally-based subsidiary whose aim is to become the largest local 
electrical producer and manufacturer. Major ABB plants are also 
separate profit centres. Finally, specialists for each profit group are 
responsible for the global marketing of products (Miles, Coleman 
and Creed 1995:139; see also Ghoshal and Bartlett 1995). The 
complexity of this network is surprising, just as its success in the 
world market-place is compelling. 
Other major companies as diverse in product focus as Xerox, 
General Electric, 3M, Harley Davidson, Hewlett-Packard and the 
American retailing giant Rubbermaid are also restructuring around 
small units. The basic idea is to ensure flexible responses to local 
conditions and to push decision making down into the smaller 
units of the organisation. 
In structural terms the common element in all these patterns of 
change is 'networking', where smaller units are linked via 
communication technology so they are able to complete complex co-
ordinated processes. A range of four such network types has been 
discussed by Hinterhuber and Levin (1994). 
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ABB is an 'internal network', maximising responsiveness and 
flexibility in a large organisation and emphasising communication 
and a common culture in order to tie the organisation together. 
'Vertical networks' are created when firms co-operate to produce 
goods and/or services. The Japanese Keiretsu system of alliances and 
the Italian pattern of diffuse industrialisation demonstrate this at a 
general level. At a more specific level the 'modular firm' that 
outsources all but its core functions while retaining strategic control 
is a vertical network. Free from the need to make big investments in 
capital equipment and able to make use of the best people wherever 
they are such firms can grow quickly, as Nike and Benneton, the 
large fashion manufacturing organisations, demonstrate. 
'Diagonal networks' are based on exploiting synergies between 
different companies. Dess, Rasheed, McLaughlin and Priem refer to 
these as 'virtual organisations', 'a continually evolving network of 
independent companies - suppliers, customers, even competitors - 
linked together to share skills, costs and access to one another's 
markets' (1995:10). There is no overall strategic control in this 
system but rather an interdependence. Corning, the $3 billion/year 
ceramics manufacturer, illustrates this pattern, actually defining 
itself as a 'network of organisations' (Sherman 1992). 
The final Hinterhuber and Levin (1994) network type is that of the 
'horizontal alliances between similar firms in similar markets in 
order to develop and/or exploit a particular technology or penetrate 
a geographical market segment' (1994:47). The European and North 
American airline industries have formed such alliances, though 
with little effect. 
Many large firms simultaneously pursue aspects of several 
networking patterns. Apple Computers illustrates this. They have 
horizontal alliances with IBM and Motorola. They also operate 
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vertical networks, for example, they outsourced almost all of their 
important 'Newton' electronic organiser/computer project to Sharp. 
Internally their different divisions also operate as networks (see also 
discussion of alliances in chapter three). 
Every type of network offers specific advantages for the organisation 
involved, and as the Apple example demonstrates, a single firm can 
benefit from several sets of advantages. In all network types 
however, the core requirements are free flows of good quality 
information and cooperative action with shared goals. Satisfaction 
of this 'core' maximises flexibility so that the organisation has the 
capacity to respond quickly to challenges and implement new ideas 
readily. 
The same generic requirements for eco-centric organisation 
structure were identified at the beginning of this discussion of 
structure. An eco-centric organisation must facilitate the languaging 
that builds changed world views and must therefore highlight 
communication. It must also place great emphasis on collection, 
storage and dissemination of good information. A generic network 
structure satisfies these requirements. 
The brief discussion of different network forms is therefore 
significant in an assessment of the extent of transition towards eco-
centric management. It suggests that direction of change for many 
organisations is favourable for eco--centricity because structural 
facilitation is already in place. In this case, Mintzberg's 'left foot' 
(structure) is ahead of the 'right foot' (strategy). From an eco-centric 
point of view, however, this is a serendipitous situation since there 
is no deliberate eco-centric intent behind the changes discussed. For 
their full import to be realised, changes towards eco-centric strategy 
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and culture are required, and the weighting given strategy by 
Amburgay and Dacin (1994) therefore remains, but with an 
interesting twist. 
Despite a positive direction of change to structure by no means all 
organisation forms are 'ready' for eco-centric strategies. Mintzberg's 
machine bureaucracies present as a major organisation 
configuration, and the enormous variety of multi-divisional 
bureaucratic patterns used by large TNCs demonstrate the 
continuing appeal of that configuration. It is, after all, a sophisticated 
reflection of the emphasis on formal control and hierarchy 
characteristic of the industrial age, with sidesteps such as 
'skunkworks' allowing organisations to cope with some of its 
inherent problems. The professional bureaucracy and ad-hocracy 
configuration will also continue, but in these cases the central 
emphasis also offers much for eco-centricity, with the former based 
on information, the latter on the need to be flexible. 
With these conclusions about the favourable direction of broad 
change towards generic network structures in mind, discussion can 
turn to a more detailed level - how could one specific eco-centric 
organisation be structured? It is worth stressing that what follows is 
only one of many possible eco-centric network structures that are 
made possible as technology and ideas change. All however, would 
facilitate the same process rather than design to orientation. 
To this point structure has been defined as a system of 'co-ordinating 
mechanisms' with later emphasis on unit or group size adding 
another dimension to the concept. It can now be further extended. In 
the Narayan and Nath (1993:305) analysis, structure also includes 
'allocation of tasks and responsibilities' and 'formal reporting 
relationships'. That the eco-centric organisation should be a network 
organisation has already been established. Irrespective of total size it 
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will be made up of units small enough to respond flexibly to new 
information, for example, news that a new population of an 
endangered species has been located on company land. There is no 
tight rule about the exact size, but as a general guide the practical 
experience of Gore and Associates, who established a limit of around 
200 people per unit in order to maximise innovation and 
communication, is persuasive (see Bateman and Zeithaml 1993:353). 
As units creep above this level the social element in 
communication becomes more difficult to maintain and more 
bureaucratic elements may be seen as necessary to hold the group 
together. 
Co-ordinating mechanisms in this eco-centric structure are based on 
information technology that allows instantaneous communication 
both within and between units, complemented by a generally 
participative leadership style (although, as earlier discussion 
indicated, the eco-leader may need to be directive when establishing 
or defending an eco-sensitive culture). 
The Japanese Kao corporation illustrates the sophistication of 
communication possible with existing information technology. 
They use computers to link resources and expertise in laboratories, 
sales units and factories. What they call Kao VAN (for value-added-
network) gives front line-managers and workers access to 
information on any topic from any part of the organisation. Ghoshal 
and Bartlett (1995:92-4) describe how it worked in developing a new 
cosmetics line. Engineers got information from the central data base 
on technical aspects; marketers got data-base information on 
consumers but also received incoming data from sales-people and 
were able to feed this back to engineers; simultaneously a telephone 
hot-line provided extra information to marketers. All this formed 
the basis for cross-functional meetings between engineers, marketers 
and production people. The Kao system is 'transparent', with 
313 
Chapter Nine 
computer terminals throughout the organisation accessible to 
employees who can check up on anything (including the president's 
expense account). It also features a decision making process which is 
facilitated by 'decision rooms' on every floor of their central 
building. These are used for open meetings which can be joined by 
anyone with an interest in the topic under discussion. 
The potential in such a system for eco-sensitive management is 
obvious. A central store of information which included 
understandable and current information sourced from all units 
inside the company and from other organisations outside (including 
universities), would help ensure the best possible decisions are 
taken to, for example, preserve biodiversity in a logging operation. 
Transparency of information is also important because it helps 
ensure that decisions are taken openly, and if, for example, a 
decision was taken that had potential to endanger an eco-system it 
would, given an eco-sensitive culture, be challenged by others 
within the relevant unit or group and also members of other units 
or groups. 
An eco-centric organisation would allocate tasks and responsibilities 
loosely, allowing time for cross-unit collaboration, a range of vertical 
and horizontal relationships, information collection and discussion 
and broadly participatory leadership. This is not a utopian ideal 
unachievable in a commercial environment, but, as the Kao 
experience indicates, part of the control of a flexible network system 
that helps ensure commercial survival. It does not mean that there 
is no hierarchy in the organisation, nor does it mean no work rules. 
It does however mean flexibility in both and a stress on the worth of 
the individual, who is entrusted to both foster regard for and behave 
sensitively towards the natural world. 
314 
Chapter Nine 
A stress on language as the key to culture also suggests that debate 
should be part of everyday life in an eco-centric organisation. If 
discussion processes include significant, open and informed debate, 
they wil be properly tested and the chances of eco-sensitive 
behaviour maximised, assuming appropriate values and culture are 
present. Scheins 'Action Company' is a (real) trans-national 
engineering organisation used to ilustrate aspects of his argument 
about culture and provides an example of a for-profit organisation 
with a debate/ discussion orientation. He summarises the 'Action 
Company Paradigm' in the folowing figure, which brings together 
several of the ideas just discussed: 
Figure 25: Action company paradigm 
The individual is 
the source of al 
good ideas 
We are one family 
■10- 00- 	 who wil take care 
of each other 1 x 1 
Truth is discovered 
through debate and 
testing (buy in) 
Every person must think ■—•■■ for himself or herself, 
and 'do the right thing' 
(source: Schein 1992:36) 
An eco-sensitive organisation could use this 'paradigm', with each 
unit operating on this basis and also connected via the Kao style 
information network. At al levels 'languaging' and discourse 
development would therefore be facilitated. Once an eco-centric 
culture has been established in one unit of a network structure there 
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is also potential for change in other units. This may happen 
'naturaly' as people transfer from one unit to another, or it may be 
the result of leadership deliberately fostering cultural change. 
There is tremendous potential for change within a large TNC using 
networks in this way. Influence can spread world-wide as the 
folowing diagrammatic representation of units and basic linkages 
within NV Philips indicates. 
Figure 26: Organisational Units and Linkages within NV Philips 
PORTUGAL 
(Source: Ghoshal and Bartlet 1990:605) 
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In an eco-centric organisation, just as in the Action Company, all 
decisions are the product of debate and individuals are expected to 
operate in accordance with the paradigm irrespective of work role or 
geographical location. The Action company is successful, and whilst 
the co-operative interactive style is by no means characteristic of the 
whole of organisation culture, it is an important part of it and 
'much of the essence of [it] still operates despite large company size, 
company maturity, and sub-cultures' (Schein, 1992:35). 
The same would be true in an eco-centric organisation. With an 
embedded culture that is centred on eco-sensitivity and including 
the 'Action Paradigm', minor sub-cultural variations in degree of 
anthropocentricism may be tolerated, but the essence necessary for 
eco-sensitivity would remain. 
An eco-centric structure is therefore relatively easy to envisage, but 
perhaps difficult to develop. Networks are best held together by 
common culture (as with ABB and the Action Company) but may be 
held together by common interests (as with the Corning's virtual 
company). In the case of an eco-centric structure the most likely 
situation is one of evolving and shared values of eco-sensitivity. It 
may also, of course, be unified by some commercial orientation 
and/or shared assumptions about the worth of individuals or any 
other powerful set of ideas. As established earlier, it is in fact most 
likely that these sorts of unifying mechanisms will come before the 
eco-centric aspect of culture contributes to unity, but in all cases of an 
eco-centric organisation a fundamental unifying force will 
ultimately be a culture embedded with eco-centricity. 
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A list of fundamental questions was presented in the introduction to 
this discussion and answers have been presented in the nine 
chapters that followed. The central elements of the argument can be 
summarised before concluding comments. 
The roots of industrial exploitation of the natural world are deep 
seated because: capitalism is expansionary, exploitative and 
technologically dynamic. It is associated with an anthropocentric 
world view epitomised by Cecil Rhodes, founder of what was 
Rhodesia and is now Zambia and Zimbabwe, who said: 'We must 
find new lands from which we can easily obtain raw materials and at 
the same time exploit the cheap slave labour that is available from 
the natives of the colonies. The colonies would also provide a 
dumping ground for the surplus goods produced in our factories' 
(quoted in McMichael 1993:313). 
Associated with industrialisation the processes of modernisation 
proceed, including differentiation of labour and institutions, the 
commodification of just about every possible object or idea and an 
expansion of, in Weberian terms, a formally rational world. 
Associated with this too are 'big science', the legitimation of a 
rational, quantitative approach to issues, and the growth of the 
corporatist state. 
The global system produced by modernisation is one featuring 
major inequities between the North and South of the globe, and, 
fundamentally for this discussion, a natural world that is subjected 
to unconstrained exploitation.This pattern continues, overlain by 
the processes of post modernisation and the emergence of re- 
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organised capitalism. This includes a breakdown of the corporatist 
state and the unravelling of established industrial networks of 
power, with a re-distribution of it to corporations, international 
bodies and social movements (in Beck's [1990a, 199013] terms 'sub-
political' spheres). It also involves an emphasis on knowledge and 
services work, continual growth in the sophistication of global links 
and ever more efficient technology. 
The juggernaut of progress continues, now spread more globally 
than ever before. The new world economy remains 
environmentally unconstrained with no part of nature left 
unaffected by humankind, and the continual creation of risk, both to 
people and nature. 
In this system business organisations are more numerous and more 
powerful than ever before. They have better access to the ever 
growing world financial system and are better able to co-ordinate 
internal activities and form alliances because of increasingly 
sophisticated and affordable communication technology. They 
benefit too, from the 1990s renaissance of market philosophy itself 
pushed on by the world trend towards privatisation of state assets 
that is part of the breakdown of the corporatism. 
In the exploitation of the nature, science has never been more guilty 
because it feeds the process of industry, but never more necessary 
because it holds many of the keys for solutions to environmental 
problems. Business too, is never more guilty, but perhaps ironically, 
in view of this sections dynamics and ability to change, never more 
significant as a factor in the changes in thinking and practice 
required to turn around the pattern of exploitation. 
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International requirements, government regulations, pressure 
groups, public opinion reflected in buyer behaviour and the 
changing opinions of their own workers are already forcing 
organisations to behave in a more environmentally friendly 
fashion. Four eras were identified in the discussion; unwilling 
agreement; win-win responses (which suggest changed practice is 
relatively easy); 'enlightened pragmatism' (preparing for future 
levels of regulation or public opinion); and eco-sensitivity. It was 
argued that those are part of a continuum, with organisation 
learning and cultural change in each era preparing the way for 
further change. 
Eco-sensitivity means the presence of eco-sensitive values and the 
ability to put these into practice. The transition towards this position 
may be slow, but it was argued that the opportunity is there to 
contribute to it with the provision of relevant theory. Opportunity is 
also there, serendipitously, because many of the adjustments to 
knowledge, practices and organisation culture required for survival 
in the world economy are also useful for eco-sensitivity. 
Transition in 'the world view' of organisations is fundamental to 
required change because of the deep-seated roots of exploitation 
within the current world economic order capitalism. Discussion 
here emphasised the need to change the degree of 
anthropocentricism evident in approach to nature, moving away 
from total anthropocentricism towards what has been termed 
amiable anthropocentrism. Organisation culture and self should 
reflect this change which is associated with new patterns of language 
and discourse within organisations. A developing eco-self will 
therefore involve new content in the discussion of issues, as well as 
identification with the natural world. It is also associated with 
holistic thinking and a move away from limited, anthropocentric 
views of risk, towards consideration of 'risk for nature', a term 
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which encompasses potential harm to the natural world and re-
defines 'decisive action' to include what is affectively a refusal to act 
in a way that may lead to harm to nature. 
These processes will become more possible with the introduction of 
'new science', a communicable and issues focused variation on 
current practices that has the capacity to educate management as 
well as provide information of direct relevance to specific issues . 
This is already developing, along with ecological economics, which 
provides managers with new, multi-disciplinary, issues focused 
understanding of the economic aspects of environmental issues. 
All these processes necessitate organisation and individual learning, 
and the planning style appropriate for eco-sensitive management is 
therefore one centred on facilitating such learning. Eco-sensitive 
planning, it was argued, can best be handled via a variation on 
scenario planning styles which are already used world-wide. 
The eco-sensitive leaders of these systems will need to operate in 
advance of public eco-centricity and in at least partial contradiction 
to the expansionist profit-seeking assumptions of the world 
economy. Reflecting the arguments already offered, they need to be 
multi-disciplinary, tolerant of a lack of structure in issues, optimistic 
in the sense that they think they can redress damage to the natural 
world, and tolerant of diversity in staff and ideas. As processoral 
leaders they must also be alert for opportunities to enhance and/or 
defend eco-centricity within their organisation (nuance alertness) 
and capable of using a range of strategies to further eco-sensitivity. 
Thus, organisations will be information based and flexible in 
structure, with a network configuration made up of relatively small 
units best suited for handling complex ecological issues. 
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New world views, (including new sources of understanding), new 
planning practices, eco-leadership and new structure are 
systematically related and part of a transition towards eco-sensitivity. 
Given the power of global capitalism this will not happen quickly. It 
will, however, need to happen if the planet is to survive. Business 
organisations are too powerful a force to ignore and they remain a 
cause of massive destruction, but because of this power and because 
of already evident indications of change they are also a necessary 
part of the solution to global ecological harm. The juggernaut of 
exploitation can be turned, but only slowly. 
This has been a multi-disciplinary exercise in theory, providing 
general answers to issues. As such it suggests a range of 
opportunities for further research. The author's research foci (but 
not, given limitations of space, details of the research techniques to 
be used beyond this thesis) include: 
• Assessment of the communicability of existing literature in 
ecological economics. It was argued that commerciability is 
a key to the policy relevance of the new theory and 
ecological economics provides an existing body of literature 
that allows this issue to be investigated. 
• Comparison of significant mining ventures in New 
Guinea. The Ok Tedi mine has been referred to. Nearby, 
Porgara, a less well publicised mining operation, poses 
similar ecological problems, whilst across the PNG boarder 
in Irian Jaya the giant Freeport mine provides further 
comparative material. Issues of interest include the 
definitions of 'risk' used, planning styles, stakeholder 
analysis and change in organisation self. (Work on these 
issues, using a comparative case studies approach has 
already started.) 
• The 'decay curve' for predicting trends in collection of 
environmental data (see chapter five) can be further 
developed using current research trends and political 
debate in Australia, where major political and community 
groups are currently debating a major Government 
research and conservation program. (Work has started on 
this project.) 
322 
Conclusion 
• Techniques for measuring organisation eco-self will be 
developed. 
• The notion of eco-leadership will be tested, using a survey 
questionnaire which investigates the style of the eco-leader. 
• A study will be conducted of the extent of multi-
disciplinary outputs from major OECD universities. This 
will further argument about the growth of multi-
disciplinarity in academia. 
It is clear that much remains to be done. Any future research should 
be informed by the multi-disciplinary, issues focused approach taken 
in the preceding discussion, since this stance remains one key to the 
solution required for the global problems to which these research 
ideas are related. Focused research projects of the type listed gains 
full meaning only if issues are focused and provided context by 
theoretical frameworks such as that provided by this thesis. 
The next decade may well be a decisive one for the global 
environment. This discussion has been one small step towards the 
solutions required. 
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